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Abstract
This work endeavors to analyze the negotiation process of the Treaty of Ghulja between the Russian Empire and Qing China in the summer of 1851. The treaty’s format and negotiation method largely followed the examples established by the original Kiakhta Treaty and its subsequent revisions. The Imperial Russian government nevertheless tried to extend the rights articulated in the Kiakhta Treaty to the new commercial treaty in Ghulja, embedding within it new rights equal to those acquired by European powers in Qing China’s territories to open free trade in Xinjiang.
Introduction
This article aims to explore the character of Imperial Russian diplomacy toward Qing China in the mid-19th century, by analyzing the process of the conclusion of the Treaty of Ghulja. The treaty was concluded between Russia and the Qing at a period of transition, during which their substantially equal relations, as articulated by the Kiakhta Treaty (1727), were transformed into unequal relations, which that gave Russia a dominant position in their negotiations after the conclusion of the Beijing Treaty of 1860. Previous research has argued that the Treaty of Ghulja, signed by the Russian and Qing empires on 25 July 1851, allowed Russians in Ghulja (Ili) and Chuguchak (Tarbagatai), two cities in the northwestern parts of Xinjiang, the right to appoint Russian consuls to those cities (Provisions 2 and 9), extraterritorial rights (Provisions 7, 10, and 11), mutual tax-free trade (Provisions 2 and 3), residential rights (Provisions 8 and 13), and the right to spread Christianity (Provision 14) (Haneda, 1961, p. 736). This was the first Russo-Qing treaty since the Kiakhta Treaty of 1727 (later revised twice, in 1768 and 1792), and was followed by the Aigun (1858), Tianjin (1858), and Beijing (1860) Treaties, which were imbalanced and involved large-scale territorial cession to Russia.
Chinese historians claim that the treaty was an unequal treaty for the Qing side, equivalent to the Nanjing Treaty between Qing and Great Britain in 1842, following the end of the First Opium War (1839–1840), and Chinese historians have claimed that the conclusion of the Treaty of Ghulja paved the way for the Russian imperialists’ penetration to Xinjiang (S. Li, 1993, pp. 51–60; Mi, 2005, pp. 46–60). However, Soviet and Russian scholars claim the treaty was an official recognition of private trade between Xinjiang and Western Siberia, which had been developing since the 1830s (Aldabek, 2001, pp. 70–114; Antonov, 1982; Gurevich, 1983, pp. 262–273; Kasymbaev, 1996, pp. 70–90; Kozhirova, 2000, pp. 20–44; Kuznetsov, 1973, pp. 110–119; Sladkovskii, 1974, pp. 230–233). Thanks to the pioneering research of Haneda and Yoshida, as well as Noda’s recent study on Russo-Chinese relations in Xinjiang and Western Siberia, the treaty has been given a less partisan treatment in Japanese academic literature. These scholars find that the treaty was similar in format, though it entailed an extension of the rights granted in the Kiakhta Treaty, was voluntarily accepted by the Qing, and later served as justification for Russian claims on and penetration into Xinjiang (Haneda, 1961; Noda, 2011, p. 254; Yanagisawa, 2009, p. 197; Yoshida, 1974, pp. 216–220).
However, the emphasis on the character of the Ghulja Treaty as a mere extension of the Kiakhta Treaty, which articulated Russo-Chinese relations over almost 120 years in the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century, discouraged researchers from analyzing Imperial Russia’s intention to renegotiate its relations with the Qing, considering the renewed penetration of Western powers into the Chinese market since the end of the First Opium War. Methodologically, existing scholarship tends to consider the treaty within the framework of the Russo-Qing relationship. Generally speaking, Chinese and Japanese scholarship places a heavier emphasis on the decision-making process of the Qing Dynasty,1 while Russian scholarship focuses on decision-making from the Russian perspective. The latter mainly focuses on the role of administrators of peripheral territories, rather than on those of the central government. This article primarily focuses on the Russian perspective, and also incorporates consideration of the detailed treaty negotiation process in Ghulja, as reflected in the Imperial Russian Central Government’s diplomacy in Asia in the 1840s and 1850s.
The article draws in part on unpublished documents, preserved in the manuscripts division of the Russian National Library in Saint Petersburg (The Division of Manuscripts, Russian National Library [Otdel rukopisei, Rossiiskaia natsional’naia biblioteka] [OR RNB]), relating to E. P. Kovalevskii (1811–1868), plenipotentiary of the Russian mission to Ghulja in 1851 (OR RNB: f. 356 [E. P. Kovalevskii], op. 1, dd. 64–86). The archive includes a copy of the treaties concluded between Qing China and Imperial Russia, part of the correspondence exchanged between both governments, and article drafts written by Kovalevskii regarding the Eastern Question. The most important source used in this article was the journal (Iskhodiashchii i vykhodiashchii zhurnal) of the Russian mission to Ghulja in 1851 (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 79), which contains several handwritten drafts of documents not preserved in the Archive of Foreign Relations of the Russian Empire Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii (AVPRI) and clarifies the negotiation process in Ghulja, which do not appear in the Qing sources.2
The path to the Treaty of Ghulja
“Traditional” Russo-Chinese relations
The Qing Dynasty, which inherited the Ming Dynasty’s foreign relations system, conducted diplomatic relations via a tribute system. From the period of Emperor Jiaqing’s rule (r. 1796–1820) forward, foreign relations outside the tribute system were recognized as commercial relations. The Qing’s system of foreign relations was gradually dissolved under the Nanjing Treaty (1842) with Great Britain; the Beijing Treaty (1860) with Britain, France, and Russia; and the establishment of Zongli Yamen in the following year (1861). The Qing Dynasty was finally incorporated into the modern, Western-initiated world diplomatic order in 1895, when the Qing abandoned its final tributary state, Korea, after its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The First Opium War, followed by the Nanjing Treaty, was a turning point in the era of the Qing’s world order system.3
During this time, Russo-Qing relations were considered by many researchers to be special, compared with the Qing’s relations with other Western powers, regardless of Russian membership in the post–Napoleonic European regime in the first half of the 19th century. There are several reasons for this. (a) Russo-Qing relations were officially based on a Sinocentric tribute system, but nevertheless operated with virtually equal commercial relations, which afforded Russia the opportunity for direct trade with Beijing4 and later mutual trade in Kiakhta. These relations were officially controlled not by the monarchs of the respective states but rather by administrative bodies, the Qing’s Board of Foreign Affairs (Lifan Yuan) and the Russian Senate (Senat). (b) Russia and the Qing shared the long border from the Pacific Ocean to Mongolia (after the collapse of the Jungar Empire in the Altai Mountains) and needed to develop permanent solutions for the problems of demarcation and the exchange of fugitives between their respective prefectural officials.5 (c) Unlike the cases of most Western countries, Russo-Qing relations were under the jurisdiction of Manchurian and Mongolian banner officials, who used Manchu as their official language, beginning with the Nerchinsk Treaty in 1689 and ending with the Aigun Treaty in 1858. From the contemporary perspective of the Qing Court in Beijing, the Treaty of Ghulja was not considered to be an essential structural change in Russo-Chinese relations as established within the framework of the Kiakhta Treaty (Yanagisawa, 2009, pp. 194–196).
