![[PDF]](/pb-assets/Icons/adobe-pdf-icon-1498649896243.png){kind=icon}
Abstract
Contemporary U.S. policy makers often characterize the U.S. counterinsurgency experience in El Salvador as a successful model to be followed in other contexts. This article argues that these characterizations significantly overstate the positive lessons of El Salvador, and ignore important cautionary implications. During the first part of the conflict, neither the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) nor the U.S. followed the tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine. The FAES killed tens of thousands of non-combatants in 1979 and 1980, before the civil war even began. This repression may have preempted an incipient popular insurrection, but it also locked in a determined social base that enabled the armed left to build a highly effective and sustained insurgency. In 1984, the U.S. had to save the FAES from likely defeat through a major increase in military aid, especially airpower. When the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) switched to a classical guerrilla strategy, the FAES, despite considerable U.S. aid, seldom followed best practices in counterinsurgency. Democratization and redistributional reforms were partial and flawed in implementation. The war settled into a stalemate that would likely have continued indefinitely had it not been for the collapse of the socialist bloc and significant changes in the interests of Salvadoran elites that were largely incidental to U.S. policies.The most important cautionary lesson is that indiscriminate violence against civilians early in a conflict can create dynamics that are very difficult to overcome in subsequent stages.
|
"The 2004 Campaign; Excerpts From the Debate Between the Vice Presidential Candidates in Cleveland," New York Times October 6, 2004, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9902E3DC163BF935A35753C1A9629C8B63&scp=1&sq=THE+2004+CAMPAIGN%3B+Excerpts+From+the+Debate+Between+the+Vice+Presidential+Candidates+in+Cleveland&st=nyt. Google Scholar | |
|
Todd Greentree , Crossroads of Intervention: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), 77-85. Google Scholar | |
|
General David A. Petraeus and General James F. Amos , Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, December 15, 2006, sec. IV, 5. Google Scholar | |
| Although in later years the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) did become much more selective in its use of violence, that had not yet taken place by this stage. Both death squad killings and rural massacres were commonplace until the mid-1980s. Google Scholar | |
|
Elisabeth Wood , Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 52-77. Google Scholar | |
| Some $45 million in aid that had been held was released again in early 1991 after Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) forces shot down a U.S. helicopter and summarily executed two survivors of the crash. Google Scholar | |
|
William D. Stanley , The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 133-217. Google Scholar | |
| See, e.g., Carlos Rafael Cabarrús , Génesis de una revolución: Analysis del surgimiento y desarrollo de la organización campesina en El Salvador (Mexico City: La Casa Chata, 1983). Google Scholar | |
|
Stanley , Protection Racket State, 107-32. Google Scholar | |
|
Mariano Castro Morán , Función política del ejército Salvadoreño en el presente siglo ( San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1989 ), 412-15. Google Scholar | |
|
Stanley , Protection Racket State, 133-77. Google Scholar | |
|
James Cheek , author interview, March 1989, Washington, DC. Google Scholar | |
|
Stanley , Protection Racket State, 178-217. For a contrasting view, see Brian J. Bosch , The Salvadoran Officer Corps and the Final Offensive of 1981 ( Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1999). Google Scholar | |
| Ambassador Robert White, author interview, April 1990, Washington, DC. Google Scholar | |
|
Robert White , "Assistance to GOES; Timing and Composition," cable 1886 from the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador to the Secretary of State in Washington, DC, March 13, 1980. Declassified, author files. Google Scholar | |
|
U.S. Department of State , "Communist Interference in El Salvador," State Department White Paper ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office , February 23, 1981), 2. Google Scholar | |
|
Jeanne Kirkpatrick , "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary 68 (1979): 34-45; Lewis Tambs, ed., A New Interamerican Policy for the Eighties: A Report of the Committee of Santa Fe (Washington DC: Council for Interamerican Security, 1980); Cleto DiGiovanni and Roger Fontaine , "Castro’s Specter ," Washington Quarterly 3 (1980): 3-27. Google Scholar | |
|
National Security Council , "Document 16: Interagency Paper on U.S. Policy in El Salvador," January 26, 1981, National Security Archives; U.S. Department of State, "Situation in El Salvador: Testimony of the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs (Bushnell) and Henry Brandon of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the House Appropriations Committee, February 25, 1981," in American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1981 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), 1255-56. Google Scholar | |
