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Abstract
This article analyses the stakeholder model of boards that is widely used in public and third sector institutions in England and Wales. The central tenet of this model is that such institutions should be strategically led by individuals who are representative of and from the groups that have an interest in them. The article focuses in particular on the operation of the stakeholder model of governing bodies of schools in England and Wales where a range of stakeholders including teachers, parents and the community are represented. The issues that arise from this stakeholder model of governing are analysed and the alternatives to it are considered. A significant alternative is the skills-based model, where boards are constituted on the basis of their expertise and not their interest in the institution. This skills-based model is becoming more prominent in the way governing bodies of academy schools in England are constituted and this is certainly the direction of travel outlined in the 2015 regulations. The article reviews the stakeholder model for the governance of schools at a time when there is much interest in the skills-based approach. The wider implications of shifting from a stakeholder to a skills-based model of public board membership are considered.
Introduction
The board model for the governing of public, private and third sector institutions is widely prevalent across the UK. This model separates the governing of institutions from those responsible for their day-to-day operation. The board, which typically comprises individuals from various backgrounds and with a range of different kinds of expertise, is primarily responsible for the overall conduct of the institution in the medium and long term. The person with responsibility for the proper function of the institution on a day-to-day basis, who is typically referred to as the chief executive officer (CEO), is normally a member of the board. Given the significance of the board’s responsibility, board functioning as a focus of research remains somewhat neglected and in particular, the functioning of boards of public sector institutions, the constitution of public sector boards and the expertise of board members have not received sufficient attention by researchers. This lack of attention in part underpins our interest and motivation to explore issues around the constitution of public sector boards. This article focuses on schools and many of the issues regarding the stakeholder versus skills model will be widely applicable in other public service contexts.
There are two contrasting perspectives on the constitution of the boards of public sector institutions: the stakeholder model and the skills-based model. The underpinning assumption of the stakeholder model is that public sector institutions should be governed by those who have an interest in them. In contrast, the skills-based model of board constitution is based on the notion that such institutions are best governed by those who have the requisite skills with an expectation that these will be a useful asset in the day-to-day management of the institution. Over 40 years ago, school governing bodies in England and Wales were re-constituted on the stakeholder model. Thus although Foo et al. (2011) argue that the notion of stakeholding was introduced to the UK public realm by the New Labour government in the late 1990s/mid-2000s, the constitution of school governing bodies demonstrates that the concept has a longer history.
The stakeholder model of school governing body constitution in England and Wales is currently being challenged especially so in England. In England, new regulations for the constitution of school governing bodies have recently been published (DfE, 2015). While giving governing bodies greater flexibility in relation their constitution, the new regulations emphasize the importance of the skills governors should have and also give a strong steer towards smaller governing bodies. In Wales, where academies have not been introduced, the stakeholder model of governance continues to operate. As education and school governance are both devolved to the National Assembly for Wales, there has not been the same attempt to force schools in Wales to adopt a skills based system.
Stakeholding and stakeholders as concepts have been the subject of theoretical and empirical analysis for some time. Gomes et al. (2010) argue that stakeholder theory can be described as descriptive/empirical, instrumental and also normative. In our analysis here, we are interested in utilizing empirical work to examine the instrumental and normative claims for the stakeholder model adopted for school governing in England and Wales. At the heart of our interest is a concern for securing the proper governance of schools as important public sector institutions.
Debates about governance reflect tensions around two dimensions of legitimacy and accountability. Haikio (2012: 417) argues:
In a governance context, all participants face novel issues of legitimacy. Common distinctions between input legitimacy … and output legitimacy … frame legitimacy as an issue for government. In a governance structure, legitimacy is required not only of the governing system but also of participants.
Haikio (2012) is drawing attention here to tensions around the rationale for determining the membership of governing bodies. In essence, in the context of schools as institutions, should a school governing body comprise solely those who have a stake in the school, or should individuals who have a set of the requisite skills? Which approach provides the most effective model of governance?
