Science or Science Fiction? Professionals’ Discursive Construction of Climate Change

Frames define how ‘the debate … over climate change is determined by which actors are engaged, what kinds of problems are debated, how those problems are defined, and what kinds of solutions are considered appropriate’ (Hoffman, 1999, p. 1369; also see Hoffman & Jennings, 2011). Each claim to know ‘what is at issue’ (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3) with climate change is embedded within a specific frame. Frames work as ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large’ (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 464). According to Snow and Benford (1988) frames have three core tasks. Diagnostic framing refers to the identification of an aspect of the world considered to be in need of amelioration – the definition of the problem and the attribution of causality. Prognostic framing attempts to propose ameliorative action and possible solutions, while humbling, undermining or neutralizing existing counter-framings. While diagnostic and prognostic framing aim at mobilizing consensus, the third framing task – motivational framing – includes the ‘call to arms’ by elaborating vocabularies of motive that provide ‘adherents with compelling accounts for engaging in collective action’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 617). Hence, groups may agree on the cause, severity and urgency of a problem, and still fundamentally differ in the proposed solution and the need to take action.

Frames not only provide worldviews; by introducing a vocabulary and constructing categorizations, ideals and models, frames also define social identities (Reger, Myers, & Einwohner, 2008; Snow & McAdam, 2000; Tajfel, 1981) and position actors in power/dependency relations to other categories of actors, associating with them a range of social expectations and capacities for actions. Apart from its actual content (the diagnosis, prognosis, and call to action), thus, each frame involves the negotiation of identities and roles, the building of alliances (the victims, villains and heroes, the advocates who are entitled to speak on behalf of others, etc.) and efforts to control participation in the struggle by active boundary management (Granqvist & Laurila, 2011; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010).

Such boundary work establishes an adversarial in-group/out-group distinction between ‘us’, the group that shares a worldview, and ‘them’, who are responsible for the problem and/or promote counter-frames (Gamson, 1992). Given that there are claims and counter-claims, prognostic framing typically advocates the efficacy of one’s own remedies while trying to break the persuasiveness of the counter-frames’ storylines. This can be achieved on two levels: either by legitimizing one’s own and de-legitimizing the opponents’ arguments and accounts and/or by undermining the identity position from which ‘they’ speak.

In struggles in which empirical credibility, i.e., the ‘fit between the framing and events in the world’ (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 208; Wynne, 2010) cannot be established, the credibility of the claims-maker is the essential currency (Benford & Snow, 2000). As stocks of knowledge are differentially distributed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), a ‘hierarchy of credibility’ exists (Becker, 1967, p. 242). For a phenomenon such as climate change, scientists and professional experts with academic credentials are at the top of this hierarchy and have become the most authoritative voice to define the way things are and to propose potential solutions (Hitzler, 1994). Experts’ claims are a specific type of knowledge claim (Lazega, 1992). Experts derive their expert status, i.e., their credibility and authority, from perceived differences in knowledge distribution. When experts speak, they claim to speak on behalf of ‘truth’. They are expected to assess the quality or value of data (Peterson, 2009), establish certainty (Bugos, 1993), and exercise control (Perin, 2005). Unlike the claims from lay actors, experts’ claims are challengeable only by other recognized members of an expert group (Collins & Evans, 2009). Therefore, much more so than other types of actors, experts have to establish the general perception in their audiences that (a) they are making informed claims based on their superior access to specialists’ knowledge (superiority of knowledge) and (b) that they are independent and their claims are objective and not driven by particularistic interests (independence). In struggles between different expert groups, to defend one’s framing always also includes defending one’s status as expert. Hence, framing struggles in scientific debates are frequently stories of true and false knowledge and biased research (Keller, 2005).

We argue that processes of constructing expert identities are political strategies that are parallel to the legitimation strategies found in public policy research (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999) or in organization studies (Vaara & Monin, 2010; Vaara, Tienari & Laurila, 2006). These authors distinguish five main discursive strategies: authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation, mythopoiesis, and normalization, which we also expect to find, to varying degrees, in experts’ claims. These align with rhetorical modes of proof (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005): authorization, rationalization, and normalization strategies are forms of logos, moral evaluation aligns with ethos, and mythopoiesis aligns with pathos. To undermine the claims and frames put forward by other members of the same professional group, individuals may also employ antagonistic identity framing of others as non-experts (destructive strategy per Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999) using oppositional strategies (cf. social identity threats per Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Berger and Luckmann (1967) especially point to annihilation, be it by outright denial of the validity or by downplaying and ridiculing the claim or by attempting to assign an inferior status to the claimant and her or his sources of information.

