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Abstract
In 2010, UCDP recorded 30 active armed conflicts (i.e. with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths). This is a substantial reduction in relation to the 36 conflicts registered for 2009. A drop of this magnitude has only been reported four times previously in the post-1946 period. However, only in two of these instances was this part of a general downward trend. Thus no major inferences should be drawn, except perhaps that the reduction in conflicts in Africa seems to be part of a trend. At 30 in 2010, the number of active conflicts is at its lowest level since 2003. Furthermore, the number of wars (1,000 or more battle-related deaths) declined from six in 2009 to four in 2010. The most intense war in terms of fatalities was in Afghanistan. Eight of the armed conflicts listed for 2009 were not active in 2010, but during the year two new conflicts erupted – Mauritania and Tajikistan – both involving rebel groups that had previously fought in neighbouring countries. Only two peace agreements were concluded during the year. While this is one more than 2009, it is decidedly below the annual average for the post-Cold War period.
In 2010, 30 armed conflicts were active in 25 locations.2 This constitutes a significant drop from the 36 conflicts recorded for 2009 (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2010) and the number of armed conflicts is now lower than any year since 2003 and before that since the mid-1970s (Gleditsch et al., 2002). A decline of this magnitude has occurred at individual occasions, notably in 1968, 1988, 1993 and 1995. Only in one of these cases (1995) was this followed by a further reduction the following year. Sometimes such fluctuations depend on the fact that many conflicts are limited in scale and hover around the threshold for inclusion of 25 battle deaths in a calendar year. Thus, it is not surprising to see some changes from one year to the next. However, the long-term decline in the number of conflicts since the end of the Cold War is still evident, as can be seen in Figure 1 . Going back to the end of the Second World War, 246 conflicts have been active in 151 locations worldwide. The annual incidence of conflict and conflict dyads3 since 1989 is recorded in Tables I and II. Figure 1 shows the trend in the number of armed conflicts since 1946.
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Table I. Armed conflicts and conflict locations, 1989--2010
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Table II. Armed conflicts by region, 1989--2010a
Also the dyadic dimension of armed conflict shows a clear decline in 2010. UCDP recorded 37 active dyads in the 2010 conflicts, which is eight fewer than in 2009. In six of the conflicts there were two active dyads and in one conflict there were three conflict dyads, with the mean number of dyads per conflict being 1.2. The number of conflict dyads measures the degree of fragmentation of a particular conflict, meaning that there are several actors pursuing similar overall goals. While there has been a clear upward trend in average conflict dyads since the early 1980s (Harbom, Melander & Wallensteen, 2008), the decline in 2010 could signal a change in this trend of conflict fragmentation. It is too early to draw any theoretical or policy implications from this, although many observers argue that fewer actors may help to simplify a negotiations process (e.g. Svensson & Wallensteen, 2010).
When considering conflict intensity, four armed conflicts reached the intensity of war (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths), down by two from 2009. The number of wars has oscillated over time, with a peak of 16 in 1988 and 1990. Since World War II, the number of wars has only been lower in 1957 (three wars). The conflict with the highest number of fatalities in 2010 was fought in Afghanistan, followed by the conflicts in Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq. The intensity of the conflict between the Afghan government and its allies on the one side and the Taliban on the other has been on the rise over the past decade and in 2010 it reached its highest level to date, with more than 6,000 battle-related deaths. Despite an increase in the number of international troops deployed in the country, the Taliban seemed to grow stronger, managing to gain a foothold in the northern part of the country, in addition to its southern and eastern strongholds.
The two conflicts that reached the intensity of war in 2009, but not in 2010, were Rwanda and Sri Lanka (Eelam). In both cases, this was related to government offensives that weakened or, as in the case of Sri Lanka, even eliminated the armed opposition forces. In the first case, 2010 saw a dramatic de-escalation of fighting from the previous year. In 2009, fighting between FDLR (Forces Democratiques de Libération du Rwanda: Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) and the Rwandan government, supported by troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was at its highest level since the group launched its armed struggle in 1997.4 FDLR, based in Eastern Congo, was challenged by a joint Rwandan and Congolese military offensive code-named Operation Umoja Wetu (‘our unity’), which significantly weakened the group. This was followed in March by a second large-scale offensive – Kimia II – carried out by the Congolese army, supported by the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC). While the year 2010 saw the launching of yet another operation – Amani Leo (‘peace today’) – it did not result in as heavy fighting as the previous offensives. In Sri Lanka, the long-time rebels of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were completely defeated by government forces at the end of May 2009, and there were no indications of revival of the rebel group in 2010.