The Nanjing Treaty and its impact on Russian diplomacy toward Qing China
How do these factors change if the Ghulja Treaty is situated in the context of Russian diplomacy of that time? After the ratification of the Nanjing Treaty between Qing China and Britain, the European powers acquired the right to establish factories, appoint consuls, extraterritorial autonomy, and other privileges relating to free trade in the open ports of Qing China’s coastal regions, by changing the tributary or commercial system to one based on commercial treaties.
The Russian central government, wary of the possible influx of European powers into the Chinese market, endeavored to change traditional Russo-Qing relations for the first time in 1843. Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855) ordered a special committee for Kiakhta trade to be organized, the meetings of which were attended by Lev Seniavin6 and Nikolai Riubimov from the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Efim Putiatin from the Naval Ministry, and two other members on 9 June and 15 December 1843. The committee came to the conclusion that, in response to the fact that European countries, including Britain, had one after another signed or planned to sign commercial treaties that would have penetrated the Chinese market, it was necessary both to investigate the conditions of the trade there and to open Russo-Qing trade in other places, especially through the Amur river and between Western Siberia and Xinjiang (The Russian State Archive of the Navy [Rossiikii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv voenno-morskogo flota] [RGAVMF]: f. 19, op. 4, d. 477, ll. 12-33ob.об.; RGAVMF: f. 19, op. 4, d. 478, ll. 132–148; Aldabek, 2001, pp. 83–84).7 As a result, N. Liubimov was secretly dispatched to Xinjiang to investigate from June to December 1845 (Aldabek, 2001, pp. 84–86). At that time, the Qing authority in Xinjiang gave permission to trade only to the Kazakhs and Andijanis, and precluded Russian involvement therein (Fletcher, 1978b, pp. 329–330; Noda, 2011, pp. 192–197). Liubimov’s report of this secret mission motivated the Russian government to convert private trade between Western Siberia and Xinjiang into an official procedure (Noda, 2011, p. 252). Despite their initially cautious attitude in taking these measures, Nesselrode and the Minister of Finance F. P. Vronchenko (1844–1852 in office) decided to open official negotiations with the Qing government to conclude a new commercial treaty regarding trade between West Siberia and Xinjiang, which was mediated by the Russian orthodox mission to Beijing (Dukhovnaia missiia v Pekine)8 in June 1846 and ratified by Emperor Nicholas I at the end of September (Aldabek, 2001, pp. 90–91).
Two requests from the Russian Senate, in 1847 and 1848, respectively, to open trade for Russians in Ghulja, Chuguchak, and Kashghar were rejected. In 1850, at the time of the dispatch of the 13th mission (1850–1857), with Archimandrite Palladii Kafarov as head, the Senate submitted a third request to open trade in these cities, through the intermediation of the guardian (pristav) of the orthodox mission, E. P. Kovalevskii.9 On the day of Kovalevskii’s departure from Beijing on 2 May 1850, Emperor Xinfeng (r. 1850–1861) approved a report by the Board of Foreign Affairs regarding open trade in Ghulja and Chuguchak (excluding the possibility of trade in Kashghar) (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 298, l. 1ob.). Treaty negotiations were scheduled for the following year in Ghulja (Noda, 2011, pp. 251–253). On 8 September 1850, the Senate informed the Board of Foreign Affairs that Kovalevskii would be dispatched to Ghulja as a plenipotentiary of the Russian empire.10
E. P. Kovalevskii and the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
E. P. Kovalevskii was of aristocratic descent, had graduated from Kharkov University in 1828, and then entered the Mining Department (Gornyi department). As a mining specialist, he was dispatched to Montenegro in 1837 and Egypt in 1847 to explore for mineral resources. He was also involved in Russia’s diplomatic and military mission to Central Asia, although both his mission to Bukhara in 1839 and Perovskii’s Khivan expedition in 1839 to 1840 were unsuccessful. He also traveled to Ghulja in the 1840s and fought in the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856 (Val’skaia, 1956, pp. 7–156). He became acquainted with A. M. Gorchakov, who appointed Kovalevskii to the head of the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in office 1856–1861) after Gorchakov’s appointment as foreign minister in 1856.
