The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control
Abstract
The alleged crisis in American civil-military relations has revived a long-standing theoretical debate about the determinants of civilian control. So far, the debate has followed lines of analysis laid by the original dispute between Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Viewed from a post-Cold War perspective, however, neither model is attractive. In this article, I define the basic problematique both the Huntingtonian and Janowitzean theories attempt to explain: how to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do. Next I critically evaluate and call into question the continued validity of key propositions of each theory and especially their reliance on "professionalism." The article concludes with a brief summary of the criteria that should guide the development of a new theory of civilian control.
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1.
1. Following on the heels of journalistic accounts of civil-military friction within the Clinton administration, several analysts have alleged that a serious rift has developed in the traditional relationship: John Cushman, "Bungling the Informal Contract," Proceedings of the Naval Institute 120, 1 (January 1994): 10-13; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, 35 (Spring 1994): 3-17. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, 29-33. Colin Powell, John Lehman, William Odom, Samuel Huntington, and Richard Kohn, "Exchange on Civil-Military Relations." National Interest, 36 (Summer 1994): 23-31. Russell Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57, 5 (October 1993): 27-58.
2.
2. "Who's in Charge of the Military?" New York Times, 26 January 1993, A18; John Lancaster, "Clinton and the Military: Is Gay Policy Just the Opening Skirmish?" Washington Post, 1 February 1993, A10; Christopher Matthews, "Clinton, Drop Military Salute," The Arizona Republic, 22 March 1993, All; "The Military and the Commander-in-Chief, " transcript of ABC News Nightline, 30 March 1993; Barton Gellman, "Turning an About-Face Into a Forward March," Washington Post, 1 April 1993, Al; "Commander in Chief," Washington Post, 4 April 1993, C6; David S. Jonas and Hagen W. Frank, "Basic Military Leadership," Washington Post, 4 April 1993, C7; Eric Schmitt, "Clinton, in Gesture of Peace, Pops in on Pentagon," New York Times, 9 April 1993, A8; John Lancaster and Ann Dewey, "Storming the Pentagon," Washington Post, 9 April 1993, Al; John Lancaster, "Crowe Discounts Military Objection to Homosexuals," Washington Post, 11 April 1993, A16; Michael R. Gordon, "Joint Chiefs Warn Congress Against More Military Cuts," New York Times, 16 April 1993, A8; Helen Thomas, "Clinton Seeks Improved Image with Military," United Press International, 7 May 1993, newswire; John Lancaster, "Accused of Ridiculing Clinton, General Faces Air Force Probe," Washington Post, 8 June 1993, Al; John Lancaster, "Air Force General Sets Retirement," Washington Post, 19 June 1993, Al; Tom Philpott, "Blue Mood Rising," Army Times, 14 June 1993, 14-20; David H. Hackworth, "Rancor in the Ranks: The Troops vs. the President," Newsweek, 28 June 1993, 24-25.
3.
3. See especially Kohn, "Out of Control," and Weigley, "The American Military."
4.
4. Charles Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22, 4 (Winter 1992/93): 2-20; and Charles Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review 29, 2 (1994) 341-392.
5.
5. This brief discussion aims solely to set up the problem of civilian control and is not intended to substitute for a comprehensive examination of the anthropological roots of war. For a useful if somewhat dated bibliography of that field see, R. Brian Ferguson, The Anthropology of War: A Bibliography (New York: Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, 1988).
6.
6. To be sure, the mythical person may find that brandishing a sword to ward off enemies creates more enemies than it intimidates. This is the famous security dilemma and, while important, does not raise the issues of control that are of interest in this study. A closer analogy might be if the mythical person found that in brandishing the sword he was likely to lop off his own head.
7.
7. Of course, the military may also be used in less urgent situations and for less urgent purposes, on which more in the text. At the most fundamental level, however, the central purpose of the military is to protect society either through offensive or defensive wars.
8.
8. In the conclusion, I return to the issue of the analytical distinction between civilian and military spheres—distinction that has become increasingly controversial as the functional and sociological differentiation between the two spheres has waxed and waned.
9.
9. Civilians are morally and politically competent to make the decisions even if they do not possess the relevant expertise (technical competence). Robert Dahl, Controlling Nuclear Weapons (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985).
10.
10. Jerome G. Kerwin, Civil-Military Relationships in American Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Harold D., Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950); Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr, The Civilian and the Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History (New York: Putnam, 1956); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms and The State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958).