Sri Lanka was the conflict with the most fatalities in 2009. The ending of that conflict and the fact that there were only four wars in 2010 suggests that the total number of battle-related fatalities was significantly lower in 2010 than in 2009. Although the war in Afghanistan escalated, it still did not match the reduction in fatalities elsewhere. Thus, the trend of reduced battle deaths in armed conflict, previously described by Lacina & Gleditsch (2005), continued in 2010, with the UCDP battle-related deaths dataset showing a decrease of more than 10,000 fatalities compared with 2009.5
As in 2009, all active conflicts in 2010 were internal. Interstate conflicts – while always fewer in number than intrastate conflicts – have become an increasingly rare phenomenon since the early 1990s, and especially since 2004.6 Between the years 2004 and 2010, only one minor interstate conflict was recorded, between Djibouti and Eritrea in 2008. Of the 30 active conflicts, nine were internationalized, meaning that they saw international involvement with troop support to one or both of the warring parties. These conflicts include Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Mauritania, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, USA (the conflict with Al-Qaeda) and Yemen.7 This is the highest incidence of internationalized armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War. In fact, the number of conflicts with external involvement has been high for some time and not below five since 2005. Never, since 1946, has there been a period this long with so many internationalized conflicts. This trend becomes even clearer when considering internationalized conflicts as a share of the total number of conflicts. This share stood at almost 27% in 2010, making it the year with the highest relative incidence of this phenomenon. In the past six years we have seen a percentage of internationalized conflicts well above what has been reported earlier, representing a clear trend. The fact that this type of conflict is on the rise can have negative implications for peacemaking efforts, since involvement by an external actor in an intrastate conflict tends to prolong it (Cunningham, 2010). Thus, the observed increase in internationalized conflicts and the decrease in dyads in conflicts discussed above signal two contradictory developments which complicate prognoses for the coming years.
In two conflicts, peace agreements were signed in 2010. On 23 February the Sudanese government and the rebel group JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) signed a peace process agreement in Doha, the capital of Qatar. The accord, which was negotiated by Chad, stipulated a power-sharing deal between JEM and the government on all administrative levels in an eventual final agreement. Furthermore, it provided for the cancellation of death sentences against some 100 JEM rebels. Above all, however, the accord was viewed as a framework agreement that was meant to become more specific and comprehensive as negotiations continued. It soon became clear that neither the ceasefire that had been agreed upon prior to the signing of the accord nor the envisioned negotiations process would become a reality. Heavy fighting erupted in late April and on 3 May JEM walked out of the negotiations.
A peace process agreement was also signed in the interstate conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea. The 6 June accord, mediated by Qatar, includes the creation of a committee consisting of one participant from each country as well as one from Qatar, charged with the contentious border issue. The parties also committed themselves to provide lists of prisoners of war and missing persons. Furthermore, Qatar agreed to monitor the border until a final agreement has been reached. This means that 2010 only saw one peace agreement that seems to be respected, which is remarkable in light of the previous record of peace accords. It is also noteworthy that negotiated settlements apparently cannot explain the reported reduction in armed conflicts.
Two new conflicts erupted in 2010, in Mauritania and Tajikistan, both involving rebel groups that had previously fought against neighbouring governments. In Mauritania, the government found itself challenged by the rebel group AQIM (Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb), originating in Algeria. On 6 August 2008 a military coup brought the present Mauritanian government to power and this triggered a reaction from AQIM. Considering the new government illegitimate and un-Islamic, AQIM called for a holy war against the regime, with the ultimate aim of replacing it with an Islamic caliphate. While some sporadic clashes were reported in 2009, fighting escalated in 2010, when Mauritania, together with France, launched a cross-border attack against an AQIM base in neighbouring Mali. This was followed by another attack across the border in September, claimed by the Mauritanian defence ministry to have been launched to prevent an attack on one of its military positions.