The system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del) was gradually developed out of the College of Foreign Affairs (Kollegiia inostrannykh del) in the years 1802 to 1832 under the reigns of Aleksandr I (r. 1801–1825) and Nicholas I. During this period, the Asiatic Department was established and incorporated under the Ministry (1832) to organize relationships with Asian states like the Ottoman Empire, Persia, the Kazakhs, the Central Asian Khanates, and Qing China (Ritchie, 1970, pp. 96–103, 109–114, 121–125, 127–130).11 A system of general governorship under the supervision of the Asiatic Division of the General Staff of the War Ministry was introduced to Asiatic Russia. Since the first half of the 19th century, a personal, charismatic, and autonomously decisive power was bestowed to governor generals in peripheral territories, mainly in Asiatic Russia. The Asiatic Department and Asiatic Division initiated administrative reform and other related issues in Asiatic Russia. This system was effective in connecting Russian diplomatic policy with the control of affairs in Asiatic Russia (Matsuzato, 2008, pp. 298–300). From 1847 to 1851, during the course of negotiations and all the way up to the signing of the Ghulja Treaty, the process was conducted between the Russian Senate and Qing China’s Board of Foreign Affairs, but it seems the decision-making on the Russian side owed to the strategies of the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the spot, Kovalevskii shouldered the realization of the policy initiated by the Asiatic Department of Nicholas I’s government, which was deeply involved in the Eastern Question and Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia.
Instructions to E. P. Kovalevskii
Before leaving for Ghulja, Kovalevskii received two instructions from L. Seniavin, former head of the Asiatic Department and the then-deputy head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 30 April 1851 (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 1–25, 31-34ob.). The instructions were divided into four parts: (a) request for open trade in Ghulja and Chuguchak, (b) request for open trade in Kashghar, (c) other related issues (avoidance of demarcation negotiations, appointment of persons in charge on both sides following the commercial treaty, and information gathering), and (d) the means for responding to questions regarding the Amur issue and the arrival of the Russo-American Company’s ship at Shanghai in 1848. Gurevich (1983, p. 270) and Aldabek (2001, pp. 101–102) briefly touch on these instructions, but no serious research has been conducted in this regard. In the following, therefore, we examine the details of these instructions.
Open trade in Ghulja and Chuguchak
The following 10 points regarding the opening of trade in Ghulja and Chuguchak were provided in Kovalevskii’s instructions (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 2ob.-14):
Establishment of a factory (faktoriia): Interference in the factory by the Qing authority should not be permitted. Qing merchants visiting for commercial purposes should come and go freely from the factory; however, Asian merchants with Russian commodities should not be allowed to enter.
Appointment of consuls or commercial agents (torgovyi agent): The appointment of the official responsible for controlling and protecting Russian merchants should be made by the Russian government, without interference on the part of Qing authorities. The instructions stipulate that
[the] Chinese will not see the appointment of these persons (consuls) as a new method, because most of the European nations conducting official trade with China already had these consuls and agents in the open ports for the purpose of facilitating European commerce. (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, l. 6-6ob.)
The instructions offer compromises that may be made if necessary: If the Qing authority declines to agree on the appointment of these officials, there may be temporary appointment of consuls or commercial agents in the summer season, a period of active commerce. If, even after this, they are unable to reach agreement with the Qing, a special commissioner (komissar) or elder (starshina) should be appointed to control merchants, as was the case with contemporary Kiakhta trade.
Criminal acts of Russians in Qing territory should be judged and punished in Russian territory, based on Imperial Russian Law. Enforcement of jurisdiction of Russian subjects should follow the provisions of the revised Kiakhta Treaty of 1792.
The fortunes of Russian merchants who have deceased while in Qing territory should be transmitted to their heirs living in Russia.
Pastures for the livestock of caravans should be allocated free of charge. Allocation may be charged only if the price of land allocation is fixed.
There should be free procurement of the food necessary for Russian subjects and free passage of Russian merchants in cities, so that they may exchange commodities with Chinese merchants. If the Qing authorities do not agree to free passage, Russian merchants should be allowed to pass, on the condition that they carry a pass issued by the head of their caravan.
Tax-free trade: The Qing authority collected taxes from the merchants twice—when they passed the Qing’s customs offices and when they exchanged goods with Chinese merchants—and these collections should be banned. If the Qing authority does not agree, tax collection should be limited to a single instance.
Regulations regarding the storage of commodities and the means and period of exchange should be articulated.
The provisions of the Kiakhta Treaty should be extended, including the prohibition of loans.
In addition to these stipulations, the treaty instructions also included a provision for free navigation through Lake Zaisan, the upper part of the Irtysh river. Arguably, this last provision was a “dummy” issue included to extract concessions from the Qing (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 13ob.-14).
Open trade in Kashghar
The instructions include the following points regarding the opening of trade in Kashghar (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 14-17ob.). The Qing authority may refuse to allow open trade in Kashghar for the following reasons: lack of commodities, small number of merchants, and the great distance of Kashghar from inner China. Accounting for this, the Russian mission should emphasize the following points: (a) There are possibilities for the development of trade; (b) provided with more affordable Russian commodities, the living conditions of local inhabitants who buy daily necessities at high prices can be improved; (c) Khoqandians have already received permission to engage in tax-free trade;12 and (d) every effort by merchants may produce profits, despite the current insecurity of the trade route and the prospective profits received by tribes13 now routing caravans along the new route.
Other related issues
The instructions also touched on other related issues: avoidance of demarcation negotiations, appointment of negotiation leaders from both sides following the signing of the commercial treaty, and information gathering (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 17ob.-22ob.).
The instructions dictated that Kovalevskii should avoid negotiations regarding demarcation, which constituted considerable parts of the Kiakhta Treaty, under the pretext that his mission was confined to strictly commercial issues. The border demarcation negotiation would involve the undesirable collision between Russia and Qing China. The instructions also express the belief that ambiguity on the border would profit Russia, which was currently the strongest power in the region, and that when the time came, it would be solved in favor of Russia (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, l. 20).
