![[PDF]](/pb-assets/Icons/adobe-pdf-icon-1498649896243.png){kind=icon}
Abstract
What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I investigate this question in the context of the United Nations system, which has undergone a dramatic shift in financing. Long associated with mandatory contributions, the United Nations increasingly relies on voluntary resources earmarked by individual donors. Previous studies have investigated the financing puzzle from a behavioral perspective and have found that wealthy donors use voluntary funding to rein in costs and constrain international organization programs. Providing an alternative theoretical approach, I investigate the financing puzzle from an institutional design perspective. I provide original United Nations funding rule data to demonstrate that it is not only funding practices, but also underlying funding rules, that have changed over time. I theorize how states with favorable views of the United Nations that sought to expand its activities — rather than those that desired to constrain it — had incentives to introduce funding rules that offered more flexibility and control to donors. I test the argument with a longitudinal case study of funding rule design and change at United Nations economic development institutions. The article expands the institutional design literature by integrating funding rules as a consequential design component and provides a novel explanation for changes in United Nations financing.
References
|
Alger, C (1973) The United States and the United Nations. International Organization 27: 1–23. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Barnett, M, Finnemore, M (2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Google Scholar | |
|
Bhouraskar, D (2007) United Nations Development Aid: A Study in History and Politics. New Delhi: Academic Foundation. Google Scholar | |
|
Boureston, J, Semmel, A (2010) The IAEA and nuclear security: Trends and prospects. The Stanley Foundation. Google Scholar | |
|
Broz, JL (2008) Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions. The Review of International Organizations 3: 351–374. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Claude, I (1963) The political framework of the United Nations’ financial problems. International Organization 17: 831–859. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Collier, D, Brady, H, Seawright, J (2004) Sources of leverage in causal inference. In: Brady, H, Collier, D (eds) Rethinking Social Inquiry. Plymouth, United Kingdom: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pp. 229–266. Google Scholar | |
|
Copelovitch, M (2010) Master or servant? Common agency and the political economy of IMF lending. International Studies Quarterly 54: 49–77. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Duffield, J (2003) The limits of “rational design.” International Organization 57: 411–430. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) (1965) Proceedings from the second (economic and financial committee). New York. Google Scholar | |
|
ECOSOC (2011) Analysis of funding for operational activities for development of the United Nations system for 2009: Report of the Secretary-General. Geneva. Google Scholar | |
|
Eichenauer, V, Hug, S (2014) The politics of special purpose trust funds. Unpublished. Google Scholar | |
|
George, A, Bennett, A (2004) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press. Google Scholar | |
|
Gibson, D (1967) The financial problem of the United Nations. International Journal 22(2): 182–194. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | ISI | |
|
Graham, E (2015) Money and multilateralism: How funding rules constitute IO governance. International Theory 7: 162–194. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Gruber, L (2000) Ruling the World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Guzman, A (2002) International law: A compliance based theory. California Law Review 90: 1823. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Hanrieder, T (2014) Gradual change in international organizations: Agency theory and historical institutionalism. Politics 34: 324–333. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | ISI | |
|
Johnson, T, Urpelainen, J (2014) International bureaucrats and the formation of intergovernmental organizations: Institutional design discretion sweetens the pot. International Organization 68(1): 177–209. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Koremenos, B (2005) Contracting around international uncertainty. The American Political Science Review 99: 549–565. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Koremenos, B, Lipson, C, Snidal, D (2001a) The rational design of international institutions. International Organization 55: 761–799. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Koremenos, B, Lipson, C, Snidal, D (2001b) Rational design: Looking back to move forward. International Organization 55: 1051–1082. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Krasner, S (1991) Global communications and national power: Life on the Pareto frontier. World Politics 43: 336–366. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Litsios, S (2002) The long, difficult road to Alma-Ata: A personal reflection. International Journal of Health Services 32: 709–732. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | ISI | |
|
Mahoney, J, Thelen, K (eds) (2010) Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. New York, NY: CUP. Google Scholar | |
|
Mattli, W (2001) Private justice in a global economy: From litigation to arbitration. International Organization 55: 919–947. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Meyer, P (2014) Organization of American states: Background issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service Report, Washington, DC. Google Scholar | |
|
Moravcsik, A (1997) Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. International Organization 51: 513–553. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Moravcsik, A (2000) The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe. International Organization 54: 217. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Nielson, D, Tierney, M (2003) Delegation to international organizations: Agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. International Organization 57: 241–276. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2011) Aid effectiveness 2005–10: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration. Google Scholar | |
|
OECD (2014) Making earmarked funding more effective: Current practices and a way forward. Report No. 1. Google Scholar | |
|
Pelc, K (2009) Seeking escape: The use of escape clauses in international trade agreements. International Studies Quarterly 53: 349–368. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Rathbun, B (2011) Before hegemony: Generalized trust and the creation and design of international security institutions. International Organization 65: 243–273. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Reinsberg, B, Michaelowa, K, Knack, S (2015) Which Donors, Which Funds? the Choice of Multilateral Funds by Bilateral Donors at the World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper, no. WPS 7441. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Rosendorff, P, Milner, H (2001) The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape. International Organization 55: 829–857. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Russell, R (1958) A History of the United Nations Charter. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Google Scholar | |
|
Seawright, J, Collier, D (2004) Glossary. In: Brady, H, Collier, D (eds) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 273–313. Google Scholar | |
|
Sharp, W (1965) The administration of United Nations operational programs. International Organization 19: 581–602. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Sridhar, D, Woods, N (2013) Trojan multilateralism: Global cooperation in health. Global Policy 4: 325–335. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Tallberg, J, Sommerer, T, Squatrito, T (2016) Democratic membership in international organizations: Sources of institutional design. The Review of International Organizations 11: 59–87. Google Scholar | Crossref | ISI | |
|
Taylor, P (1991) The United Nations system under stress: Financial pressures and their consequences. Review of International Studies 17: 365–382. Google Scholar | Crossref | |
|
Thompson, A (2010) Rational design in motion: Uncertainty and flexibility in the global climate regime. European Journal of International Relations 16: 269–296. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals | ISI | |
|
UNAIDS (The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS) (1995) Decisions, recommendations and conclusions adopted by the first meeting of the program coordinating board of UNAIDS. Google Scholar | |
|
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (1967) Harmonization of administrative and financial procedures. Google Scholar | |
|
UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (1999) Management study on trust funds and counterpart contributions. Nairobi. Google Scholar | |
|
UN Juridical Yearbook (1966) Chapter VI. Selected legal opinions of the Secretariat of the United Nations and related inter-governmental organizations. pp. 222–264. Google Scholar | |
|
UN Yearbook (1946–2013). New York, NY: United Nations. Google Scholar | |
|
US Congress (1955) Review of the United Nations charter; compilation of staff studies prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Google Scholar | |
|
US Congress (1983) The U.S. role in the United Nations: Hearings before the Subcommittee Committee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing, House of Representatives, 98th Congress. Google Scholar | |
|
US Department of State (1944) Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1944 (vol. 1). Google Scholar | |
|
US Department of State (1945) Foreign Relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. Google Scholar | |
|
WHO (World Health Organization) (2011) Medium-term strategic plan 2008–2013: Interim assessment. Geneva. Google Scholar |