In Tajikistan, the originally Uzbek rebel group IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) escalated attacks in 2010. When the group was formed in the late 1990s, it initially focused its attention on removing the Uzbek government. However, already in this early phase, IMU was present in Tajikistan, where it had some of its rear bases. After heavy government pressure, the group was forced to retreat to its bases in Afghanistan in October 2000, after which the IMU fighters fought alongside the Taliban for over a year. In the wake of the US intervention in 2001, remnants of the group moved to Pakistan’s tribal areas. Around this time, IMU expanded its goals, announcing that it was now fighting for the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia (the area called Maverannahr, which includes the territory between the rivers Amu Darya and Syr Darya in present-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and southwest Kazakhstan). In line with this new goal, IMU regionalized its attacks. While most of the group remains in Pakistan, some fighters are based in Afghanistan, and the group operates small cells in the Fergana Valley, conducting attacks in the border areas of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 2010 a group of IMU fighters located in Tajikistan’s Rasht Valley escalated attacks on government targets, and the conflict crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold for the first time.
Aside from the Sri Lankan case, discussed above, seven other conflicts listed for 2009 were no longer active in 2010. This is the first main explanation for the reduction of the overall number. As the following account makes clear, conflicts on a low level of intensity have become even less active, in some cases following major government offensives.8 This is also why it is difficult to determine whether the conflicts are actually terminated or if the inactivity simply means that rebels are regrouping.
Some of these conflicts are clearly continuing, but at a lower intensity level. In the conflict between the Angolan government and the Cabindan separatist group FLEC-FAC (Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda – Forces Amardas de Cabinda), fighting has continuously been at a low level, with the number of fatalities fluctuating around the 25 battle-related deaths threshold for inclusion in the UCDP record. While there were a couple of well reported events in 2010 – such as the attack on the Togolese national soccer team travelling by bus in the region – the conflict level fell below this threshold.
The conflict between the Ethiopian government and the rebel group OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) has been ongoing since the mid-1970s. It is difficult to find reliable, neutral information on fighting between the parties, so UCDP pays attention to other signs that indicate active fighting. If, for instance, OLF has claimed to have engaged government forces in a large battle near the Kenyan border but there is no other corroboration of this, indicators such as cross-border movements of refugees, or complaints by the Kenyan police that Ethiopian troops have crossed the border in apparent pursuit of rebels, are taken into account. However, in 2010 there were few claims from the parties of large-scale fighting, and few additional indicators suggesting that the conflict was ongoing at a level that would cause 25 battle-related deaths. Thus, the conflict is coded as not active.
In the conflict between the Indian government and the separatist rebel groups in Manipur in north-east India, conflict activity de-escalated in 2010. As with the Cabinda case, fighting has always been on a low level, fluctuating around the 25 battle-related deaths threshold, and in 2010 it fell below that threshold.
There were no reports of fighting between the Malian government forces and the Touareg rebel group ATNMC (Alliance Touareg Nord Mali pour le Changement) in 2010. After a major rebel attack in December 2008, the army carried out an offensive in January 2009, where they were able to capture and destroy ‘Boureissa’, the main rebel base. After some further defeats, ATNMC leader Ibrahim Ag Bahanga left the country and hundreds of his fighters joined an ongoing peace process between the government and another Tuareg rebel group, ADC (Alliance Démocratique du 23 Mai pour le Changement). Ag Bahanga subsequently spent the rest of 2009 and most of 2010 in Libya and Algeria, apparently increasingly isolated.
The conflict that erupted over the status of the Kokang region, between the government of Myanmar and the rebel group MNDAA (Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army) in 2009, was not active in 2010. Following a government offensive, the national army was able to overrun the Kokang region in late August 2009. The government subsequently promoted some lower-level MNDAA members to be government representatives in Kokang, whereas other fighters fled across the border to China, where they were demobilized. While the leader of the group, Peng Jiasheng, and some troops loyal to him withdrew and claimed to prepare for a new phase of fighting, there were no more clashes in 2009. The only violence involving MNDAA that was registered for the year 2010 were two bomb blasts that resulted in one death.9
Following the Nigerian government’s harsh crackdown on the Islamic rebel group Boko Haram in 2009, little was heard from the group during the first months of 2010. A few months into the year rumours began to circulate that the group was preparing renewed armed actions and that it was cooperating with AQIM. There were subsequent reports of attacks on security forces by suspected Boko Haram members in northern Nigeria, but it was not possible to determine how many had been killed. The conflict is coded as an unclear case in 2010.