|
Hugh Byrne , El Salvador’s Civil War: A Study of Revolution ( Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996 ), 88. Google Scholar | |
|
The Popular Revolutionary Army controlled areas in eastern El Salvador that were most suitable for infiltrating weapons. Other groups had stronger popular base networks, which assisted in arms distribution, intelligence gathering, and other logistics. The Popular Liberation Front had a particularly strong and tightly organized rural base, the Armed Forces of Liberation was small but had an adept urban commando group, and the National Resistance and Central American Workers Party had small but useful regional forces. Google Scholar | |
|
José Angel Bracamonte and David Spencer , Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas ( Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 7-8. Google Scholar | |
|
Mark Danner , Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War (New York : Vintage, 1994). Google Scholar | |
|
Andrew J. Bacevich , James D. Hallums , Richard H. White , and Thomas F. Young , American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, Special Report ( Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s , 1988), 26. Google Scholar | |
|
Benjamin C. Schwartz , American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 1991), 17-22. Google Scholar | |
| Ibid.; Bacevich et al., American Military Policy. Google Scholar | |
|
U.S. Congress , "Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for Fiscal Year 1982: Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 97th Congress, 1st Session, February 25, 1981" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 261-62. Google Scholar | |
| One suspects that the full report is even more frank than the very heavily redacted version currently declassified. Google Scholar | |
|
U.S. Congress, "Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982: Part 9: Markup, House Foreign Affairs Committee , April 28-30, May 5-7 and 12-13, 1981, 97th Congress, 1st Session" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 38-81. Google Scholar | |
|
Mark Peceny , Democracy at the Point of Bayonets ( University Park: Penn State University Press, 1999). Google Scholar | |
| Cable number 3088 from the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador to the State Department in Washington, DC, April 9, 1982. Google Scholar | |
|
Cynthia Arnson , Crossroads: Congress, the Regan Administration, and Central America (New York: Pantheon, 1989), 149. Google Scholar | |
|
Terry Lynn Karl , "Imposing Consent? Electoralism vs. Democratization in El Salvador," in Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985, ed. Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva (La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, 1986), 25. Google Scholar | |
|
Arnson , Crossroads, 149-54. Google Scholar | |
|
Bacevich et al., American Military Policy, 5, 28-33. Google Scholar | |
| A contributing factor in the FMLN’s shrinkage was the decision to abandon forced recruitment, which had generated loyalty problems. Moreover, following the transition to a guerrilla strategy, large forces were a liability. We have seen no evidence that the FMLN faced any difficulties in maintaining a roughly constant force structure throughout the late 1980s, and it was able to partially rebuild its regular forces after heavy losses in November 1989. Google Scholar | |
|
Bacevich et al., American Military Policy, 40-43. Google Scholar | |
| Ibid., 40-43. Google Scholar | |
| Ibid. Google Scholar | |
|
D. Michael Shafer , Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press , 1988); Greentree, Crossroads of Intervention , 73-108. Google Scholar | |
|
Terry Lynn Karl , "After La Palma: The Prospects for Democratization in El Salvador," World Policy Journal 1 (Spring 1985): 305-30. Google Scholar | |
|
CIA 1989, 12, Direct of Central Intelligence, "National Intelligence Estimate, El Salvador: Government and Insurgent Prospects," (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, February,1989 , declassified with redactions), 8-20. As Elisabeth Wood points out in Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador ( Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), the "two-faced" strategy was not limited to urban areas but also involved agricultural cooperative federations and other organizations prominent in rural areas that similarly provided an organizational base for the FMLN that brought logistical and political benefits. Google Scholar | |
| Bracamonte and Spencer, Strategy and Tactics, 128-37. Google Scholar | |
| Civilian casualties during the offensive were not well documented. The Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported 2,400 civilians killed in November and December, citing unnamed "official sources." The figure of 1,000 civilian casualties in San Salvador was commonly mentioned in the press but, like most such estimates, difficult to corroborate. A great deal of firepower was unleashed on the occupied neighborhoods, and it is likely that significant civilian casualties occurred, especially in the initial days of the offensive when civilians had not yet been able to flee the combat area. See Organization of American States, "Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1989-1990" (Washington, DC: OEA/Ser.L/V/II.77 rev. 1, doc. 7, May 14, 1990), chap. 4, http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/89.90eng/chap4b.htm. Google Scholar | |