This article examines the interests and participation of stakeholders in the governing of schools and their role in ensuring appropriate levels of performance and accountability within schools. It seeks to reflect critically on the nature of the stakeholder model of public boards and particularly in relation to school governing bodies. By comparing policy and practice in England and Wales we attempt to deepen the analysis. We begin the article by setting out the key arguments underpinning the stakeholder model when it was originally advanced. In the subsequent part, we analyse the position of each of the stakeholder groups and review a range of evidence on the roles and participation of these stakeholders in governing. In the final part of the article, we draw conclusions on the appropriateness of the stakeholder model of governing for schools and, given the shift in England to the skills based approach, the alternatives.
Stakeholder Theory and the Notion of Stakeholders
The concept of stakeholder governance has its origins in the idea that there are ‘Groups of people without whose support the organization would cease to exist’ (Lozano, 2005: 60). Thus Freeman and Reed (1983: 30) refer to stakeholders as ‘those groups who are vital to the survival and success of the corporation’ and Freeman (1984: 46) defines a stakeholder is ‘any individual or group who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives’. Bryson’s (2004: 22) conceptualizes stakeholder broadly similarly: ‘the term refers to persons, groups or organizations that must somehow be taken into account by leaders, managers and front-line staff’. These definitions and conceptualizations are compatible with approaches to democracy and social justice, in which the interests of those who experience services and/or who are the recipients of goods and services must be acknowledged, given weight and allowed to influence. Hence as Freeman (1984: 39) argues:
stakeholder groups have a right not to be treated as a means to some end, and that therefore must participate in determining the future direction of the firm in which they have a stake.
Implicit within the acceptance of a stakeholder perspective is that stakeholders can be identified and engaged with, and their interests/stakes identified, prioritized and responded to appropriately, all of which may be problematic. For example, Lozano (2005) argues that having a stake in an organization does not in itself suggest anything about the nature of the interest or, importantly, the extent of ‘power’ associated with it. Similarly, Donaldson and Preston (1995) point out that the priority of interests of one set of stakeholders over those of another set may not be immediately self-evident. Further, the rank order of the benefits different stakeholder groups receive may not be easily discerned. Thus, Fassin (2009) talks of the ambiguity and vagueness of the stakeholder concept, which may make it harder for organizations to engage with it. Gomes et al. (2010) offer a model that categorizes different stakeholders thus enabling the identification of stakeholder groups and to some extent, their interests. The model distinguishes controllers, regulators, collaborators, agenda setters and those who have legitimate interests. Even if the various stakeholder groups can be identified and their interests/stakes characterized, the diversity of their interests and the power associated with them may give rise to significant conflicts. As Freeman (1984: 41), points out: ‘conflicting stakes require methods of resolution’.
School Governing and the Stakeholder Model
The stakeholder approach to school governing in England and Wales originated with the Taylor Report (1977) and the subsequent Education Act 1980 and Education No. 2 Act 1986. The genesis of the report was rooted in both the diversity of school governing arrangements in England and Wales and concerns about the performance of certain school governing bodies.
The legislation under which school governing operated at the time of the Taylor Report (1977), the Education Act 1944, had been was relatively loosely framed to enable and allow for variety. Indeed ‘the Act did not stipulate what interests should be represented on managing and governing bodies’ (Taylor Report, 1977: 21). Local education authorities (LEAs) had considerable power to determine the membership of governing bodies of schools within their remit and governing bodies had the some lesser appointing powers (Taylor Report, 1977). As a consequence, the size and constitution of governing bodies varied widely. In some local authority areas, headteachers chose to be members. In others, parents were represented and there were pupils on governing bodies in some local authorities. The Taylor Report was critical of this diversity, and also the lack of action by LEAs to widen the range of representation, stating that: and ‘governing bodies very commonly continue to have a majority of LEA elected members or at least of LEA nominees’ (Taylor Report, 1977: 22).
The Taylor Report (1977) argued for a consistent approach to school governing across England and Wales and that the interests of the teaching staff, parents and others such as past pupils needed to be reflected in the constitution of school governing bodies. It argued governing body membership should comprise the four principal stakeholder groups represented equally: the LEA, staff, parents and the local community. These four groups could, ‘contribute towards the establishment of a partnership based on their common interest in the welfare of the school’ and would ‘be able to speak with knowledge and experience over the whole range of matters which are likely to come up for discussion’ (Taylor Report, 1977: 22). The report made recommendations on the size of governing bodies based on pupil enrolment and proposed standardized appointment and election processes.
