![[PDF]](/pb-assets/Icons/adobe-pdf-icon-1498649896243.png){kind=icon}
Abstract
This article addresses an issue often neglected by the current literature on political corruption: Why do citizens support corrupt governments? The authors argue that people in countries where government institutions are weak and patron-client relationships strong are more likely to support a corrupt leader from whom they expect to receive tangible benefits. Using a cross-national analysis of citizens in 14 countries, the authors find statistical evidence consistent with the hypothesis, which also complements some of the recent works on clientelism and institutional development. This has important implications for scholars and practitioners working on accountability and good governance issues because its shows that as long as corrupt leaders can satisfy their clientelistic networks by manipulating government resources, they are likely to retain political support. This, in turn, questions the assumption that a few administrative reforms can weed out corruption in countries where formal and informal institutions provide opportunities for this phenomenon to thrive.
Keywords
|
Adserá, A. , Boix, C. , & Payne, M. (2003). Are you being served? Political accountability and quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization , 19, 445-490. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Ames, B. (1995). Electoral strategy under open-list proportional representation. American Journal of Political Science, 39, 406-433. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Anderson, C. , & Tverdova, Y. (2003). Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes toward government in contemporary democracies. American Political Science Review, 47(1), 91-109. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Beck, A. , & Lee, R. (2002). Attitudes to corruption amongst Russian police officers and trainees. Crime, Law and Social Change, 38, 357-372. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Bratton, M. , & van de Walle, N. (1994, July). Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa. World Politics , 46, 453-489. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Brom, L. (2004, October). Avances para un catálogo lego de situationcies corruptas. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Las Vegas, Nevada . Google Scholar | |
|
Brusco, V. , Nazareno, M. , & Stokes, S.C. (2004). Vote buying in Argentina. Latin American Research Review, 39(2), 66-88. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Burgess, R. , & Besley, T. (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics , 117, 1415-1451. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Cain, B. , Ferejohn, J. , & Fiorina, M. (1987). The personal vote: Constituency service and electoral independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Calvo, E. , & Murillo, M.V. (2004). Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market. American Journal of Political Science, 48, 742-757. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Carey, J. , & Shugart, M. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering or electoral formulas. Electoral Studies, 14, 417-439. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Clapham, C. (1982). Clientelism and the state. In C. Clapham (Ed.), Private patronage and public power (pp. 1-35). London: Frances Pinter . Google Scholar | |
|
Dhillon, A. , & Wantchekon, L. (2003). Policy commitment through intermediaries: A theory of electoral clientelism. Unpublished manuscript, New York University. Google Scholar | |
|
Easterly, W. , & Levine, R. (1997). Africa's growth tragedy: Politics and ethnic divisions . Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1203-1250. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Eisenstadt, S. N. , & Lemarchand, R. (Eds.). (1981). Political clientelism, patronage and development. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Google Scholar | |
|
Elliott, K. (Ed.). (1997). Corruption and the global economy: Introduction. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Google Scholar | |
|
Estévez, F. , Magaloni, B. , & Diaz-Cayeros, A. (2002, May). A portfolio diversification model of policy choice. Paper presented at the Clientelism in Latin America: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives conference , Stanford University. Google Scholar | |
|
Fox, J. ( 1994). The difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship: Lessons from Mexico. World Politics, 46(2), 151-184. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Goldsmith, A. (1999). Slapping the grabbing hand: Correlates of political corruption in emerging markets. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 58, 865-883. Google Scholar | |
|
Heidenheimer, A. (Ed.). (1970). Political corruption: Readings in comparative analysis. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Google Scholar | |
|
Huntington, S. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Google Scholar | |
|
Inglehart, R. , Bashkirova, E. , Basanez, M. , Chiu, H.-Y. , Diez-Nicolas, J. , Esmer, Y. , et al. (2000). World values surveys and European values surveys, 1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997, ICPSR version [Computer file] . Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research. Google Scholar | |
|
Kaufmann, D. (1997). Corruption, the facts. Foreign Policy, 107, 11-31. Google Scholar | |
|
Kaufmann, D. , Kraay, A. , & Mastruzzi, M. (2003). Governance matters III: Governance indicators for 1996-2003 (Working Paper 3106). Washington, DC: World Bank. Google Scholar | |
|
Kaufmann, D. , Kraay, A. , & Zoido-Labaton, P. (1999). Governance matters (Working Paper 2196) Washington, DC: World Bank. Google Scholar | |
|
Kaufmann, D. , & Wei, S.J. (1999). Does “grease money” speed up the wheels of commerce? (Working Paper 7093). Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Keefer, P. (2005). Democratization & credibility: Why are young democracies badly governed? (Working Paper 3594) Washington, DC: World Bank. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