Hence, despite that all experts’ claims are similar in the sense that they are a certain type of claim – reliant upon the attribution as superior knowledge and independent from particularistic interests – they differ in their legitimation strategies and adversarial framing activities, depending on the defensiveness, i.e., the extent to which adherents feel threatened and ‘under attack’, and on the intensity of the identification and mobilization efforts inherent in the framing. We argue that both will increase sensemaking and accounting activities leading to more extensive use of legitimation/de-legitimation and identity/boundary work.

In expert-driven discourses, frames without endorsement by legitimated expert groups have little chance to prevail. However, if experts provide differing frames and prescribe different solutions, it is important not to stop at reconstructing the different interpretations but to contribute to an understanding of the social and political dimensions of these contestations, i.e., to trace the frames back to specific sponsors and the economic and cultural resources available to them (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) as well as the discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010) they enable. These discursive struggles establish what counts as ‘facts’ and ‘problematic’, whose knowledge claims gain the status of truth, what impacts public policies (Motion & Leitch, 2009) and affects organizations’ environmental strategies (Banerjee, 2002; Sharma, 2000). In the context of climate change, the frames sponsored by experts in high hierarchical positions in the petroleum industry and in government agencies that regulate the industry are central ‘command posts’ (Zald & Lounsbury 2010, p. 963) and crucial to understanding defensive institutional work or outright resistance.

Maguire and Hardy (2009, p. 169) introduce the concept of defensive institutional work as the ‘purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at countering disruptive institutional work’ by outsiders seeking to change or discard the existing practices. Parallel to Vaara et al.’s (2006) (de)legitimation strategies or Meyer and Höllerer’s (2010) defendants of the traditional truce, Maguire and Hardy find that industry incumbents authored texts that challenged outsiders’ assertions of the negative impacts of DDT; the categorizations of its use as unethical, undesirable, or inappropriate; and the calls for regulatory change to ban its use. Additional research is required, however, to understand how defensive institutional work is performed in response to insider-driven change (Maguire & Hardy, 2009). This provides the motivation for our research question: How do professional experts frame the reality of climate change and themselves as experts, while engaging in defensive institutional work against others?

In our field of study, we note that there is a distinction between experts who express concern about the rapidly changing climate and those who deny that there is a problem related to climate change. The ensuing debate is often caricatured as a war between two sides – ‘you either believe in climate change or you don’t’ – especially in North America. We find that virtually all respondents (99.4%) agree that the climate is changing. However, there is considerable disagreement as to cause, consequences, and lines of action (as outlined in Figure 2). On this basis, we find five different frames, each of them summarized in Table 3. Eight percent of respondents did not provide enough information regarding their framing of climate change to be categorized.

• Frame 1: Comply with Kyoto

The largest group of APEGA respondents (36%) draws on a frame that we label ‘comply with Kyoto’. In their diagnostic framing, they express the strong belief that climate change is happening, that it is not a normal cycle of nature, and humans are the main or central cause. Supporters of the Kyoto Protocol consider climate change to be a significant public risk and see an impact on their personal life. In their prognostic framing, they tend to fear that the risks are greater in extent (i.e., global and regional) and in magnitude (i.e., changes to both the average state and variability of the climate) than other groups; they believe to a lesser degree that climate change has long-term effects only and to a higher degree that it will result in warming as opposed to cooling and warming. They are the only group to see the scientific debate as mostly settled and the IPCC modeling to be accurate, e.g., ‘I believe that the consensus that climate change is occurring is settled. The role of humans in climate change is controversial more because of the political/economic implications and the creation of winners and losers than the science.’ They view the Kyoto Protocol and additional regulation as the solution: ‘Absolutely! 1000%. It is the only effective way to curb pollutions…We, as Engineers, are very much responsible.’ Advocates of this frame are less likely to use symbolism and metaphors; in speaking for themselves and legitimating their expertise, they do not deviate significantly from the average. Yet, more than others, they highlight fraternity and the need to act together, to realize one’s responsibility, and to find answers. They are significantly less likely to use de-legitimation strategies and are least likely to speak against others. However, they request industry and corporations to comply with the law and encourage the creation of regulation: ‘Industry should stop complaining and get on with it and provide leadership for us all.’ They also believe that APEGA should support climate change science: ‘Science is not a democracy, nor is it a popularity contest. APEGA must stand up for science.’