The Amur issue and the arrival of the Russo-American Company’s ship at Shanghai harbor in 1848
The instructions included the following points regarding response to the Amur issue and the arrival of a ship from the Russo-American Company’s ship to Shanghai harbor in 1848 (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 31-34ob.).
Kovalevskii was instructed to select and highlight an important issue between the two countries, and in doing so express concern about the presence of foreign ships approaching the Amur’s mouth and the need to investigate this issue. Although sea trade was less important for Russia than land trade, it was still profitable for the Russo-American Company, particularly in the exchange of fur from Russo-American colonies for Chinese commodities. The issue of sea trade was addressed at the end of the negotiations on the commercial treaty, which read as follows:
If all of the European nations, even those who have not signed any treaty with China, as well as Americans, were allowed to conduct trade in the five Chinese ports, then why is only Russia, which has the same power [as European nations] not permitted [to engage] in this trade? [Russia] has the right to receive special attention from the Chinese government on the basis of its centuries of friendship with China. (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 33ob.-34)
The special committee for Kiakhta trade in 1843 evinced Russian concern about the possible penetration of European powers into the Chinese market, as well as the Russian endeavor to ameliorate those concerns by emphasizing the traditional friendship between Russia and Qing China. As we will see below, the Imperial Russian government, emphasizing this traditional friendship, tried to extend the rights articulated in the Kiakhta Treaty and its revisions to the commercial Ghulja Treaty, embedding in it new rights equal to those the European powers were acquiring in Qing China.
Treaty negotiations in Ghulja in 1851
Open trade in Ghulja and Chuguchak
Carrying the above instructions, Kovalevskii’s mission departed from Saint Petersburg and crossed the Qing border (karun) sometime around 30 June 1851. The mission was composed of the plenipotentiary E. P. Kovalevskii; one secretary; translators of Manchu (I. I. Zakharov), Chinese (A. A. Tatarinov, also serving as a medical doctor), and Tatar languages; one officer; approximately 30 soldiers; and five drivers (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 79, ll. 10–11).14 On 7 July 1851, the mission arrived in Ghulja, and on 8 and 9 of July, Kovalevskii and Yishan, Governor General of Ghulja (Ili i uheri bici hafan) (1850–1854 in office) and Qing’s plenipotentiary, and his colleagues (Buyantai and others) met. The two parties began treaty negotiations on 10 July (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 79, l. 16-16ob.).
Soviet and Kazakhstani researchers (Aldabek, 2001; Antonov, 1982; Gurevich, 1983) have paid more attention to the events leading up to the treaty negotiations and have been relatively dismissive of the negotiations themselves. Chinese and Japanese scholarship reconstructed the negotiation process in Ghulja based on Yishan’s report, dated 7 August 1851 (Haneda, 1961; Q. F. Li, 2000, pp. 221–222; Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’an guan, 1981, pp. 2–15). However, Yishan’s report lacks a description of the early process of negotiation until the point where the Russian mission proposed open trade in Kashghar. Here, we examine the journal of Kovalevskii’s mission (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 79), according to which Yishan and his colleagues proposed a draft of the treaty with 18 provisions on 12 July (translation from the Manchu draft of the treaty, offered by the name of Tsziantsziun, that is, Governor General of Ili; OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 79, ll. 17-20ob.).15 After a temporary suspension in negotiations, an ultimatum of 17 provisions was drafted on 19 July (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 79, ll. 22ob.-27). Some minor adjustments were made to the language, and the treaty was signed on 25 July by Kovalevskii on the Russian side and Yishan and Buyantai on the Qing side.
In the following section, we will carefully examine the differences between the draft proposed by the Qing representatives on 12 July (Draft A) and the ultimatum completed on 19 July (Draft B), referring to Kovalevskii’s report on the treaty negotiations, submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 August (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 35ob.-41ob.).16
As is illustrated in Table 1, the following provisions were proposed by the Qing authority in Draft A, which coincided with the instructions given to Kovalevskii and were modified in Draft B: Provision 3 (4 in Draft A, tax-free trade), Provision 4 (2 in Draft A, presentation of merchant passports [bilet] to the Qing’s post officer), Provision 5 (3 and 17 in Draft A, caravan route), Provision 10 (5 in Draft A, extradition of escaped criminals), Provision 11 (12 in Draft A, allocation of pasture land for livestock caravans), Provision 12 (15 in Draft A, prohibition of loan use of the merchants), Provision 16 (16 in Draft A, person in charge of negotiation of both sides after the conclusion of the treaty), and Provision 17 (18 in Draft A, method of ratification of treaty).
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Table 1. Brief description of the comparison of the contents of Drafts A and B.
The provisions offered by the Qing authority and accepted by Kovalevskii were as follows: Provision 8 (13 in Draft A, time period in which Russian merchants were allowed to visit Ghulja and Chuguchak) and Provision 15 (14 in Draft A, obligation of Qing officials in Ghulja and Chuguchak to exchange sheep for cotton cloth [daba]).17 Provision 14, regarding freedom to perform religious acts within the territory of the factories, was proposed by the Qing authority after Draft A was submitted and incorporated into Draft B.
Based on the Russian mission’s journal, the points of contention between the Qing authority and Russian mission were as follows: Provision 1 (1 in Draft A, purpose of treaty), Provision 2 (7 in Draft A, tax-free trade and appointment of consuls), Provisions 6 and 7 (10 and 11 in Draft A, protection of caravans and settlement of dispute), and Provision 9 (8 and 9 in Draft A, free passage in cities).
