Alternative media framing of COVID-19 risks

The lack of temporal variation in frame expression is, perhaps, the most notable finding of this study. While the risk information used by Metokur within his streams varied considerably across mainstream news articles, publications from scientific institutions and social media posts, the relative consistency of frame expression was unexpected. The lack of significant variation in frame expression suggests that there was a formulaic structure to the streams, in which novel risk information was interpreted through a distinct ideological lens and produced for an intended audience. Such an approach to reporting on risk echoes Kitzinger’s (2000) concept of media templates, where journalists rely upon previously established strategies to purposefully select aspects of risk which generate public interest by succinctly disseminating relatable information to news audiences. While there are major structural differences between mainstream news journalism and alternative media structures, evidence of AMPs developing their own media templates reinforces suggestions that the narratives which emerge from risk interpretations may hold value in amplifying public perceptions of risk (Burgess, 2019).

From the analysis of Metokur’s risk amplifying frames, an overall narrative emerged where the risk of neoliberal social engineering in response to the pandemic was viewed as far more dangerous than the risk of death from COVID-19. Each of the constituent frames contributed to this overall narrative by amplifying different sociopolitical aspects of risk to varying degrees. Although there was little variability in frame expression between streams, the proportional makeup of frames perhaps indicate how the AMP content creation process can spotlight more performative discourses while the more ideological concepts remain shadowed.

The significantly high expression of Certainty within the streams was unexpected, mainly because the amplification potential of certainty appears to have been overlooked within SARF research. However, behavioural scholars have suggested that encountering certainty can influence risk perceptions by increasing resistance to persuasion and reduces the need to acquire different interpretations of risk information (Glasman and Albarracin, 2006; Maheswaran and Chaiken, 1991; Tormala and Petty, 2002). For Metokur, the Certainty frame appears to be used to construct a sense of authenticity regarding his interpretations of risk information. Within the wider ecology of the internet, authenticity has emerged as a key social currency for social media influencers for audience building and facilitating strategic communication (Consalvo et al., 2020; Woodcock and Johnson, 2019). Metokur’s appears to construct a sense of authenticity around his proclamations that the COVID-19 pandemic would result in catastrophic disruption to the established social order and facilitate new modes of living within a post-pandemic world. Authenticity, in this regard, is the ability for AMPs to establish their interpretations of information as being independent from direct institutional coercion.

Metokur’s use of videogame analogies and Chinese social media video content developed a sense of authenticity by providing his online audience with relatable contexts and tangible examples for risk information which was largely absent from mainstream media coverage. Furthermore, embedded within the Certainty frame were performative aspects, such as edgy and politically incorrect humour, which may not be permitted on mainstream media platforms. In general, the Certainty frame may outline the ‘draw’ of risk-amplifying, conspiracy-laden, infotainment. AMPs may select this frame to present their content as the reality TV of scientific discourse; a raucously entertaining affair where technical nuance is discarded in favour of wild interpretations of risk information.

The categorisation of Blame and Uncertainty as common frames was expected, as SARF research has previously identified such frames as crucial aspects of risk amplification (Burgess, 2012; Niu et al., 2020). Expression of Uncertainty may be elevated in situations where the anticipated harms from risk are expectedly unmanageable (Beck, 1992; Hope, 2003). Seemingly uncertain situations appear to influence public risk perceptions by encouraging broader contemplation of institutional honesty and incompetence (Johnson and Slovic, 1995). As such, elevated expression of Blame may be expected in situations where risk can be directly attributed to institutional failings (Burgess, 2012). In practice, Metokur weaved between both frames to construct discourses of organised irresponsibility over the inefficacy of neoliberal institutions to stop COVID-19 from becoming a global pandemic. Organised irresponsibility identifies a condition where institutional attempts to reduce risk in one sociopolitical domain are perceived (by the public) as producing risk in another sociopolitical domain (Mythen, 2018). As such, the public may confront a broad spectrum of complex social subjectivities which appear to temper and coerce the underlying rationale for institutional risk management strategies.

From analysis of the Uncertainty frame, Metokur develops discourses of organised irresponsibility by asserting that the messaging from the WHO had been coerced by the political interests of the CCP. Metokur further suggested that the information disseminated by the WHO would provide the evidential bases for pandemic management policies by national governments. From analysis of the Blame frame, Metokur further reinforced the concept of organised irresponsibility by relying upon stereotypes of Chinese cultural practices to illustrate how the CCP were uninterested in health protection of their public, and that a lack of corporate governance encouraged Chinese firms to engage in risky scientific research projects. Furthermore, Metokur identified Western cosmopolitan populations as having a disproportionate influence upon Western policy design, contending that Western governments would not implement the necessary risk management strategies which could be perceived as negatively impacting Chinese, or East Asian, populations. It appears that organised irresponsibility holds some value in amplifying risk information by forming the foundation for conspiratorial theorisation. Where examples of organised irresponsibility are located, AMPs may feel that those institutions entrusted with healthcare protection are not operating for the direct public benefit but are more interested in retaining power and influence over decision making processes. AMPs may be inclined to view ‘the general public’ as a fragmented and tribal space, and that institutional messaging on risk is tailored to appease the political tastes of dominant sociocultural groups (Caulkins, 1999). Beck (1992) suggests that it is actors of the dominant sociopolitical groups who permit themselves to define risk objects and propose risk management solutions. As such, the white and male identity of many far-right AMPs appears to have helped develop a foundational worldview that neoliberalism has become the dominant social order, and that neoliberal institutions seek to oppress traditional (risky) Western identity groups to appeal towards cosmopolitan (neoliberal) sensibilities (Esposito, 2019; Phelan, 2019).