• Frame 2: Nature is overwhelming

The second largest group (24%) express a ‘nature is overwhelming’ frame. In their diagnostic framing, they believe that changes to the climate are natural, normal cycles of the Earth. Their focus is on the past: ‘If you think about it, global warming is what brought us out of the Ice Age.’ Humans are too insignificant to have an impact on nature: ‘It is a mistake to think that human activity can change this… It would be like an ant in a bowling ball who thinks it can have a significant influence the roll of the ball.’ More than others, they strongly disagree that climate change poses any significant public risk and see no impact on their personal lives. In their prognostic framing, they do not see any risks. If anything, climate change detracts from more important issues: ‘Why don’t we focus on more urgent issues… 25,000 people die each day due to hunger, malaria …’ They are most likely to speak against climate science as being science fiction, ‘manipulated and fraudulent’. They are least likely to believe that the scientific debate is settled, that IPCC modeling is accurate, and oppose all regulation ‘based on the incorrect assumption that greenhouse gases cause climate change’. They recognize that we should reduce pollution regardless: ‘We need to adapt to climate change, which has been going on for 4 billion years. We need to reduce polluting our planet.’ In their identity and boundary work, they are least likely to list others as allies or prescribe any actions for themselves or others. Significantly, they are more likely to criticize others as unknowledgeable and to describe climate scientists and environmentalists as hysterical: ‘This present hysteria on “global warming” is purely political and has little to do with real science.’ APEGA ‘should educate the public and the government … to counteract media hype and pressure from the green extremists.’

• Frame 3: Economic responsibility

Ten percent of respondents draw on an ‘economic responsibility’ frame. They diagnose climate change as being natural or human caused. More than any other group, they underscore that the ‘real’ cause of climate change is unknown as nature is forever changing and uncontrollable. Similar to the ‘nature is overwhelming’ adherents, they disagree that climate change poses any significant public risk and see no impact on their personal life. They are also less likely to believe that the scientific debate is settled and that the IPCC modeling is accurate. In their prognostic framing, they point to the harm the Kyoto Protocol and all regulation will do to the economy. For them, any solution must protect the economy. More than others, they invoke the public interest and the need to promote an informed debate and to educate others, and recommend enhancing efficiency and competitiveness: ‘Alberta must pursue to reduce truly toxic emissions, diversify our economy, and to meet the growing energy demands.’ They are significantly more likely to position themselves as experts as a function of their own education and knowledge sources. They are most likely to speak against others and de-legitimate others as non-experts, as impractical: ‘Conservation is always a good idea, but spending money without any real understanding of what the value you will be getting is always a bad idea.’ More than any other group, they speak against the Kyoto Protocol and its supporters: ‘third world countries (China, Egypt, etc.) [who are] free to burn garbage and pollute with no repercussions’, and politicians who ‘do nothing well except waste money that isn’t theirs’. For them, ‘Kyoto is simply designed to transfer large sums of money from the wallets of citizens of mostly Caucasian countries to the Swiss bank accounts of third world dictators.’ They express much stronger and more negative emotions than any other group, especially that climate science is a fraud and hoax and that regulation is futile, useless, and impossible. They are more sceptical and cynical: ‘Don’t we pay enough taxes as it is? Do we need to send our money overseas?’ Lastly, they use symbolism and metaphors much more than any other framing (see next section):

• Frame 4: Fatalists

‘Fatalists’, a surprisingly large group (17%), diagnose climate change as both human- and naturally caused. ‘Fatalists’ consider climate change to be a smaller public risk with little impact on their personal life. They are sceptical that the scientific debate is settled regarding the IPCC modeling: ‘The number of variables and their interrelationships are almost unlimited – if anyone thinks they have all the answers, they have failed to ask all of the questions.’ ‘Fatalists’ consider the Kyoto Protocol as ‘too late’ and irrelevant. They are much less likely to support regulation generally, but do also not care about the economy, and are much less likely to express emotions (except for denying responsibility), or use symbolism and metaphors. Fatalists are not convinced that involvement will make a difference and, thus, following Gamson (1992), they do not develop the sense of agency. To the contrary, they seem generally apathetic – ‘How can anyone take action if research is biased?’ They are least likely to speak for themselves, define themselves as experts or admit any professional and ethical responsibilities. Likewise they are least likely to refer to others in a positive or negative way.