In Provision 1 of Drafts A and B, Qing representatives asserted that both governments should monitor and administer their respective subjects; however, in Draft B, these expressions were omitted and only the promotion of mutual interest and friendship of both countries was explicitly articulated.
In Provision 2, the Qing authority tried to focus only on establishing fair exchange for merchants and the prohibition of their payment of commissions and other fees (proviziia i soderzhanie) to officials. Russian representatives disagreed with this approach, arguing that tax-free trade and the appointment of Russian consuls to Ghulja and Chuguchak should also be incorporated. According to Kovalevskii, “the Chinese finally agreed to free trade for Russians in Ili and Tarbagatai and the appointment of consuls [to these cities], [but] they tried to weaken the latter’s influence and to enable their officials to interfere with [Russian] subjects.” This provision clearly shows that the tax-free trade on the border articulated by the Kiakhta Treaty was extended to that in the cities of Ghulja and Chuguchak within the territories of Qing China. This provision also indicates that the tax-free trade would be controlled under the supervision of Russian consuls appointed to these cities.
The question of border demarcation also became an issue, in part because Provision 6 was vague in its articulation of the extraterritorial rights of Russian consuls. Provision 6 said that, when a caravan lost fortune or livestock within Qing territories, Russian consuls and Qing officials should investigate the matter collaboratively. According to Kovalevskii, “The Chinese strongly demanded clarity about where they held responsibility for the safety of caravans, in other words, where their border would begin.” The Qing representatives originally argued that the Qing authority should be responsible for caravans beginning in Aiaguz, but eventually drew their claim back to the post (karun) line,18 because the Russian mission did not accept their claims of authority over the Kazakhs. The two parties finally compromised: Neither the Qing nor the Russian government would be responsible for the protection of the lives or commodities of the caravans passing through the Kazakh pasture lands outside the post. Considering the ongoing military operations of the Russian army in the eastern Kazakh Steppe at the time,19 this agreement effectively worked for the toleration of Russian occupation and rule over the Kazakhs outside the Qing border.20
Provisions 6 and 7 were somewhat ambiguous in their articulation of the extraterritorial rights of Russian consuls, despite confirming that the jurisdiction of Russian subjects should be under the purview of Russian consuls. In Provision 7, the Qing representatives argued that, according to Qing law, criminals should be punished in the place of their criminal act, that is, in Qing territory. Kovalevskii was opposed to this motion and stopped the negotiation (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 79, l. 16ob.). As a result, it was determined that the investigation of criminal acts in Qing territory was to be conducted in cooperation between Russian consuls and Qing special officials, and that important issues would be solved following extensions of the relevant provisions of the revised Kiakhta Treaty of 1792.21 Thus, Russian extraterritorial rights over the conflicts involved with both Qing and Russian subjects are not clearly stated in the treaty, except for serious criminal cases.
In Provision 9, the Qing representatives originally did not permit the free passage of Russian merchants outside their place of residence. Kovalevskii took issue with this and suspended the negotiations (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 79, l. 16ob.) until the Qing agreed to allow Russian merchants the right of free passage in the city so long as they held a certificate (bilet / temgetu šusihe) issued by the Russian consuls.
Provisions regarding the establishment of factories were not included in Draft A but were articulated in Provision 13 of the treaty.
Open trade in Kashghar
The details of the negotiation in Ghulja regarding the issue of Kashghar trade still need to be considered. Both the Qing and Russian sides claimed their opponent was subdued or had fallen into a difficult situation (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 79, ll. 29ob.-32; Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’an guan, 1981, pp. 12–13). The Qing representatives, following the Emperor Xianfeng’s edict, certainly refused to accept the Russian request, pointing to three reasons (lack of commodities, the small number of merchants, and Kashghar’s significant distance from inner China), and Kovalevskii finally abandoned the negotiation (Aldabek, 2001, p. 105; Haneda, 1961, p. 734). In any case, the Russian side did not take the failure seriously. Kovalevskii was instructed to conclude the commercial treaty regarding Ghulja and Tarbagatai first, and Nesselrode did not regard the failure of the Kashghar question in this negotiation as a final breakdown, considering that the question would be solved over time (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, l. 23; Aldabek, 2001, p. 105). Kovalevskii left Ghulja on 31 July and arrived in Saint Petersburg on 1 October (Aldabek, 2001, pp. 105–106; Q. F. Li, 2000, p. 222).