In many ways, the Taylor Report (1977) was very far-sighted and radical in its vision for school governing and its proposals. It explains very clearly the basis for school governing in England and Wales. Thus the report’s rationale for retaining LEA interests originates from their experience of council business, together with their knowledge of the opinions and aspirations of local communities. Further although it proposed reducing the number of LEA governors, the report deemed LEA participation in school governing as central to the success of schools. The report rejected arguments advanced by the National Association of Headteachers at the time that headteachers should not be governing body members and their presence should be advisory. It claimed: ‘that so far as possible, those with a direct interest in the running of the school should participate fully’ in the governing of the school – in the deliberations and in its decisions. In line with that principle, the report also argued that both teaching and support staff should be represented and that the representatives of the two groups should be chosen in separate elections. Similarly, the report recommended that parent governors should be elected by parents. The idea of pupil governors was rejected on the grounds that school governors cannot lawfully be under the age of 18 years. However, it did recommend a change in the law to enable students over the age of 16 years to become governors.
In addition to LEA, staff and parent representation, the Taylor Report also proposed representation of the school’s wider community school governing bodies. Such representatives should:
take due account of all the expectations of the local community and of all the various external pressures and demands made on the school (such as those of employers, examining bodies or institutions of further and higher education) in school governance’. (Taylor Report, 1977: 30)
Individuals representing the wider community, for example, major employers, would be coopted by the other three stakeholder groups.
Implementing Taylor and After
The proposals for the constitution of school governing bodies set out in the Taylor Report (1977) were enacted by legislation passed in the 1980s. Although a number of LEAs had experimented with teacher participation on governing bodies during the 1970s (New, 1993), the 1980 Act formally enabled them and parents of pupils to be school governing body members. The Education Act No. 2 1986 reduced the number of teacher members and local authority members and it increased the numbers of parent governors and governors from the school’s wider community. In both England and Wales, the Education Reform Act 1988 accorded governing bodies significant powers and responsibilities in the management of schools. In 1999, education was deemed a devolved service in Wales and consequently, school governing in England and Wales now operate under different frameworks.
The number and categories of governors vary and are specified separately in regulations in Wales (Welsh Government, 2010) and in England (DfE, 2015) with separate guidance available for governing bodies who wish to change the way they are constituted (DfE, 2014a). In Wales, the numbers of governing body members in the various categories are specified in considerable detail in the regulations (Welsh Government, 2010). They vary according to: the type of school, for example, whether it has a religious foundation or is a community school; the phase, for example, infant or secondary and the size of the school.
In England, the regulations on school governing body constitution have changed significantly in recent years. A major driver of the change has been the development academy schools, which are directly accountable to central government. At the time of the 2010 election, there were 203 academies in England, which were all secondary schools. In October 2014 there were over 4200 academies (DfE 2014b) a large proportion of which are secondary schools.
The new governance regulations for maintained schools in England (DfE, 2015) specify that school governing bodies should have no fewer than seven members and comprise: at least two parent governors; the headteacher unless the headteacher resigns the office of governor, one staff governor; one local authority governor and two coopted members. In the case of foundation schools, the governing body must also include at least two (but no more than one-quarter of the total) partnership governors. This reconstitution to smaller governing bodies reduces the potential for stakeholder involvement in school governing.
Academy school governing bodies have much greater freedom in their membership. The academy governance model is flexible and it allows schools to constitute a governing body on the basis of their school needs (http://apps.nationalcollege.org.uk/resources/modules/academies/academies-online-resource/ac-s4/ac-s4-t4.html). This allows academy schools to move away from the stakeholder model, which schools in Wales are not permitted to do. Academization therefore has the potential to threaten the model originally proposed in the Taylor Report. The new regulations for England are very directly focused on ensuring that governing bodies are ‘constituted with governors who have the relevant skills to contribute to effective governance, encouraging ineffective governors to stand down and be replaced by new strong governors’ (Nash, 2014).