11.
11. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, Morningside Edition, 1991); Eliot Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); and David Hendrickson, Reforming Defense: The State of American Civil-military Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
12.
12. Two important exceptions are the body of scholarship examining the role of the president in authorizing the use of force and the literature on the military-industrial complex. The former, however, is largely juridical in perspective, analyzing the issue in terms of what is or is not allowed under the Constitution. See, for instance: Thomas T. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender (New York: Liveright, 1974); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 1972); Jacob K. Javits, Who Makes War: The President vs. Congress (New York: Morrow, 1973); Abraham Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power: The Origins (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976). The military-industrial complex literature, in contrast, adopted a political science institutional focus, although its impact has been mixed. See Steven Rosen, ed., Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1973). See also, Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
13.
13. And, of course, there is a vast empirical literature on matters touching on civilmilitary relations, including defense organizational reform, defense procurement, defense policymaking, and so on. My point is that there has been very limited theoretical development, particularly as it pertains to the mechanisms of how civilian institutions control military ones in the United States.
14.
14. Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Timothy Colton, Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962); Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Claude Welch, ed., Civilian Control of the Military (New York: State University of New York Press, 1976); and Claude Welch, No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). While none accepts him uncritically, these scholars can be placed within the Huntingtonian tradition with the important and obvious exception of Finer. Perhaps the best comparative treatment within the Janowitz tradition is Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971).
15.
15. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960; Free Press, 1971); also Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Woods, eds., The Military: More Than Just a Job? (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988); and Samuel Sarkesian, The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1975). For a review of this literature see: Bernard Boene, "How `Unique' Should the Military Be? A Review of Representative Literature and Outline of a Synthetic Formulation," European Journal of Sociology 31, 1 (1990): 3-59; James Burk, "Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society." Armed Forces and Society 19, 2 (Winter 1993) 167-186; and James Burk, "Major Trends in Civil-Military Relations" (paper presented at the conference on "Sociology and War" sponsored by the Triangle Universities Security Seminar, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 18 November 1994). There is, of course, still another macro sociological school that examines civil-military relations and state formation. The principal work in this area includes: Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988); and Charles Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
16.
16. For example, Finer, Man on Horseback, especially 88-89; and Welch, Civilian Control of the Military.
17.
17. Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force," in Donald Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, eds., U. S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition? (Center for Strategic and International Studies 1995), 113-144.
18.
18. Recently, however, there have been efforts to reconstruct the theoretical edifice of civil-military relations. Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Michael Desch, "Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing U.S. Civil-Military Relations" (paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1995); and Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," Armed Forces & Society 22, 1 (Fall 1995): 7-24.
19.
19. Louis Smith's earlier American Democracy and Military Power covers much of the same empirical territory and continues to be informative. It is considerably less ambitious theoretically, however, and this helps explain why it is largely unfamiliar to current audiences. The classic work before World War II is Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: A Romance and Realities of a Profession (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1937). Huntington claims that his predecessors and intellectual competitors only produced "a confused and unsystematic set of assumptions and beliefs derived from the underlying premises of American liberalism... [theory that is] obsolete in that it is rooted in a hierarchy of values which is of dubious validity in the contemporary world. " Huntington, Soldier and State, vii.
20.
20. And, one might add, Huntington's theory thrives in part because its many vigorous critics have an interest in preserving the vitality of their principal foil.
21.
21. See Weigley, "The American Military," 31, n. 8.
22.
22. Huntington, Soldier and State, viii. See also 84-85.
23.
23. It is important to note that Marxism is "anti-military" in that it opposes the Weberian ideal-type military mind, as Huntington defines it: a world view that sees man as inherently evil, history as cyclical, power as essentially military, threats as ubiquitous, and foreign policy best conducted in a minimal, unadventuresome fashion. Marxism sees man as inherently good, history as progressive, power as essentially economic, threats as limited to class warfare, and foreign policy best conducted in a revolutionary fashion. Huntington allows, obviously, for a putatively Marxist "antimilitary" state like the Soviet Union nevertheless to build a huge military establishment with global reach and global import. Huntington, Soldier and State, 79 and 92.
24.
24. The functional and societal imperatives should not be confused with the problematique itself, which is logically prior to explaining changes in civilian control. The problematique speaks more to the why of civilian control than the how—the former being a question that is rarely made explicit in Huntington's theory. Huntington, Soldier and State, 2 and 156.
25.