The importance of the Treaty of Ghulja
Format of the treaty
The Treaty of Ghulja was relatively equally balanced (Quested, 1968, p. 36). As Haneda (1961) argued, the Qing regarded the treaty as an extension of the Kiakhta Treaty. The Russian government (Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) also instructed Kovalevskii to extend some of the provisions of the Kiakhta Treaty, including tax-free trade and prohibition of credits, in the new treaty (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 12ob.-13). The languages used (originals of the treaty are written in Manchu and Russian) and the process of negotiation (officially between the Qing’s Board of Foreign Relations and the Russian Senate) were also similar to those in the Kiakhta Treaty and its 1768 and 1792 revisions.22
Difference between the originals of the treaty
Of the eight points (Points 9 and 10 had no concrete instructions) of the instruction given to Kovalevskii, Points 4, 5, and 8 were included in Drafts A and B, while Points 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 were accepted by the Qing representatives after negotiations. In an attempt to extend certain provisions of the Kiakhta Treaty and its revisions (reflected in the tax-free trade, prohibition of credits, and other aspects of Draft A), Russia was arguably successful in that it acquired rights equal to those enjoyed by the European powers (establishment of Russian factories, appointment of Russian consuls, Russian extraterritorial rights, albeit with ambiguities as to the duties of consul, and free passage of Russian merchants in the cities, on condition that merchants held a certificate issued by the Russian consuls). This view is supported by the following phrase used by Kovalevskii in the report he submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
all of the requirements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs given to me in the instructions were fulfilled, except for the inclusion of some provisions in the treaty necessary from the viewpoint of local opinions. The ratification of the treaty was so difficult because the [Qing] local bureaucrats had their own views and instructions [based] on the former treaties of China with Russia. They did not want to recognize that the relationship between Russia and China was different [from those in earlier times] and, if even [the relations were based on] the regulations, they did not accept that the Chinese could no more control foreigners in its territories. (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 79, ll. 32ob.-33; Aldabek, 2001, p. 103)
However, we need to be reserved in definitely concluding that the Russian mission successfully forced the Qing to accept the contents of the instructions given to Kovalevskii. The originals of the treaty were written in Manchu and Russian. Quested (1968, pp. 36–37) and Mi (2005, pp. 57–60) have pointed out differences between the originals, although they did so using the Chinese translation of the Manchu original. Here, we investigate the difference between the Manchu and Russian originals regarding the points contested by both sides (the appointment of Russian consuls and the establishment of factories).23
According to Provision 2 of the Russian original, the Russian consuls had the right to supervise all Imperial Russian subjects in Ghulja and Chuguchak. According to the instruction to the consuls, their position and deal were equal to those of the Ottoman Empire and Qajarid Iran (The Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan [Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan] [TsGARUz]: f. 1, op. 32, d. 366, l. 81ob.). However, according to the provisions of the Manchu original, a consul is mentioned as an “official named consul, specialized in the supervision of trade (cohotoi emu hūda be kadalara kongsul sere hafan)” (Provision 2), and an “official for the supervision of trade or merchants (hūda maiman / hūda i niyalma be kadalara hafan)” (Provisions 7–9, 11) (Sbornik, 1889, pp. 103–107; Wang & Zhang, 1974, pp. 51–53). Their duties thus seem limited to the supervision of trade (Mi, 2005, p. 57). The word equivalent to consul (lingshiguan in Chinese) is not used here (Wang & Zhang, 1974, pp. 113–122, 453–468). Provision 13 of the Russian original regulates that “Russian merchants arriving to China for trade should stay in the factories,” while the Manchu original only says “Russian merchants should use their dormitories (boo).” In the Manchu original, we cannot find any regulations concerning the factories or their use for living or trade by Imperial Russian subjects enjoying extraterritorial rights under the supervision of Russian consuls.
Free trade
What accounts for these differences between the originals of the treaty? Mi (2005, p. 59) points out the discrepancy between Qing officials’ traditional view of Russia and reality, and the incompetence of the Qing officials in charge of negotiation, that is, their lack of knowledge of the Russian language and the contemporary situation of Russia, which led to the Qing’s diplomatic failure. However, this needs to be reconsidered, bearing in mind the meaning of commercial treaties at that time.
The main aim of Russian foreign policy in Europe in the 1840s was to maintain the anti-France coalition with Britain immediately before the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853–1856) (Anderson, 1966, pp. 110–113). From the commercial perspective, faced with increasing British commercial influences and competition with Russia in Asian markets,24 the voice for changing Russian trade policy from a protective to a free trade one became stronger within the government, through the reduction of the custom rate and the relaxation of embargos, after the replacement of the finance minister E. F. Kankrin (1823–1844 in office) by his successor Vronchenko in May 1844 (Struve, 1913/2007, pp. 190–193). In particular, Nicholas I’s government was looking for a market in which to sell Russian industrial goods (mainly textiles—woolen cloth [sukno] and cotton goods), produced by the Russian textile industry rapidly developed from the 1830s (Rozhkova, 1949, pp. 335–344). The Chinese market under the Qing dynasty was their best prospect; however, the Russian government could not force the Qing government to accept the unilateral commercial provisions, as the former had suffered from the latter’s repeated stopping of Kiakhta trade throughout the 18th century (Yoshida, 1974, p. 217). During that period, Russian dominion over the Kazakh Senior Juz and the Kyrgyz, who had settlements along trade routes between Western Siberia and Xinjiang, was under construction (Noda, 2011, pp. 221–256). Therefore, extending the existing “free trade” provisions of the Kiakhta treaties (Morinaga, 2009) to the regulated trade between Western Siberia and Xinjiang (prohibition of direct trade between Russian and Chinese merchants, official control of price, etc.), the Russian government also tried to incorporate as many privileges as had been acquired by the European powers in Qing territories by interpreting the words “hūda be kadalara hafan” and “boo” more broadly as “consul” and “factory” in the Russian original.25
Conclusion
The Ghulja Treaty was concluded at a period of transition, during which substantially equal Russo-Qing relations articulated by the Kiakhta Treaty (1727) were transformed into the unequal relations, which gave Russia a dominant position in their negotiations after the conclusion of Beijing Treaty of 1860. In this context, the problem of whether the Ghulja Treaty was of a new unequal or a traditionally substantially equal character is contested among researchers. Less partisan research, which emphasizes the traditional character of the treaty, has discouraged researchers from analyzing Imperial Russia’s intention to renegotiate its relations with the Qing, considering the renewed penetration of Western powers into the Chinese market since the end of the First Opium War.