Realities of the Stakeholder Model
This section explores the operation of the stakeholder model of governance in practice drawing together a range of evidence about the participation of key stakeholders. We review the positions of the various stakeholder groups and issues relating their roles and we also analyse the stakeholder approach to governance itself.
Staff Members: Headteachers
Headteachers in both England and Wales can decide to be a member of their school’s governing body and in almost all cases they do (Balarin et al., 2008; James et al., 2011). Their membership raises two issues, the first of which is their level of influence. There is much evidence that headteachers are highly influential members of governing bodies. Munn (2000: 95) argues that:
school boards and governing bodies have found it difficult, at least in the short term, collectively to have a real influence on decision-making in their schools on a range of routine matters. Much power and authority remains with the headteacher.
The influence of the headteacher has also been confirmed by subsequent studies (Farrell, 2005; James et al., 2010) and in many ways it would be surprising if that was not the case. As with corporate boards, evidence indicates that the information asymmetries bias decision making in favour of management (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). However, the governing body responsibility is not just to make decisions but also to challenge and to scrutinize (Ofsted, 2011; DfE, 2014c) and here other board members, especially the chair, may well play an important role (James et al., 2012). A second and related issue with regard to headteacher membership is the expectation that the governing body will challenge the headteacher and hold the headteacher to account (Ofsted, 2011; DfE, 2014c) when the headteacher is him/herself a member (Balarin et al., 2008; James, et al., 2010).
Staff Members
The participation of staff members in governing matters is constrained by regulation and statute (DfE, 2014c). Thus staff members are not permitted to become members of statutory sub-committees including staff disciplinary and dismissal (and appeals) panels, pupil disciplinary and exclusion panels and admissions committees. This constrained role raises questions as to their legitimacy and creates the possibly that they may regard themselves as ‘second-class’ members (Earley and Creese, 2001). They are able, however, to join other committees and can provide information relating to ‘local knowledge’ at meetings (James, et al. 2010), which arguably elevates their standing as governors.
James et al. (2010) report that staff governors make a mixed contribution to the work of school governing bodies. Staff governors can provide useful knowledge and insights in meetings, although in some instances they have a very passive role and make only a very limited contribution. Staff members have a responsibility as part of the collective governing body to call the headteacher, who is their senior/line manager, to account. This responsibility and relationship can present staff governors with some difficulties. For example, they may feel reluctant to communicate to the governing body matters of concern about the conduct of the school, for example, those issues that relate to the headteacher’s leadership and management. Similarly, they may not wish to publicly disagree with the headteacher – their ‘chief executive’ – or raise particular issues. James et al. (2010) report instances where staff governors adopt a role of supporting the headteacher in governing body meetings. Such staff governors may have become governors following the headteacher’s prompting and/or advocacy and appear to see their governor role as consolidating their position in the school and/or aiding their career. Hence, they may not wish to engage in conflict with the headteacher in this public forum.
On occasions, staff members are elected as governors with the support of a trade union and may see their role as advancing union interests. New (1993) provides examples of disputes between trade unions and governing bodies. She includes cases of strong public disagreement within governing bodies between school staff (particularly teaching staff) and other governors, though these examples occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. New (1993) outlines five modes for teacher governor functioning in governing bodies: ‘good sense’; ‘professional information giving’; ‘presenting personal opinions’; ‘representing staff views’; and ‘raising issues at staff request’. Her research findings suggest that of all the governors, teacher governors were the least vocal members.
In summary, available evidence indicates that members of staff become governors for a range of reasons (New, 1993; James et al., 2010). It also suggests that participation of members of staff on school governing bodies can be problematic, including the difficulty they experience in participating in challenging and calling the headteacher to account in this public forum.
