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First published online July 7, 2016

The Causes of Fraud in the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009: Evidence from the Mortgage-Backed Securities Industry

Abstract

The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 was marked by widespread fraud in the mortgage securitization industry. Most of the largest mortgage originators and mortgage-backed securities issuers and underwriters have been implicated in regulatory settlements, and many have paid multibillion-dollar penalties. This article seeks to explain why this behavior became so pervasive. We evaluate predominant theories of white-collar crime, finding that theories emphasizing deregulation or technical opacity identify only necessary, not sufficient, conditions. Our argument focuses instead on changes in competitive conditions and firms’ positions within and across markets. As the supply of mortgages began to decline around 2003, mortgage originators lowered credit standards and engaged in predatory lending to shore up profits. In turn, vertically integrated mortgage-backed securities issuers and underwriters committed securities fraud to conceal this malfeasance and enhance the value of other financial products. Our results challenge several existing accounts of how widespread the fraud should have been and, given the systemic crimes that occurred, which financial institutions were the most likely to commit fraud. We consider the implications of our results for regulations that were based on some of these models. We also discuss the overlooked importance of illegal behavior for the sociology of markets.

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Biographies

Neil Fligstein is the Class of 1939 Chancellor’s Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of California. He has done work in the fields of economic sociology, organizational theory, and political sociology. His recent books include Euroclash (Oxford University Press 2008) and A Theory of Fields (with Doug McAdam, Oxford University Press 2012). He is currently working on a book about the financial crisis.
Alexander F. Roehrkasse is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology at the University of California. He is interested in political sociology, economic sociology, and the sociology of law. His dissertation concerns the evolution of laws regarding marriage and divorce in the United States.

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Article first published online: July 7, 2016
Issue published: August 2016

Keywords

  1. white-collar crime
  2. finance
  3. organizations
  4. markets

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Neil Fligstein
Alexander F. Roehrkasse
University of California-Berkeley

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Neil Fligstein, Department of Sociology, 410 Barrows Hall, University of California-Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, 94720-1980 E-mail: [email protected]

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