• Frame 5: Regulation activists

The last group (5%) expresses a frame we call ‘regulation activists’. This frame has the smallest number of adherents, expresses the most paradoxical framing, and yet is more agentic than ‘comply with Kyoto’. Advocates of this frame diagnose climate change as being both human- and naturally caused, posing a moderate public risk, with only slight impact on their personal life. Advocates do not significantly vary from the mean in how they consider the magnitude, extent, or time scale of climate change. They are also sceptical with regard to the scientific debate being settled and are the most indecisive whether IPCC modeling is accurate: ‘the largest challenge is to find out what the real truth is… I don’t know what the impact really is. I suspect it is not good.’ Despite their seemingly ambivalent stance, they are most likely to believe that nature is our responsibility: ‘It is only reasonable to assume that we are changing our environment and climate, all you have to do is look out your window to see it.’ They believe that the Kyoto Protocol is doomed to failure (‘can’t do it, even though we should’), yet they motivate others most of all to create regulation: ‘Canada should implement aggressive policies to reduce GHG emissions in the spirit of the Kyoto Accord.’ They also recommend that we define and enact sustainability/stewardship, reduce GHGs, and create incentives: ‘No one technique will work. It will require a combination of all available options.’ The emotions they invoke are to realize responsibility and find answers, prevent failure, and emphasize consensus and fraternity. They use nature, ecosystem and health metaphors more than other group: ‘Educating the general public that the planet is a closed system.’ Further, they envision an expanded role for professionals: ‘APEGGA and the members should…have the guts to speak up and be heard when pending decisions become motivated by politics and short-term shareholder gratification.’ ‘Regulation activists’ speak for themselves and legitimate their own expertise second most. However, they also do the second greatest de-legitimation of others’ expertise, mostly on the basis of others’ lack of knowledge: ‘Kyoto targets were negotiated without sufficient scientific basis or economic forecasting.’ They criticize politics (‘The AB govt lives in the dark ages on environmental matters’) and industry, especially the entanglement between the two: ‘Regulations are no good if they are not enforced, or if written by industry based on profitability.’ Yet, perhaps paradoxically, this group mobilizes more action than ‘comply with Kyoto’: ‘Alberta should be developing a good overall environmental policy that will leave our grandchildren proud to live in Alberta, a slower pace to development of resources [that] may result in short-term pain for long-term gain.’

All frames draw on the same ‘ingredients’ of expertise claims – discernment of true and false knowledge (superiority of knowledge) and biased research (independent decisions). Respondents believe themselves able to base professional work on solid scientific principles (highest mean: ‘nature is overwhelming’, lowest mean: ‘fatalists’) and, to a slightly lesser degree, to have sufficient scientific information to make informed professional decisions (highest mean: ‘economic responsibility’, lowest mean: ‘fatalists’). Concerning unbiasedness, they are convinced to have sufficient professional independence to properly consider climate change science (highest mean: ‘economic responsibility’, lowest mean: ‘comply with Kyoto’). Also, adherents of all frames do not feel pressured to base professional work on factors other than science principles. Only a very small minority (4%) are uncertain regarding their expertise, admitting in their open-ended responses that they feel unqualified to make recommendations.

Despite these similarities, there are interesting differences. As suggested by identification theory’s in-grouping/out-grouping, individuals’ responses vary as a function of (a) the extent that they identify with and try to mobilize allies and (b) the extent they feel their identity is threatened and under attack, leading to defensiveness against enemies. This is illustrated in Figure 3. The activation of both – identification and defensiveness – results in more extensive and intensive accounts offered, identity and boundary work, and effort in mobilizing action.