Parent Governors
Parent governors are elected on to governing bodies by parents of pupils attending the school. Ensuring that there are sufficient parents coming forward for election can be problematic in some school settings. In general, the more disadvantaged the community, the harder it is to find willing parents, a trend heightened where the community comprises a number of minority ethnic groups and where English is not the first language (James et al., 2010, 2014). As James et al. (2011: 414) have identified, these areas have a low level of governance capital – ‘the network of individuals and their capabilities, relationships and motivations that are available for the governing of a school is lower’. However, such a relationship between the level of governance capital and governor recruitment is not a deterministic one. Governance capital interacts with governance agency, which is ‘the capacity of those involved in the governing of a school to act’; in this case to encourage parents to come forward for election (James et al., 2011: 414).
In disadvantaged or multi-ethnic settings, even when parents are willing to offer themselves for election, there is a tendency for some parents to make limited contributions, something not helped by the technical and professional language of the educational world (Farrell and Jones, 2000; James et al., 2010). Parent governors in general complain about what they see as the unnecessary complexity of professional world. Evidence indicates that some parents join governing bodies for a limited set of reasons, for example, to bring about a specific change within the school or to promote their own child’s/children’s interests (James et al., 2010). In the former instances, the parent may continue to pursue their ‘single issue’ or alternatively (and in many instances) develop as governors and come to understand the full breadth and scope of their responsibility.
There is also evidence in the field that parent governors are a very valuable part of any governing body. Some parents who may come into school with an initial focus of their child’s/children’s interests can develop into governors with a full understanding of their responsibility and role (James et al., 2010). In addition, as highlighted by Wilkins (2010), parents have been part of governing bodies for a number of years and their participation promotes a citizenship approach to governance.
Very little is known about how parent governors maintain contact with other parents because although parent governors are elected by parents, there is no formal mechanism of accountability to them (Farrell and Law, 1999). Some evidence indicates that parental interaction is greater among parents of primary school aged children in comparison with their secondary school counterparts, if only because they are more likely to interact with other parents ‘at the school gate’ (James et al., 2010). It would be interesting to observe the impact (if any) of electronic media on potential interactions but no evidence exists as yet.
Local Authority Members
Local authority governors are appointed by the local authority. The local authority, though more influential in past times, still plays an important role in school governance, providing a range of resources such as training and advice to schools. Ideally, local authority governors can be a channel of communication between the school and local authority. In England, evidence clearly indicates a widespread trend of power increasingly shifting upwards to central government and downwards to bodies such as school governing bodies and away from local government (see, for example, Connolly and James, 2011). This trend is evidenced less clearly in Wales. Hence, there is a measure of differentiation between Wales and England over the significance of local authorities, with Welsh local authorities retaining more influence, although this matter is increasingly subject to debate). Thus in Wales, the proportion of governors designated at local authority governors required for school governing bodies is higher than in England. James et al. (2010) report that the role of the local authority governor is under-developed and no special use is made of the designation by the local authorities.
Local councillors may become school governors and typically take the ‘local authority’ designation. James et al. (2010) report that councillors make a mixed contribution with some contributing significantly to their school governing bodies, providing valuable ‘inside knowledge’ on local policy matters, and in some cases taking on the role of chair. Others, however, do not attend meetings sufficiently regularly and their interests may be divided between acting in the interests of the school and the local authority, where conflicts may occur. Thus they may have divided loyalties, particularly when they come to the school governing bodies with a clear ‘political agenda’. The potential for local councillors to have only a token interest in the school was one of the reasons the Taylor Report (1976) recommended widening the membership of governing bodies.
Local authority governors have traditionally been councillors but clearly, they can also be officers or other members of the community. Having a role in local schools through their governing bodies provided a forum for councillors to be visible and also provided opportunities for them to participate in decision making at the school as well as the county level. Officers can also be members of governing bodies but their participation is dependent on vacancies existing after councillors have been offered the positions. This is also the case with regard to others in the community having local authority governor positions. Very little is known about the extent to which there are differences between the contribution of different local authority governors.
Foundation and Partnership Governors
Foundation and partnership governors are appointed where schools are religious in character and have a specific brief to ensure that this interest is maintained. Their stake is explicitly associated with the body to which they are associated. Their connection with the local church, for example, can provide a useful source of recruits to the governing body (James et al., 2010). There is evidence that the other commitments of local clergy can impede their full involvement in the governing body (James et al. 2010). Nonetheless, many local clergy play a significant influence, especially where there is a religious aspect to the matter under consideration.
