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Abstract
Autonomy is increasingly rejected as a fundamental principle by liberal political theorists because it is regarded as incompatible with respect for diversity. This article seeks, via an analysis of the Danish cartoon controversy, to show that the relationship between autonomy and diversity is more complex than often posited. Particularly, it asks whether the autonomy defense of freedom of expression encourages disrespect for religious feelings. Autonomy leads to disrespect for diversity only when it is understood as a character ideal that must be promoted as an end in itself. If it by contrast is understood as something we should presume everyone possesses, it provides a strong basis for equal respect among people from diverse cultures. A Kantian conception of autonomy can justify the right to freedom of expression while it at the same time requires that we in the exercise of freedom of expression show respect for others as equals.
| John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Charles Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chap. 6. Google Scholar | |
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William A. Galston , Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chap. 2. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
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Chandran Kukathas , "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 228-56, 242. Google Scholar | |
| For overviews of the place of autonomy within liberalism, see Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 229ff.; Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 36ff.; John Christman and Joel Anderson, eds., Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Google Scholar | |
| When I speak of "Kantian" and "Millian" conceptions of autonomy, the understanding of these conceptions is not intended to represent the considered views of either Mill or Kant. The labels are used as a convenient way of referring to ideas that are often associated with Kant and Mill, respectively. However, while the two conceptions of autonomy do not necessarily represent the understandings of autonomy that the two philosophers would subscribe to, they are Kantian and Millian in the sense that they are present in their writings. For these two different uses of "Kantian," see Robert S. Taylor, "Kantian Personal Autonomy," Political Theory 33, no. 5 (October 2005): 602-28, 603. Google Scholar | |
| The article applies a number of moral notions such as autonomy, respect, and arrogance to a concrete case, why it might be called an exercise in applied ethics. It is important to emphasize that such an exercise by no means is a matter of simple deduction giving clear-cut answers based on abstract principles applied to an unproblematic case. Cf. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, "Relativism, Universalism, and Applied Ethics: The Case of Female Circumcision," Constellations 14, no. 1 (2007): 91-111, 105. Google Scholar | |
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Avner de-Shalit , Power to the People: Teaching Political Philosophy in Skeptical Times ( Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006 ), 6. Google Scholar | |
| It will be noted that I write that "some" and not "all" religious feelings should be respected based on a commitment to Kantian autonomy. In public deliberation, which is my focus, it would give religious groups an improper veto over what counts as wrongful expression if all religious feelings without qualification should be heeded. Rather, the argument is that the principle of autonomy properly understood requires that everyone, speakers and listeners, be respected as capable of contributing insights into determining what constitutes the proper limits of public deliberation. This procedural and democratic approach, of course, relies on substantive moral commitments, and these are the basis for condemning the arrogance of the defenders of the cartoons who-as we shall see-did not respect Muslims’ ability to contribute to public deliberation over the limits of freedom of expression. These moral commitments equally imply the wrongfulness of heeding the claims of listeners who demand the right to unilaterally determine the limits of freedom of expression and its proper use. Google Scholar | |
| Flemming Rose, "Muhammeds ansigt" [The face of Muhammad], Jyllands-Posten, September 30, 2005, my translation. Google Scholar | |
| On the different frames in the Danish news coverage of the controversy, see Peter Hervik and Clarissa Berg, "Denmark: A Political Struggle in Danish Journalism," in Reading the Mohammed Cartoons Controversy: An International Analysis of Press Discourses on Free Speech and Political Spin, ed. Risto Kunelius, et al. (Bochum, Germany: Projekt Verlag, 2007), 25-39. Google Scholar | |
| Editorial, "Truslen fra mørket" [The threat from the dark], Jyllands-Posten, September 30, 2005, my translation. Google Scholar | |
| On Rasmussen’s refusal to meet the ambassadors, see Klaus and Michael Rothstein , Bomben i turbanen [The bomb in the turban] (Copenhagen : Tiderne Skifter, 2006), 32ff. Google Scholar | |
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Quoted from Pernille Ammitzbøll and Vidino Lorenzo , "After the Danish Cartoon Controversy," Middle East Quarterly 14, no. 1 (2007): 3-11. Google Scholar | |
| John Hansen, "Jyllands-Posten havde ret til at bringe de tegninger-punktum" [Jyllands-Posten had a right to publish those cartoons-period], interview with Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Jyllands-Posten, October 1, 2006, my translation. Google Scholar | |
| Karen Jespersen, "Islam har brug for en oplysningstid" [Islam needs enlightenment], Berlingske Tidende, February 4, 2006, my translation. Google Scholar | |
| Karen Jespersen and Ralf Pittelkow, Islamister og naivister-et anklageskrift [Islamists and naivists-an indictment] (Copenhagen: People’s Press, 2006), 25, my translation. The authors of this book are, respectively, a former cabinet minister, also cited above, and a commentator at Jyllands-Posten. Google Scholar | |