Thus, the two frames that identify/mobilize most (‘economic responsibility’ and ‘regulation activists’) are most active in their identity and boundary work. They use the most rationalization, authorization, and moral-evaluative legitimation to establish their own and others’ expertise. However, they also de-legitimate others the most. Mobilization is the call to arms that provides appropriate vocabularies of motive (Benford & Snow, 2000). Indeed, these two frames also use the most mythopoiesis legitimation – symbolism, metaphors, and emotion – that offer these vocabularies. ‘Economic responsibility’ uses vocabularies of the market and war such as ‘killing the market’ and ‘economic suicide’ or ‘fighting the lefties’. To describe the position of environmentalists, they use religious and faith-based metaphors and political metaphors in line with their pecuniary rationale. They warn not to ‘sacrifice jobs at Gore’s altar’, or ‘that very little actual benefit can be provided by sacrificing our standard of living to appease the false god of ‘environmentalism’, while ‘carbon credits are the modern-day equivalent of indulgences. Pay and your “sin” of CO₂ is forgiven for no real benefit’.

The ‘regulation activists’ frame uses vocabularies of responsibility and stewardship of building consensus, realizing responsibility, and finding solutions to protect the environment. They enlist the most allies: Canada, Alberta, industry, APEGA, and other professionals. For them, they prescribe the second most amount of action – enacting stewardship, creating incentives, developing regulation, and reducing GHG. They urge APEGA to ‘stop dithering and actively encourage its members to push for improved efficiency and emissions reduction. One of our laws requires us to protect the environment – this is not happening now’ and to provide ‘leadership in searching for real answers … based on the common good’. The government ‘must mandate policies. Hopefully informed (from APEGA members) policies’.

The most defensive frames are ‘economic responsibility’ and ‘nature is overwhelming’ – both deny that climate change is a relevant problem and feel challenged by the IPCC positioning, which, as a counter-frame, puts these adherents in the defensive. As opponents to regulation, they have to stand against the inherently moral ‘comply with Kyoto’ frame, which they fear has become mainstream. Their opposition is reflected in their own framing activities: more affirmation of their own positioning as reflected in increased legitimation of their problem diagnosis and own expertise, more boundary work (per Gieryn, 1995; Branscombe et al., 1999; Hunt et al., 1994) and more adversarial framing (Gamson, 1999) as reflected in the de-legitimation and undermining of others’ expertise. Both frames buttress their position by normalizing climate change and rationalizing nature as uncontrollable, thus any action would be ineffective. While ‘economic responsibility’ adherents prescribe economic fixes, ‘nature is overwhelming’ adherents only support reducing pollution in general terms. Both liaise with ‘true scientists’ and de-legitimate the rationality of their opponents more than other frames: politicians (‘too dumb to realize that it will take many decades to put in place an infrastructure to improve energy efficiency’), media (‘media hype’ and ‘lack of unbiased information’), and – most of all – IPCC, and its supporters’ scientific grounding – ‘The holes left in the report by the IPCC leads me to form certain questions regarding the validity of claims made by the panel, the media and other alarmists.’

To determine the potential influence of these frames on policy responses, we compare the positions of the sponsors of these frames within their organization and the field (see Table 4). Adherents of frames that support regulation (‘comply with Kyoto’, ‘regulation activists’) are – in our study – significantly more likely to be lower in the organizational hierarchy, younger, female, and working in government. Indeed, in our study, only seven respondents using these frames are at the highest level in government. Conversely, adherents of those frames that are more defensive and oppose regulation (‘nature is overwhelming’, ‘economic responsibility’) are significantly more likely to be more senior in their organizations, male, older, geoscientists, and work in the oil and gas industry. Adherents of these two frames comprise 33.7% of our respondents overall, but 63.3% of top managers in the oil and gas industry as opposed to 19.1% supporting regulation. The majority of command posts within organizations, especially in the industry, seem to be manned with opponents to the IPCC and anthropogenic climate science. While it may not be overly surprising that industry executives support the industry’s interests, taking into consideration that we have analyzed experts’ frames that are founded on a claim of being independent and non-partisan, it is also important to note that the two frames that especially dwell on the point of ‘real science’ versus ‘hoax’ at the same time represent core economic interests.