Community and Coopted members
Governing bodies can appoint members of the community to their membership. In Wales, such members are referred to as community governors, a term which is still in use in England although there is a shift to the use of the term ‘coopted governors’. In some cases, local authorities advertise for governors and hold formal selection processes.
Many governing bodies use the power to coopt members of the wider community in order to strengthen the range and depth of expertise on the governing body (James et al., 2010). Schools use this category to engage individuals from groups/institutions that may not be formally identified as stakeholders. They seek to secure representation from major employers locally, businesses, universities and/or further education colleges. This practice is seen as broadening the skills and interests of school governing bodies. As members of the local community, arguably community and coopted governors are likely to have a strong interest – a stake – in the school. However, this interest may be tenuous especially if they have been coopted because of the skills and expertise they bring. Here, we see the origins of the stakeholder–skills tension and debate (Balarin et al., 2008) and this aspect is considered below.
Sponsor Governors
In Wales, governing bodies may appoint individuals who give or have given assistance to the school, perhaps of a financial nature. These individuals clearly have a stake in the school and arguably they are more akin to stockholders than stakeholders. They will have a desire to protect their own financial stake. The nature of their stake is clearly different from that of staff governors or parent governors.
An Evaluation of the Stakeholder Model
In the previous section, we have focused on the individual stakeholders and discussed their involvement and participation in governing bodies. In reviewing the stakeholder model, the major issue is the extent to which schools are governed effectively by the range of stakeholder interests in the school. In other words, does the stakeholder model of governance ensure that schools continually reflect on and improve their performance? If it does not, then what are the alternatives to this and would they be more likely to develop and promote improvement?
The literature on school performance is extensive (Harris and Jones, 2010; Sammons et al. 2011) with a number of factors identified as important in success but there is little evidence on the approach to governance. The stakeholder model is not reviewed per se but it is the case that in many schools, there has certainly been a shift to incorporating particular skills sets in new governor selections. The promotion of the skills based model of governance has been influenced by the increased pressure on schools to be effective. There is a divergence here between the existing practice in Wales and the regulations that are being introduced in England. These regulations will be introduced as amendments to the 2012 Constitution Regulations and will take effect from 1 September 2015. These indicate that when recruiting governors, governing bodies need to ‘focus on finding people with the necessary skills’. Further, it suggests that governing bodies conduct a review of their ‘effectiveness, membership and structure and make changes to ensure it is not just fit for purpose, but that it is dynamic and highly professional in its approach’ (Nash, 2014). Clearly, governing bodies can be constituted on the basis of the stakeholder model and at the same time, have the requisite skills among their membership. However, the new focus and drive on performance and improving standards has put pressure on the traditional stakeholder model, particularly for schools in England.
As an alternative to the stakeholder approach, the skills model is more closely focused on board members being appointed for their individual skills, usually rooted in professional experience and qualifications. There is an expectation that the board will use their skills to more effectively challenge school management to improve the organization. In governor appointments, this would mean reviewing the existing skill set and to recruit governors where there are gaps in this. Currently, both community and coopted members are appointed and governors might invite individuals to join on the basis of their ‘skills or expertise’ rather than their ‘stake’.
The National Governor Association in England encourages all governing bodies to undertake a skills audit when a vacancy arises and use this to find a new member (http://www.nga.org.uk). Clearly, this is intended to focus on the acquisition of skills both within individual governors and also across the governing body as a whole. One of the key findings of Taylor and O’Sullivan’s (2009: 690) research is that boards ‘should move away from a traditional representative structure in favour of a more focused, corporate style board’. The message given to sports boards was that a more corporate style of board in which individuals are recruited for their skills rather than representation was what was required in order to improve performance. In contrast to this view, there is limited evidence to suggest that the highest performing public organizations are those with the most corporate style of board and one might point to failures in the UK private sector, including the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds bank for support of this. In essence, effective organizations are associated with a range of governance approaches.