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William A. Galston , "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105, no. 3 (April 1995): 516-34. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
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Anders Jerichow and Mille Rode , eds., Profet-affæren: Et PEN-dossier om 12 Muhammed-tegninger-og hvad der siden hændte [The Prophet Affair: A PEN dossier about 12 Muhammad cartoons-and what followed] (Danish PEN, n.d.), 35ff. Google Scholar | |
| Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 21. Google Scholar | |
| See Ulf Hedetoft, "Denmark’s Cartoon Blowback," openDemocracy, March 1, 2006, http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/blowback_3315.jsp (accessed March 18, 2008). Google Scholar | |
| Jyllands-Posten is Denmark’s largest newspaper and is ideologically close to the current government. The newspaper’s anti-immigrant and anti-Islam position is widely shared in the Danish population, as indicated both by the widespread support for the government’s restrictive immigration policies and in public discourse. See Jørgen Goul Andersen, et al., eds., Det nye politiske landskab: Folketingsvalget 2005 i perspektiv [The new political landscape: Perspectives on the 2005 parliamentary election] (Århus, Denmark: Academia, 2007). Google Scholar | |
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Susan J. Brison , "The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech," Ethics 108, no. 2 (January 1998): 312-39, 312ff. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
| I here use the distinction between concept and conception, according to which the concept refers to the overall idea or the core meaning, and conceptions are rival ways of understanding, applying, and/or specifying the concept. See W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955-56): 167-98; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1999), 5. Google Scholar | |
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T.M. Scanlon , "A Theory of Freedom of Expression," in The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy ( Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6-25. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
| Ibid., 15. Google Scholar | |
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C. Edwin Baker, for example, justifies freedom of expression with reference to its role in fostering self-realization and self-determination. See his Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989), 5, 59. Google Scholar | |
| See Daniel Jacobson, "Mill on Liberty, Speech, and the Free Society," Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2000): 276-309, 294ff. Google Scholar | |
| Joshua Cohen has criticized theories that justify freedom of expression on the basis of autonomy for being sectarian. See his "Freedom of Expression," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 3 (1993): 207-63, 221ff. Google Scholar | |
| Joseph H. Carens, "Free Speech and Democratic Norms in the Danish Cartoons Controversy," International Migration 44, no. 5 (2006): 33-42; Christian F. Rostbøll, "Ytringsfrihed, respekt og ansvar" [Freedom of expression, respect, and responsibility], Tidsskriftet Politik 10, no. 4 (2007): 76-85; Ole Wæver, "Aviser og religioner i en globaliseret verden" [Newspapers and religions in a globalized world], in Gudebilleder-Ytringsfrihed og religion i en globaliseret verden [Images of God: Freedom of expression and religion in a globalized world], ed. Lisbet Christoffersen (Copenhagen: Tiderne Skifter, 2006), 181-208. Google Scholar | |
| Below, I argue that listeners do not have a veto regarding what counts as disrespectful expression. Google Scholar | |
| Later, I argue that this constraint can be grounded in the Kantian conception of autonomy, and thus autonomy as a character ideal should not be abandoned but must be constrained by this other conception of autonomy. Google Scholar | |
| Flemming Rose, "Why I Published Those Cartoons," Washington Post, February 19, 2006. Google Scholar | |
| It may be asked whether Jyllands-Posten and its defenders were committed to any principles at all or paid only lip service to "Enlightenment values" while they were in fact promoting a nationalist project. If that is the case, it is interesting to note how well autonomy as a character ideal serves the latter project. One can also question whether autonomy as a character ideal is an "Enlightenment value." However, my aim is not to enter an argument about how best to understand the Enlightenment but only to engage those who talk about autonomy as an Enlightenment value and who by autonomy seems to refer to something like the character ideal I have been discussing. Google Scholar | |
| Below, I consider the objection that "as long as the means serves the end" is a sufficient moral constraint. Google Scholar | |
| When I say that all human beings are presumed to possess autonomy, this should be understood as an absolute that implies that no one can altogether forfeit respect as an autonomous human being. I think the same holds for Kant: "Kant typically treats autonomy as an all-or-nothing trait that grounds a basic respect due to all human beings, as opposed to a variable respect earned only by the most conscientious." Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "The Kantian Conception of Autonomy," in Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 76-96, 79; also see Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 91ff., 108. However, while Kantian autonomy sets an absolute limit on how we can treat others, it is not an absolute in the sense that it implies that one cannot further develop autonomy and approximate some ideal of the rational, independent, and reflective person. Moreover, I do not think we can reduce the Kantian notion to a universal capacity for autonomy since for practical purposes we are required to presume others not merely to be able to develop autonomy but to treat others as always already autonomous beings who can contribute reasons of their own regarding what is right and wrong, valuable and not. It is my hope that my analysis of the cartoon controversy and the discussion below can show the practical importance of this distinction. Google Scholar | |