25. Although Huntington's objective/subjective typology is the most influential legacy of Soldier and the State, Huntington did not in fact make extensive use of it in his subsequent empirical analysis of American military history. Moreover, in a 1977 retrospective, Huntington preferred to emphasize the extirpation-transmutation typology at the expense of objective or subjective control. He also added a third alternative reflecting his original policy recommendation, toleration, when societal values shift from liberalism in the direction of conservatism. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," in Civil-Military Relations, ed. Andrew W. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington (Washington: American Enterprise Institute; 1977), 5-28. The original extirpation-transmutation distinction is in Soldier and the State, 155- 156.
26.
26. Huntington states his claim with characteristic directness towards the close of the book: "The requisite for military security is a shift in basic American values from liberalism to conservatism. Only an environment which is sympathetically conservative will permit American military leaders to combine the political power which society thrusts upon them with the military professionalism without which society cannot endure" (464). Quotes in the body of the article are to 456 and 457, respectively.
27.
27. In the epilogue to Soldier and the State, rarely quoted by political scientists, Huntington paints a disparaging portrait of Highland Falls, the Norman Rockwellian village to the south of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He contrasts it with the order and serenity of West Point itself and appeals for the triumph of the latter over the former. "West Point embodies the military ideal at its best; Highland Falls the American spirit at its most commonplace. West Point is a gray island in a many colored sea, a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon; Yet is it possible to deny that the military values—loyalty, duty, restraint, dedication—are the ones America most needs today? That the disciplined order of West Point has more to offer than the garish individualism of Main Street? (465). Ironically, the shrinkage in budgets occasioned by the end of the Cold War may be giving West Point a Darwinian victory over Highland Falls' "small town commercialism." The cash-starved military academy has started to compensate for lost appropriations with revenues generated from new on-base retail businesses aimed at the cadet population. Because of tax advantages, the new military businesses are thriving, easily besting the civilian competition from Highland Falls. See Evelyn Nieves, "Sir! We're Losing Our Shirts, Sir!," New York Times, 12 May 1996, p. 29.
28.
28. Quotes are from Huntington, Soldier and State, 83 and 84, respectively. See also especially 74. Of course, the military can not enjoy autonomy on all matters touching on military affairs. Huntington argues that civilians must decide grand strategy matters and leave the lower level operational/tactical decisions in military hands. As I argue in the text, however, drawing the line between strategic and operational matters has proven extremely difficult and resulted in numerous violations of Huntington's idealized division of labor.
29.
29. Huntington documents this in Soldier and State. Louis Smith provides supporting evidence in American Democracy and Military Power, as does Allan R. Millett, "The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective," Mershon Center Position Papers in the Policy Sciences, Number 4, 1979.
30.
30. Michael Desch adds an additional independent variable, internal threat, which produces an interesting reformulation of Huntington's hypothesis that gets more variation while not being much finer-grained. Desch abandons, however, Huntington's objective-subjective measure of the dependent variable in his "Losing Control?" The assertive-delegative typology also addresses this problem with a more nuanced measure of the pattern of civilian control. Peter Feaver, "An American Crisis in Civilian Control and Civil-Military Relations?" The Tocqueville Review 17, 1 (1996): 159-184.
31.
31. See Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 9-11.
32.
32. All quotes to Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 26 and 11.
33.
33. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 11-13.
34.
34. Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of Democracy 6, 1 (January 1995) 65-78.
35.
35. Because of space constraints I do not discuss two additional alternative explanations in the text: (1) the Marxist explanation that ideology is epiphenomenal and that adequate military security was supplied because of the material economic interests of the military-industrial complex; and (2) Aaron Friedberg's explanation for why Lasswell's garrison-state never materialized, namely that nuclear deterrence permitted security on the cheap. I would argue that Friedberg provides a better rebuttal to the Marxist critique of Huntington than he does an alternative to Huntington himself. Cold War budgets may seem cheap in retrospect but only in comparison to an idealized maximum. And, despite the efforts of academic strategists, no U.S. government ever acted as if nuclear deterrence alone sufficed. Cold War military budgets remained high, much higher than Huntington expected when he wrote in 1957. These are not, then, satisfactory saves to Huntington's theory. Rosen, Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?" International Security 16, 4 (Spring 1992): 109-142.
36.
36. Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force."
37.
37. Richard Betts, Soldiers Statesmen and Cold War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) 11; and David H. Petraeus, "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era," (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1987), 115-126.