The conflict between the Pakistani government and the separatist rebel groups in Baluchistan, fought between 2004 and 2009, was not registered as active in 2010. While there were reports of clashes in the region, the quality of the reporting was poor. Thus it was not possible to determine which rebel group was responsible for the attacks, and the conflict was considered an unclear case in 2010.
In terms of regional distribution, we note that the reduction of armed conflict has been particularly notable in Asia and Africa. More specifically, Africa south of the Sahara is a region that has seen a significant drop in the number of armed conflicts over the past decade. While the world as a whole experienced a peak in armed conflict in 1992, just after the end of the Cold War, the conflict peak in sub-Saharan Africa came some years later, in 1998, with 16 conflicts active. The number then fell sharply and had by 2005 reached a level not recorded since the mid-1970s, with six conflicts active. Even though the next three years saw an increase, the number has now dropped for two consecutive years and with eight conflicts active in 2010, this is a decrease of 50% since the peak year. Furthermore, only one war – Somalia – was recorded for sub-Saharan Africa in 2010, which is considerably below the numbers registered for most years since the late 1970s.10 Although many expected the financial crisis to lead to increased conflict, the crisis may also have made it more difficult for rebel groups to finance arms purchases. However, many African countries appear to have quickly overcome the effects of the crisis. In 2010, some African economies actually reported pre-crisis growth numbers – no doubt based on increased trade with China and India. Particularly high growth rates were identified for Ethiopia and Ghana, both in conflict-prone areas, whereas southern Africa was growing below expectations (IMF, 2011). For populations in many African countries, this might result in a more optimistic scenario for the future and, thus, a reduction in the recruitment into government or rebel armies.
The decline in the number of conflicts can to some extent also be related to political developments in key countries such as India and Burma/Myanmar. In India, the tendency to vote according to regional and ethnic patterns that was observed in 2009 may indicate reduced support for armed actors (Jaffrelot & Verniers, 2009). In Burma, the developments leading up to general elections may have made the government more willing to compromise with rebel groups to demonstrate a smooth process to the outer world (Nyein, 2009). Other factors that may have played a role in the present decline are arms embargoes and previous peace accords that are finally starting to have an impact. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that there were only two new conflicts in 2010, and both included actors that had been active before. There was no previously ended conflict that restarted.
The persistence of the declining trends may have appeared to be challenged by events during the first months of 2011. However, many of the developments in the Middle East and in Africa displayed the traits of one-sided violence rather than armed conflicts. Some events also followed earlier observed patterns. Only the conflict in Libya may, so far, be entirely new.11
Acknowledgements
Numerous colleagues in Uppsala have contributed to the data collection, notably Marie Allansson, Christian Altpeter, Johan Brosché, Mihai Croicu, Maria Greek, Helena Grusell, Stina Högbladh, Emma Johansson, Joakim Kreutz, Marcus Nilsson, Therése Pettersson, Nynke Salverda, Ralph Sundberg, Samuel Taub and Nina von Uexküll.
Replication data
The complete datasets (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and UCDP Dyadic Dataset) updated to 2010 are found at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/. Older versions of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset can also be found at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/ and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. The tables and figures in this article were created directly from the Excel sheet at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/. Detailed descriptions of the individual conflicts are found at www.ucdp.uu.se/database. Replication data for this article can be found both at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/ and www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.
Research for this article was financed by the Swedish International Cooperation Development Agency (Sida) and Uppsala University.
Notes
1
Lotta Themnér has previously published under the name Lotta Harbom.
2
For an intrastate conflict, the location is a country. For an interstate conflict, it is two or more countries. Several countries (notably India and Myanmar) have several separate conflicts going on at the same time, fought over different incompatibilities, which is why the number of conflicts exceeds the number of locations. It should also be noted that the names of the conflicts do not necessarily indicate where the actual fighting takes place. Their names reflect the location of the incompatibility – which government it is that is being disputed, or in which country a disputed territory is located. For example, in the case of Rwanda, the incompatibility concerns governmental power in Rwanda, but no fighting took place in this country in 2010. Instead, all conflict activity was located in neighbouring DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), where the Rwandan rebel group FDLR (Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda: Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) has its bases.
