Securities Regulation: Opportunities Exist for IIROC to Regulate Responsively
Abstract
This article examines the applicability of responsive regulation within an inter-agency framework in the financial sector. To do so, the article uses the self-regulatory organization that is responsible for governing Canada’s investment dealers and brokerage firms—the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC)—as a prototype example to illustrate how responsive regulation may be encouraged within an inter-agency framework. While the theory aspires to general applicability, particular consideration is given to its ability to govern multiple agencies. In particular, the article pays attention to jurisdictional boundaries to ensure that inter-agency relationships have some legitimacy in market regulation.
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Biographies
Mark E. Lokanan is a senior lecturer in Accounting and Financial Management in Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University. His academic interest is a cross-fertilization between financial crime, forensic accounting, and commercial law. His areas of expertise are in fraud examination, investment fraud, financial market regulation, fraudulent financial statements, Benford law for fraud detection, and forensic and investigative interviewing. He has published in the Journal of Financial Crime, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, and Contemporary Justice Review.
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Article first published online: April 29, 2015
Issue published: March 2018
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