As aspects of risk amplification, Low Trust, Dread and Stigma have received quite robust theoretical development within SARF (Frewer, 2003; Kasperson et al., 2001; Renn et al., 1992). While expression of Dread and Stigma were comparatively low, the content analysis identified several narrative elements which aligned well with the more readily expressed Low Trust frame. It appears that Low Trust, Dread and Stigma frames may operate in concert to establish the complex ideological foundation that guides interpretations of risk information. Metokur’s low expression of these ideological frames may have been a creative decision to avoid the perception that his streams were an ideologically inspired rant. From the content analysis, it appears that these frames might not neatly align with pre-conceived ideological structures (e.g Libertarian, Fascist, neo-Nazi), but rather they assist with biased imagineering which helps to demarcate the boundaries of risk within Identitarian contexts (Douglas, 1999). Imagineering is a concept borrowed from computer science literature which outlines the human process of sensemaking from internet-mediated information (Bojanova et al., 2014). Imagineering contends that both digitally distributed narratives and virtually accessible knowledge contextualise ‘real world’ representations of an object within a range of possible future occurrences. Within imagineering, sensemaking occurs by explaining why future occurrences are possible, rather than highlighting which future occurrences are likely. Within risk amplification by far-right AMPs, the imagineering of catastrophe may begin with the presumption that whiteness is at risk of genocide (Baele et al., 2020). It then becomes incumbent upon the AMP to introduce overlapping discursive contexts which affirms a future of white genocide/without whiteness.

Using the Low Trust frame, Metokur introduces one discursive context of catastrophic imagineering by asserting that the intent of scientific labour is to amass political power to inform policy decisions that encourage the growth of a cosmopolitan (anti-white) social identity. Within SARF, trust is envisioned as a form of social capital which helps mediate risk perceptions (Kasperson et al., 1999; Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003). While perceived expertise is a key factor for engendering public trust, other factors such as perceived objectivity, fairness, commitment and caring have also been suggested as trust modifiers (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003; Renn and Levine, 1991). The central focus of Metokur’s Low Trust frames was upon the seemingly friendly and political relationship between the WHO and the CCP. Metokur did not appear to undermine the WHO in terms of its scientific expertise, but rather used the lack of institutional condemnation towards the CCP as evidence of corruption. Metokur presented an imagineered problem with this apparent relationship, suggesting that other national governments would base their COVID-19 risk response strategies on the faulty recommendations of the WHO derived from fictitious data supplied by the CCP.

Having used the Low Trust frame to seemingly establish the ideological bedrock of his risk interpretations, Metokur’s use of the Dread frame better outlines a perceptive link between the COVID-19 pandemic and white genocide. Whilst there was some concern that the COVID-19 virus was a genocidal tool to eliminate older white populations, more emphasis was placed upon an imagineered future where the COVID-19 pandemic legitimised technocratic authoritarianism by neoliberal institutions to politically oppress non-cosmopolitan whiteness. Dread has been identified as a key affective factor in risk amplification, highlighting how the potential catastrophe of consequences better influences public risk perception than the likelihood of severe outcomes (Burke et al., 2011; Slovic, 1987).

Metokur suggested that changes to the US security apparatus following 9/11 served as an example for the scale of changes to social policy to come from the COVID-19 pandemic. Metokur further contested that new surveillance technologies would become integral to neoliberal post-pandemic precautions, and that the need to limit scientific misinformation would redefine non-cosmopolitan white discourses as a risk to the neoliberal social order. By introducing the discursive context that the ‘real’ harm from COVID-19 is the potential post-pandemic social engineering (and not the immediate deaths), Metokur seemingly broadens the time horizons beyond the traditional media focus of dread factors from immediate risk objects (Sjeemin, 2000). While the dread from temporally distal risk factors often forms the basis for speculative fiction, AMPs who provide such a broad view of dread may provide their audiences with a form of hyperreal infotainment that is largely unavailable from mainstream news reporting on risk (Lazaroiu, 2008).

Given Metokur’s previous content focused almost exclusively on ‘degenerate’ social groups/actors, the expression of Stigma frames was significantly low. However, there may have been a creative decision for Metokur to attenuate stigmatisation to comply with YouTube’s terms of service around bullying and hate speech. Metokur’s frame construction corresponds well with previous theorisation under SARF, in that he signified specific scientific technologies and social identity groups as threat to social order (Gregory et al., 1996). Through suggesting that COVID-19 was designed as a specifically Chinese bioweapon, Metokur seemingly introduces a discursive context which juxtaposes disruption to social order alongside Chinese industrialism and capitalist pretences of technological innovation. By identifying the apparent selfishness of cosmopolitans, Metokur stigmatises these identity groups as being the direct beneficiaries of the post-pandemic social order, asserting that multinational corporations would provide innovative technologies that largely satisfy cosmopolitan consumerist needs. Therefore, agents of neoliberalism are stigmatised as a threat to whiteness increasing society’s reliance upon corporate hierarchies, and further diminishing the biopolitical power of local communities. Whilst Metokur does not offer particular narratives of resistance against such perceivably catastrophic futures, this may again be a strategy to circumvent YouTube terms of service around bullying and harassment. However, such framing may be used by viewers to legitimise behaviours which result in online harassment of individuals who are seen as cosmopolitans or neoliberal agents.