| See David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and the Politics of Identity (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999); Rostbøll, "Ytringsfrihed, respekt og ansvar." Google Scholar | |
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Immanuel Kant , Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 37, Ak.4:428. Google Scholar | |
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Immanuel Kant , The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 186, Ak.6:434-35. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
| Also see Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice, 70-72; Rawls, Political Liberalism, 19ff., 81ff. Google Scholar | |
| Stephen Darwall, "Two Kinds of Respect," Ethics 88 (1977): 36-49; Darwall, The Second-person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 122ff. Google Scholar | |
| Darwall, The Second-person Standpoint, 123. Google Scholar | |
| Ibid., 120. Google Scholar | |
| Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 199, Ak. 6:449. Google Scholar | |
| Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 39-42, Ak. 4:431-34. Google Scholar | |
| Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 187, Ak. 6:435. Google Scholar | |
| Darwall, The Second-person Standpoint, 136. Google Scholar | |
| I am grateful to Peter Jones for this way of putting the point. Google Scholar | |
| Some defenders of the cartoons would reply that the cartoons were criticisms of specific beliefs, for example, of the belief in religiously justified terrorism. However, the justification of the cartoons was not primarily that one should be free to mock specific (erroneous and dangerous) beliefs but that one can mock whomever and whatever one wishes no matter the purpose of doing so. It is the latter point I reject. It moves too swiftly from the principle that no beliefs should be held free of criticism to the idea that one can say or publish anything in any context. Cf. Carens, "Free Speech and Democratic Norms in the Danish Cartoons Controversy," 36ff. Google Scholar | |
| Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice, 84. Google Scholar | |
| See Peter Jones, "Respecting Beliefs and Rebuking Rushdie," British Journal of Political Science 20, no. 4 (October 1990): 415-37, 429. Google Scholar | |
| Phillipe Val, the editor of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, which was brought to court for publishing the cartoons, thus said it was "racist" to claim that all Muslims were hurt by the cartoons because this assumed that they are "not smart enough to understand cartoons." See Jørgen Ullerup, "Muhammed-krig i retslokalet" [Muhammad war in the court room], Jyllands-Posten, February 8, 2007, my translation. Google Scholar | |
| Jespersen and Pittelkow, Islamister og naivister, 178, my translation. Google Scholar | |
| As Anna Elisabetta Galeotti notes, "Universalists who do not acknowledge the implications of the application of their principles can be both particularistic and dogmatic: particularistic because their views embody particular interpretations, and dogmatic because obscuring such interpretations places them beyond critical scrutiny." See "Relativism, Universalism, and Applied Ethics," 106. Google Scholar | |
| I pursue this line of argument further in Christian F. Rostbøll, "The Use and Abuse of ‘Universal Values’ in the Danish Cartoon Controversy" (paper, American Political Science Association annual meeting, Boston, August 28-31, 2008). Google Scholar | |
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Robert Post , "Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad," Constellations 14, no. 1 (2007): 72-90, 81. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
| Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’" in Kant: Political Writings, 2nd ed., ed. Hans Reis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54-60, 57. Kant actually does not use the term autonomy in this connection. Google Scholar | |
| Also see note 35 above. Google Scholar | |
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Gerald F. Gaus , "The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism," in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, ed. John Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 272-306, 297-99. Google Scholar | |
| Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 37. Google Scholar | |
| Pamela Johnston Conover, Donald D. Searing, and Ivor M. Crewe, "The Deliberative Potential of Political Discussion," British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 1 (2002): 21-62, 55. Google Scholar | |
| For strong and weak conceptions of autonomy, see Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 36ff. Google Scholar | |
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Rainer Forst , "A Critical Theory of Multicultural Toleration ," in Multiculturalism and Political Theory, ed. Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 292-311, 302ff. Google Scholar | |
| On the point that freedom of expression should not be "placed at the mercy of others’ willingness to react in violent and disorderly ways," see Jones, "Respecting Beliefs and Rebuking Rushdie," 435. Google Scholar | |
| Also see Christian F. Rostbøll, "Freedom of Expression, Deliberation, Autonomy, and Respect," European Journal of Political Theory (forthcoming). Google Scholar | |
| Post, "Religion and Freedom of Speech," 76ff. Post is concerned with legal limits on freedom of expression, but this point is relevant in relation to self-restraint as well. Google Scholar |