In this article, the author concludes the following: The Ghulja Treaty was concluded without a strict mutual understanding between Qing China and Russia. The differences between the Manchu and Russian originals of the treaty stemmed from the broader interpretation of the Manchu original by Russia, by which means Russia sought to acquire as many privileges as other European powers had attained within the Qing territory. However, it seems that these differences also stemmed from the Qing government’s perception that the treaties were a temporary, expedient measure to discipline “barbarian” Europeans, which meant that the new free-trade regime in the coastal regions of Qing China, based on commercial treaties with European powers, did not work as the Europeans had expected in the 1840s and 1850s (Motegi, 1997, pp. 33–38). The Russian military conquest of the Amur river basin developed extensively during the Crimean War, and the Tianjin and Beijing Treaties at the time of the Second Opium War (1858–1860), enabled Russia to acquire extraterritorial rights, low custom rates in coastal regions, and most favored nation status in Qing territory. Thus, based on the provisions of the Ghulja Treaty, the Russian consuls and factories expanded their role and their geographical sphere both in coastal regions and in Xinjiang and Mongolia.26 The Imperial Russian government, utilizing the traditional framework of Russo-Chinese relations, endeavored, as much as possible, to acquire rights equal to those Western powers had acquired in Qing territory, even if the mutual understanding of the provisions of the treaty was lacking.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Mitsubishi Foundation under Grant Number 30213, the Murata Science Foundation under Grant Number H30助人11, and the project “Comprehensive Studies on Slavic Eurasian Regions” (Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University).
Notes
1.
Noda (2011, 2016) revealed the detailed process of the development of trade between Xinjiang and Western Siberia and the political relations between Qing China and Russia, focusing on the role of the Kazakhs up to the ratification of the Treaty of Ghulja. In addition, relying on Qing sources and referring to Russian and Soviet scholarship, Noda briefly described the Ghulja Treaty negotiation process (Noda, 2011, pp. 251–255).
2.
The author had no chance to refer to the primary sources in Russian and Manchu preserved in the Archive of Foreign Relations of the Russian Empire and the Chinese First Historical Archive in Beijing. For the former, see Nakami (1996) and Shibuya (2002), and for the latter, particularly the “Manchu documents relating to Russia,” see Yanagisawa (2001).
3.
For the most recent discussion on Qing China’s diplomacy, see Okamoto (2017).
4.
The last official Russian caravan was dispatched to Beijing in 1754. Later, official Russo-Chinese trade was effectively limited to Kiakhta, as dictated by the Kiakhta Treaty and its revisions. For more on the process of the conclusion of the Kiakhta Treaty and its revisions, see Shibuya (2010) and Yanagisawa (2013). For an analysis of Kiakhta trade until the 1830s based on Russian sources, see Morinaga (2010).
5.
We can compare this long-term history of negotiation between officials with that between the Portuguese in Macau and Qing officials in Canton.
6.
Lev Seniavin worked in the offices of the Asiatic Department from 1822 to 1848, its formative period. He acted as head of the department (1841–1848) and then as a temporary deputy of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as deputy to minister Count Karl Nesselrode, the Foreign Minister [1816–1856 in office]) from 1850 to 1852 (Ritchie, 1970, p. 133).
7.
As a result, Putiatin was supposed to be dispatched, but was not, due to opposition from Nesselrode (Fumoto, 2014, p. 47). Later, the collection of information on open ports was entrusted to the Russian-American Company, which dispatched the ship Menshikov to Shanghai in 1848.
8.
For a discussion of the Russian Orthodox Mission to Beijing, see Veselovskii (1905) and Chen (2008).
9.
A civil official with the title of pristav (police commissioner) was made a member of the mission in 1809. The official acted as an inspector general, security officer, diplomat, and intelligence agent (Ritchie, 1970, p. 117).
10.
For detailed research on the negotiation process between Qing China and Imperial Russia prior to the dispatch of Kovalevskii’s mission to Ghulja, see Aldabek (2001, pp. 82–102).
11.
The Asiatic department was divided into three sections. The first section dealt with Russian relations with the Ottoman empire and Greece. The second was responsible for relations with Iran, the Caucasus, the Kazakhs, the Central Asian Khanates, and Qing China. The third oversaw the departments’ administration and finances (Ritchie, 1970, pp. 127–130).
12.
The Qing government gave more privileges, such as custom exemption and extraterritoriality, to the Khanate of Khoqand between 1831 and 1835, than it did to Britain after its defeat in the First Opium War (Fletcher, 1978a, pp. 367–385). Hamada (2008) reveals that the local authority of Qing China in Xinjiang concealed the existence of these treaties from the emperor, by tampering with the translation from the Chaghatay Turkic originals to the Chinese language.
13.
This seems to refer to Kyrgyz groups residing between the Kazakh Steppe and Xinjiang.
14.
I. I. Zakharov and A. A. Tatarinov were members of the 12th Orthodox mission to Beijing and were appointed the first consuls in Ghulja and Chuguchak, respectively. Later, Zakharov became a professor of Manchu language at Saint Petersburg Imperial University and published “Manchu Grammar” (Grammatika man’chzhurskogo iazyka) in 1879. Tatarinov worked as a translator during the negotiations of the Beijing Treaty of 1860 (Yoshida, 1974, p. 214).
15.
The original of Draft A was written in Manchu. This article uses the Russian translation of the draft because it is difficult to access the original.
16.
This article’s analysis is admittedly one-sided: Information is totally based on Russian materials that offer perspectives from the Russian side, due to a lack of access to the Manchu documents, which provide a fuller description of perspectives from the Qing side.
17.
According to Provision 8, Russian merchants could stay in Ghulja and Chuguchak for the definite period that the Qing requested, from Qingming to Dongzhi in the Chinese calendar (approximately 25 March to 10 December in the Julian calendar). Although the Qing representative argued that the merchants should return immediately after that period, regardless of their unsold commodities, it was eventually agreed that merchants could stay if they had unsold commodities, so long as they were under the supervision of the consuls.
18.