Rather than being seen at opposite ends of the spectrum, the skills and the stakeholder models can combine to create governing bodies which are made up of a range of members. This flexible interpretation of the existing stakeholder model may suggest that there is no need for reform. Governing bodies can be made up of members with their stakeholder interests and who also fill a gap in relation to what they can contribute. It is this model, labelled a ‘stakeholder+’ approach, which was proposed in the Welsh Government’s review of school governance (Wales Government, 2014). In this, governors would represent the traditional stakeholder groups and when vacancies arise, would actively seek stakeholder members who are also skilled. A range of different approaches to this have being adopted in different parts of the public sector. Taylor and O’Sullivan’s (2009) research is concerned with the structure of UK sports governing boards. Their review of governance structures suggests that instead of sports boards always being made up of membership of the key stakeholder groups, individuals should also be included who have ‘specific business expertise as well as a greater element of non-executive monitoring’ (Taylor and O’Sullivan, 2009: 681). The authors argue that national governing bodies ‘should move away from a traditional representative structure in favour of a more focused, corporate style board’ (Taylor and O’Sullivan, 2009: 690).
One of the main debates around the stakeholder model is whether the model enables the constitution of governing bodies which collectively have the full range and depth of capabilities required to govern the school effectively. Here, the argument is that the skills based model would ensure better and more secure governance. However, this model would call into question whether such governors would be motivated to undertake the considerable workload entailed in school governing (Balarin et al., 2008) without remuneration when they have no substantial interest in the school. The existence of a range of ‘independent’ governors, viewed as essential by increasing numbers of private sector bodies, has much to commend it and remains a strength of the existing arrangements.
Clearly, from the way school governing bodies are constituted, a range of stakeholders are engaged in the governing of schools in England and Wales. In reality, there will be ‘power differences’ between the various stakeholders ‘round the table’. The literature suggests that the headteacher can be the dominant figure in determining the school’s direction and vision and some governing bodies can play a comparatively minor role – see for example Ranson et al. (2005) and James et al. (2011). This suggests that some bodies, constructed on the stakeholder model, may struggle to fulfil their responsibilities. This includes being able to ‘call the headteacher’ to account, for example. However, there is evidence to suggest that such a conclusion does not apply in all cases and underplays the role of governing bodies and the reality of school management and governance.
James et al.’s (2010) research also highlights that for the most part, school governing bodies can operate without much public attention, sometimes they can be very dynamic and susceptible to periods of change, amounting in some instances to turmoil. Here, the normal pattern of behaviour has been disrupted by an event, for example, a critical inspection report or a governor with a determined vision for the school that may be at odds with headteacher’s or other governors’, for example, which disrupts the ‘normal’ processes. These ‘events’ will typically reflect the concerns of stakeholders. There is evidence of the ability of governing bodies to manage such periods, and in so doing demonstrating considerable resilience, which indicates that there is huge value in the stakeholder model.
The renewed emphasis from inspection agencies on school governance and their ‘leadership and management’ of schools may well increase the contribution of the range of stakeholders in governance as their role as governors is subject to increasing scrutiny (Ranson, 2011). Recent Ofsted school inspections have involved greater involvement from governing bodies (http://www.gov.uk/being-inspected-as-a-maintained-school-or-academy). This enhanced scrutiny is facilitated by the publication of inspection reports and the interest of local and sometimes national media in these. Details of a school’s governing body members are typically available on the school’s website together and governors in the future may find themselves increasingly held to account.
Stakeholder membership of governing bodies does not exclude of course other vehicles for parents and staff in particular to make their views known. Thus as Munn (1998) pointed out, exit as well as voice can play an important role in parents ensuring that their views of the school can find expression. Indeed, those who might challenge the stakeholder model and who prefer a skills-based managerial model, may argue for such an approach with ‘advisory groups’ to influence a skills-based governing body. Such an arrangement is very different from the stakeholder model in which governors who are representative of those with a substantive stake in the school are responsible for its conduct. Further, whether members of the community as one example of a stakeholder group would be motivated to actively engage in an advisory role of that kind is debateable.