| Ambassador William Walker, author interview, July 1992, Washington, DC. Google Scholar | |
| Wood, Forging Democracy from Below. Google Scholar | |
|
Herman Rosa , AID y las Transformaciones Globales en El Salvador: El Papel de la Política de Asistancia Economica de los Estados Unidos desde 1980 ( Managua: CRIES , 1993), 75-95. Google Scholar | |
|
Wood , Forging Democracy from Below; Jeffrey Paige, Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997 ). Google Scholar | |
| In late 1990 and early 1991, U.S. policy makers were skeptical about the peace process in the wake of the FMLN’s introduction of sophisticated antiaircraft missiles in late 1990 and the shooting down and subsequent murder of U.S. military personnel in early 1991. However, U.S. diplomats strongly supported the crucial negotiations on police and military reform, held in New York in September 1991, and their advocacy helped overcome resistance within the FAES to a negotiated settlement. Google Scholar | |
|
Mark Peceny and William Stanley , "Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America," International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 149-82. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
David Galula , Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice ( New York : Praeger, 2006), 52. Google Scholar | |
| Petraeus and Amos, Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, sec. I, 21. Google Scholar | |
|
David Kilcullen , The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One ( New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 264-67. Google Scholar | |
|
Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr. , Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts ( Chicago: Markham, 1970). Google Scholar | |
|
Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. , The Army and Vietnam ( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press , 1986), 5; also see Andrew J. Bacevich , The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War ( New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); John D. Waghelstein , "What’s Wrong in Iraq? Or Ruminations of a Pachyderm," Military Review 86 (January- February 2006): 112-17. Google Scholar | |
|
Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson , "Inequality and Insurgency," American Political Science Review 81, no. 2 ( 1987): 425-51; Edward Muller and Erich Weede , "Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A Rational Action Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 4 (1990): 624-51. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Kilcullen , Accidental Guerrilla , 1-38. Google Scholar | |
|
Mark Irving Lichbach , "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," Journal of Conflict Resolution 31, no. 2 (1987): 266-97; T. David Mason and Dale A. Krane , "The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror," International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 1 (1989): 175-98; Marwan Khawaja , "Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank," Sociological Forum 8 (1993): 47-71; Christian Davenport , "The Dictator’s Dilemma," in Repression and Mobilization, ed. Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Carol Mueller ( Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press , 2005), 58-81. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | ISI | |
|
Lichbach , "Deterrence or Escalation?"; Ronald Francisco, "The Relationship between Coercion and Protest," Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 2 (1995): 263-82. Google Scholar | |
|
Mason and Krane , "Political Economy." Google Scholar | |
| See Tom Gibb , "Salvador: Under the Shadow of Dreams," undated manuscript; Wood, Insurgent Collective Action. Google Scholar | |
|
Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, 98. Google Scholar | |
| By indiscriminate, we mean violence that does not distinguish between nonviolent opposition, such as protests and strikes, and insurgency. This of course oversimplifies the spectrum of opposition activity. Protesters who resort to such violence as arson, burning buses, and rock throwing are nonetheless distinct from organized insurgents undertaking a military campaign against the state. Google Scholar | |
|
Petraeus and Amos , Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, sec. 6, 5. Google Scholar | |
|
For example, the analysts and military officers who most often cited the Salvadoran success story argued against the recent "surge" in favor of a lighter American footprint in Iraq. Julian Barnes and Peter Speigel, "Fallback Strategy for Iraq: Train Locals, Draw down Forces," Los Angeles Times, March 11, 2007, http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimes885.html. Google Scholar | |
|
Angel Rabasa , "El Salvador: 1980-1992," in Money in the Bank Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, ed. Angel Rabasa , Lesley Anne Warner , Peter Chalk , Ivan Khilko , and Paraag Shukla ( Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 45. Google Scholar | |
|
Kilcullen , Accidental Guerrilla. Google Scholar |