Aiaguz lies to the north of Lake Balkhash and was the location of a type of Russian local administrative office known as a okruzhnoi prikaz (Noda, 2016, p. 42). Among the karun established by the Qing, there were two types: the temporary summer karun and the permanent winter karun (Noda, 2016, p. 274). The temporary summer karun was sometimes established as far as Aiaghuz river and Balkhash lake until the beginning of the 19th century, because the Qing authorities did consider such previously Jungar territories to be their own territory (Noda, 2016, p. 273). In addition, it seems that, contrary to the Russian perception of karun as a borderline, Qing officials only considered karun a border point to Ghulja (Boro Hūjir) and Chuguchak (Ujan), respectively, at the time of Ghulja Treaty negotiation (Sbornik, 1889, pp. 104–105). Thus, until the time of Ghulja Treaty negotiation, neither the Russians nor the Qing had yet come to make any distinction between the two types of karun with reference to border issues (Noda, 2016, p. 274) or a clear common perception of the border between them. The line of permanent winter karun was used as a reference point during later demarcations of the border based on the Beijing Treaty of 1860 (Noda, 2016, p. 274; Yoshida, 1974, p. 234). For a detailed description of the placement of karun in Russo-Qing border regions, see Noda (2016, p. 275).
19.
Regarding the establishment of Russian rule over the Kazakh Senior Juz, see Noda (2011, pp. 221–256). The Russian army dispatched from Kopal Fortress occupied and destroyed the Khoqandian fortress of Tauchubek south of the Ili river in 1850 to 1851 (Terent’ev, 1906, pp. 88–89). The instructions anticipated the Qing authorities’ protests over these processes and dictated to Kovalevskii as follows. First, according to their testimonies, the Kazakhs had previously paid tribute (iasak) to Khoqand, not to the Qing, and had voluntarily submitted themselves to Russia and asked the nation to construct a fortress for their protection after being threatened and attacked by Khoqandians. The Qing authority had no right to interfere with the Kazakhs. Second, Russian military operations south of the Ili river aimed at punishing the Khoqandians who caused disturbances in the Kazakh Steppe (The Division of Manuscripts, Russian National Library [Otdel rukopisei, Rossiiskaia natsional’naia biblioteka] [OR RNB]: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 17ob.-18). The Qing authorities saw that Russia had strengthened its influence on the pastures of the Kazakhs by imposing taxes and mobilization on them (Noda, 2011, p. 250). Contrary to the Russian claim, the Qing authorities maintained that the Kazakh Senior Juz belonged to Qing China and protested the construction of the Kopal Fortress, while also exchanging correspondence with Russian authorities at that time (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 17ob.-18).
20.
In September 1851, the guardian (pristav) of the Kazakh Senior Juz, M. D. Peremyshl’skii, stopped the inspection of the Qing officials in the pastures of the Kazakhs (Moiseev, 2003, p. 26). The official demarcation in this region between Russia and Qing China, however, was carried out at the Treaty of Tarbagatai in 1864, based on the contents of the Beijing Treaty of 1860 (Noda, 2009, pp. 149–150).
21.
This likely implies the provision of the revised Kiakhta Treaty, which stated that anyone who crossed the border and committed a criminal act should be investigated at the border when arrested and sentenced according to the law of the country to which he or she belonged (Yoshida, 1974, p. 180).
22.
The Senate and the Board of Foreign Affairs exchanged correspondence regarding the arrangement of the negotiations in Ghulja, following the negotiations of the Kiakhta Treaty. Both sides used Manchu, as they did in the negotiation process of the revision of the Kiakhta Treaty in 1768. For the Qing side, there was no one who spoke or wrote Russian in the process of revision of the Kiakhta Treaty in 1768 (Yanagisawa, 2003, pp. 29–31). The same was true of the negotiation of the Treaty of Ghulja. Zakharov acted as translator in Manchu.
23.
There were no serious differences in meaning between the Manchu and Russian originals regarding jurisdiction (Provisions 2, 7, 10, and 11) or the free passage of Russian subjects (Provision 9).
24.
Britain, starting with the conclusion of the treaty with the Ottoman Empire in 1838, constructed its treaty network of free trade worldwide (treaties with Būsaʽīd dynasty in 1839, Qajarid Iran in 1841, and the Qing Empire in 1842; Mōri, 1982, p. 27). These treaties articulated the extraterritorial right, fixed custom rate, most favored nation status, and other unilateral provisions obliged to the state concerned, although the unilateral provisions might have been realized a long time after the conclusion of the treaty, as witnessed in the case of the establishment of the process of British extraterritorial rights in Eastern Africa under Būsaʽīd rule (Katakura, 2015).
25.
According to close analysis of Draft B, we can recognize the following modifications and broader interpretation of the Manchu original, which has crossed out: “consul or commercial agent (konsul ili drugoi torgovyi agent)” replaced with “consul” in Provision 2, “place for living and warehouse of commodities (mesto dlia zhitelʼstva i skladki tovarov)” (Provision 13), and “in their own house (v svoei podvorʼe)” (Provision 14) replaced with “place for a factory (mesto dlia faktorii)” and “in their own factory (v svoei faktorii)” (OR RNB: f. 356, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 22ob.-27ob.).
26.
Provision 6 of the Beijing Treaty stated that the rights of free trade, establishment of a factory, and cession of pasture for livestock in Kashghar were given to the Imperial Russian subjects. The types of buildings to be included in “house (boo)” were stated in detail there. Provision 8 of the treaty stated that, “based on the regulations over Ghulja and Chuguchak (na osnovanii pravil, priniatykh dlia Ili i Tarbagataia),” the consuls in Kashghar and Urga should be appointed with detailed obligations in relation to Russian subjects and their extraterritorial rights (Sbornik, 1889, pp. 163–166, 182–184).
ORCID iD
Akifumi Shioya 
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2762-8685
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Author biography
Akifumi Shioya is an assistant professor of the University of Tsukuba, Japan. A historian holding a PhD from the University of Tokyo (Japan), he has conducted archival survey and fieldwork in the post-Soviet countries and Turkey, mainly in the Central Asian and Caucasian countries, and Russia.