King, G. , Tomz, M. , & Wittenberg, J. (2000). Making the most of statistical analyses: Improving interpretation and presentation. American Journal of Political Science, 44, 347-361. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Kitschelt, H. (2000). Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities. Comparative Political Studies, 33, 845-879. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | ISI | |
|
Kitschelt, H. , Mansfeldova, Z. , & Markowski, R. (1999). Post-communist party systems competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Knack, S. , & Keefer, P. (1995). Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures. Economics and Politics, 7, 207-227. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Leff, N. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption . American Behavioral Scientist, 8(3), 8-14. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | |
|
Leftwich, A. (1995). Bringing politics back in: Towards a model of the developmental state. Journal of Development Studies, 31, 400-435. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Lemarchand, R. (1972). Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical Africa: Competing solidarities in nation-building. American Political Science Review, 66(1), 68-90. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Lizzeri, A. , & Persico, N. (2001). The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives. American Economic Review, 91(1), 225-239. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Luttmer, E. (2001). Group loyalty and taste for redistribution. Journal of Political Economy, 109, 500-528. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Malesky, E. (2001, March). Enduring clientelism in Vietnam. Paper presented at the Citizen-Politician Linkages in Democratic Politics conference, Duke University. Google Scholar | |
|
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 681-712. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Medina, L. , & Stokes, S. (2002). Clientelism as political monopoly. Chicago: University of Chicago. Google Scholar | |
|
Mishler, W. , & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comparative Political Studies, 34(1), 30-62. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | ISI | |
|
Mitchell, P. (2000). Voters and their representatives: Electoral institutions and delegation in parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 38, 335-351. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Montinola, G. , & Jackman, R. (2002). Sources of corruption: A cross-country study. British Journal of Political Science, 40, 570-602. Google Scholar | |
|
Morris, S. (1991). Corruption and politics in contemporary Mexico . Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Google Scholar | |
|
Norton, E.C. , Wang, H. , & Ai, C. (2004). Computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit models. Stata Journal, 4(2), 103-116. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | |
|
Nye, J. ( 1967). Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis. American Political Science Review, 61, 417-427. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Persson, T. , Tabellini, G. , & Trebbi, F. (2003). Electoral rules and corruption. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 958-989. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Roniger, L. , & Gunes-Ayata, A. (1994). Democracy, clientelism, and civil society. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. Google Scholar | |
|
Rose, R. , Mishler, W. , & Haerpfer, C. (1998). Democracy and its alternatives: Understanding post-communist societies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Google Scholar | |
|
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Samuels, D. (1999). Incentives to cultivate a party vote in candidate-centric electoral systems: Evidence from Brazil. Comparative Political Studies, 32, 487-518. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | |
|
Schmidt, S. W. , Guasti, L. , Land, C. , & Scott, J. C. (Eds.). (1997). Friends, followers and factions: A reader in political clientelism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Google Scholar | |
|
Schulte Nordholt, N.G. (2000). Corruption and legitimacy in Indonesia: An exploration . In H. E. Bakker & N. G. Schulte Nordholt (Eds.), Corruption and legitimacy (pp. 65-95). Amsterdam: SISWO Publications. Google Scholar | |
|
Scott, J.C. (1972). Patron-client politics and political change in southeast Asia. American Political Science Review, 66(1), 91-113. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Seligson, M. (2002). The impact of corruption on regime legitimacy: A comparative study of four Latin American countries. Journal of Politics, 64, 408-433. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Shefter, M. (1977). Party and patronage: Germany, England, and Italy . Politics and Society, 7, 403-452. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | |
|
Shleifer, A. , & Vishny, R. (2002). The grabbing hand: Government pathologies and their cures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Google Scholar | |
|
Stokes, S. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review, 99, 315-326. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Theobald, R. (1982). Patrimonialism. World Politics , 34, 549-558. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Tomz, M. , Wittenberg, J. , & King, G. (2003). CLARIFY: Software for interpreting and presenting statistical results (Version 2.1). Stanford University, University of Wisconsin, and Harvard University. Retrieved February 17, 2004, from http://gking.harvard.edu/ Google Scholar | |
|
Tulchin, J. , & Espach, R. (Eds.). (2000). Combating corruption: Anti-corruption policies in Latin America. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Google Scholar | |
|
Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior: A field experiment in Benin. World Politics, 55, 399-422. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Waterbury, J. (1976). Corruption, political stability, and development: Comparative evidence from Egypt and Morocco. Government and Opposition, 11, 426-445. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Wertheim, W.F. (1970). Sociological aspects of corruption in Southeast Asia. In A. Heidenheimer (Ed.), Political corruption: Readings in comparative analysis (pp. 195-211). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Google Scholar |