3
A dyad is defined as a pair of warring parties. In interstate conflicts, these warring parties are governments of states, whereas in intrastate conflicts, one is the government of a state and the other is a rebel group. For more information about the dyadic dimension of armed conflict, see Harbom, Melander & Wallensteen (2008). The UCDP Dyadic Dataset can be downloaded from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/.
4
Note that the group was formed as PALIR (Party for the Liberation of Rwanda: Peuple en armes pour la libération du Rwanda). In May 2000, parts of PALIR, together with exiled Rwandan politicians, created the politico-military organisation FDLR and on 30 September the group formally dissolved itself into FDLR, accepting the political leadership of FDLR. In line with UCDP coding rules, FDLR is seen as the continuation of PALIR.
5
UCDP Battle-related deaths dataset v. 5-2011, 1989–2010 is released in July 2011.
6
This may actually be a longer trend. Using recent Correlates of War data, interstate wars have not been more than one-third of all inter- and intra-state wars since 1816 (Wallensteen, 2011: 28–32; Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
7
See Appendix 1 for information on the states contributing troops to these conflicts.
8
For more in-depth information on the developments in these conflicts, see the UCDP’s online Conflict Encyclopedia at www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
9
While it is clear that the first blast did not kill anyone, sources disagree on whether there were one or no deaths in the second blast.
10
For more information on the trends in armed conflict in Africa, see Harbom & Forsberg (2011).
11
For an update on the unfolding developments in the Arab world, see UCDP. Arabian Spring http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/62/62191_Background_narrative_arabian_spring.pdf and http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/62/62193_chronologic_timeline_arabian_spring.pdf. For a definition of one-sided violence see Eck & Hultman (2007) as well as the UCDP website, www.ucdp.uu.se.
12
UCDP has also coded a fourth type, extrasystemic armed conflict: a conflict that occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. These conflicts are by definition territorial. The last such conflict ended in 1974, so this category is not applicable in Appendix 1.
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Appendix 1
Armed conflicts active in 2010
This list includes all conflicts that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in 2010 and fulfilled the other criteria for inclusion. The column Year shows the latest range of years in which the conflict has been active without interruption. The start year is found in parenthesis in the Incompatibility column, which indicates when the armed conflict reached 25 battle-related deaths for the first time. If a conflict has been inactive for more than ten years or if there has been a complete change in the opposition side, the start year refers to the onset of the latest phase of the conflict. For more complete information on the conflict history, see (a) the list of armed conflicts 1946–2010, at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ and http://www.prio.no/cscw/ArmedConflict and (b) the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s online database at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database. For a list of all conflicts and dyads 1946–2010, see http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/. The column Intensity in 2010 displays the aggregated conflict intensity. Thus, if more than one dyad is active in the conflict, the intensity column records their aggregated intensity.
Definitions
An armed conflict is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state.
The incompatibility is the stated (in writing or verbally) generally incompatible positions. A more detailed definition can be found on UCDP’s webpage, at http://www.ucdp.uu.se.
The conflicts are divided according to their intensity into two categories:
Minorarmed conflicts: at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year but fewer than 1,000.
War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year.
Furthermore, the conflicts are divided according to type of conflict.12
Interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states.
Internationalized internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups, with intervention from other states in the form of troops.
Internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups.
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Appendix 2
Unclear cases in 2010
Cases that have been completely rejected on the grounds that they definitely do not meet the criteria of armed conflict are not included in the list below. For the conflicts listed here, the available information suggests the possibility of the cases meeting the criteria of armed conflicts, but there is insufficient information concerning at least one of the three components of the definition: (a) the number of deaths, (b) the identity or level of organization of a party, or (c) the type of incompatibility. For unclear cases for the entire 1946–2010 period, see http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ or www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict. The unclear aspect may concern an entire conflict (e.g. Yemen) or a dyad in a conflict that is included in Appendix 1 (e.g. PJAK in the Iran conflict).
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