38.
38. The success of Desert Storm, where such micromanagement was apparently not evident, offers further support. It is not clear, however, that the conventional wisdom is correct on how hands-off the civilian leadership was during Desert Storm. Likewise, it is not obvious that solicitude to civilian direction is what produced the problem in Vietnam. The more general proposition that civilian micromanagement produces failure remains unproven conventional wisdom, deserving further careful empirical study. On Desert Storm see: Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 225, 347, 364-365, and 368; Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press Morningside Edition, 1991), 223; Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 94-96, and 122; H. Norman Schwarzkopf, with Peter Petre, The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 325-326, 361-362, 441-445. For an argument that the Army was insufficiently attentive to civilian direction, see Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, 49-75.
39.
39. Interestingly, in his 1977 update, Huntington did not discuss these traditional measures of professionalism, adopting instead the Janowitzean language of congruence/convergence. For Huntington, congruence with civilian institutions—measured in terms of personnel, function, and structure—varies negatively with professionalism: the greater the congruence the less the military is professional. During the early Cold War, Huntington saw greater congruence (hence lesser professionalism), but he saw the trends reversing in the early 1970s with the abandonment of the draft and the decline of ROTC at elite schools. Thus, albeit using different measures, Huntington could argue that professionalism declined with civilian interference. Such a defense of hypothesis #3, however, would cut against the logic undergirding hypothesis #2, which held that professionalism accompanied an increase in military security: Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 22-25.
40.
40. Indeed, Finer argues that some features of professionalism may even encourage the military to subvert civilian control. For instance, professionalism increases military capacity to act decisively, thus enabling the military to accomplish difficult tasks such as a coup. Moreover, there is a tendency among professional armies to see themselves as "servants of the state rather than the government in power," thus weakening the authority of individual civilian leaders: Finer, Man on Horseback, 24-27. Others have echoed Finer's critique, notably Janowitz, discussed in the text, and Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).
41.
41. Welch, Civilian Control of the Military. Alain Rouquie, in his review of military history in Latin America, advances the polar opposite thesis of Huntington: that civilian government tended to be supreme until the military professionalized, indeed the military could only coup after they had gone through this modernization phase and enjoyed the autonomy Huntington recommends. Rouquie, The Military and the State, 72-116. Also Stepan, The Military in Politics.
42.
42. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier.
43.
43. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 418.
44.
44. David R. Segal, "National Security and Democracy in the United States," Armed Forces & Society 20, 3 (Spring 1994): 375-394.
45.
45. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 435.
46.
46. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 367-369.
47.
47. Arthur D. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 2, 1 (Spring 1974) 62.
48.
48. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 363-367.
49.
49. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 350-360.
50.
50. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 439-440.
51.
51. The terms are Arthur Larson's in Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control," 62-64.
52.
52. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 440.
53.
53. Larson, "Military Professionalism," 62.
54.
54. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 420.
55.
55. In contrast with Huntington, moreover, Janowitz's understanding of civilian control is not specified in cause-effect hypotheses and so does not lend itself to traditional hypothesis testing.
56.
56. Charles Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," Armed Forces & Society 4, 1 (Pall 1977) 41-50. Moskos and Woods, The Military: More Than Just a Job.
57.
57. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control," 65.
58.
58. Elsewhere I have proposed such a theory drawing upon insights from microeconomics' principal-agent framework. Peter D. Feaver, "Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations," Working Paper No. 4 of the Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, May 1996.
59.
59. Bernard Boene, "How `Unique' Should the Military Be?" passim.
60.
60. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. For a recent emphatic recapitulation of this argument, see David W. Tarr and Peter J. Roman, "Serving the Commander-in-Chief: Advice and Dissent" (paper presented at the 1995 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago Hilton Towers, 31 August-3 September 1995), and Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, "Soldiers, Presidents, and the Use of Force in the Post Cold War" (paper presented at the 1995 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago Hilton Towers, 31 August-3 September 1995).
61.
61. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered," 10.
62.
62. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered," 10.
63.
63. For this reason, Tarr and Roman's related claim that civil and military actors are "functionally indistinguishable" on decisions concerning the use of force is also unhelpful. Roles overlap, but the military and the civilian players know who is military and who is civilian and, of course, it matters for how each player's advice and interests get considered. Tarr and Roman, "Serving the Commander-in-Chief," 20-22.
64.
64. Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization, 17.
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