Perhaps understandably, there is no strong demand from within the education profession to shift away from the stakeholder to a skills-based governing body model. Arguably, a skills-based approach would shift school governing towards a more corporate business model and significantly away from the stakeholder model upon which the current system is based. Such an arrangement may well be ‘less comfortable’ for staff and headteachers. The abolition of school governing bodies altogether in which schools and headteachers were accountable directly to a ‘local authority’ or to central government would represent an even bigger challenge for many in education. The announcement by the Minister for Education in Wales in November 2012 about the need to secure educational improvements in schools perhaps reflects a changing relationship between the central government and schools and also their school governing bodies in Wales (Andrews, 2012). The setting up of the review group in the 2012–2013 year to review school governance was also focused on improving governance. The report finds that:
The existing school governance system in Wales has been in operation for some time. There are important aspects of this system that could be reformed so that the governance of schools better facilitates and promotes the improvement agenda. Governing bodies need to be more skilled in their governance role and also they need to be able to recruit more widely so that the very best individuals participate in governing schools. (Welsh Government, 2013: 3)
As indicated above, one of the suggestions outlined in this review group’s report includes adapting the existing stakeholder model of governance to a ‘stakeholder plus’ one in which when recruiting new members, governors are mindful of the skill mix sought. The regulations in England go much further than this in their focus on recruiting governors with specific skills rather than their stakeholder interests.
Any defence of the stakeholder approach of school governance is of course not arguing that the model cannot be improved. Whether changing the constitution of the governing body would lead to an improvement is open to debate. Balarin et al. (2008) and James et al. (2010) argue that the largely hidden nature and low profile of school governing generally and the lack of recognition of the contribution of school governors generally does not help to engage those with the right kind of capabilities from the various stakeholder groups to participate in school governing.
Conclusion
In this article we have reviewed the stakeholder model of school governance in England and Wales where a range of stakeholders including teachers, parents and the community are represented and are chosen by the stakeholders themselves. There is no doubt that this model is under pressure with a range of voices suggesting a more skills based approach to school governing.
Although the arrangements for ensuring stakeholder representation on governing bodies in Wales and England are broadly similar, there are some significant differences, for example, in the detail of the specification of the numbers representative of each stakeholder groups (more detailed in Wales), the number of local authority governors (more required in Wales) and the inclusion of sponsor governors (included in Wales, no longer in England). It is clear that the direction of travel for school governing bodies in England is much more skills based with less focus on stakeholder interests. Governing bodies in both England and Wales have been informed that they are going to be much more central in the school improvement agenda than has been the case in the past and ensuring good governance has to be central to this.
While there is a recognizable shift away from the stakeholder approach in recent years, it is clear that the school governing body membership as outlined in the Taylor model has had its challenges. The election of parents and staff has at times been less than perfect and in a number of cases, those elected have not played to the fullest the role anticipated. Putting this evidence to one side, there have been cases when parent and staff governors have made a significant and positive contribution and the parents in particular have drawn strength from their independence. But so long as the focus is on skills and competence and not representation, and while the validity and significance of representation is ignored, challenges to the stakeholder model are likely to continue. However, in our view these challenges are not sufficient to overturn the existing stakeholder model of governance. This approach to school governance has characteristics that distinguish it from the skills-based model and there are clearly tensions and challenges for each of the stakeholders as part of the board. However, the stakeholder approach to school governance continues to have much merit as it affords a degree of authenticity to those representatives as well as a degree of independence not easily replicated in the skills based approach.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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Author biographies
Michael Connolly is an emeritus Professor of Public Management at the University of South Wales and is interested in education policy, governance and public management. He has published a wide range of academic papers and on governance, improving public services and devolution. Email: Michael.
Catherine Farrell is a Professor of Public Management at the University of South Wales. Her research interests are on school governing bodies and citizen participation in public services. Her work on public service boards includes school governing bodies as one approach to be evaluated in terms of the level of involvement of board members in strategy and leadership. Email: catherine.
Chris James is a Professor of Education based in the Department of Education at the University of Bath. Chris has published widely on school governance in England and the improvement journey of schools. He regularly advises the Department for Education on schools on management and leadership issues. Email: c.