Beyond general elections: How could foreign actors influence the prime ministership?

Recent reports of election interference ring alarm bells about the vulnerability of the Canadian political process. We examine a different but potentially more perilous loophole in the electoral process beyond general elections to demonstrate how foreign actors could directly influence the prime ministership through the manipulation of party membership. We suggest that foreign actors could influence the selection process of party leadership and, consequently, the prime ministership, simply by purchasing party memberships that distribute ballots in leadership elections without identity verification. After introducing China and Russia's strategies to influence Canadian politics, we offer a few recommendations to address the party membership loophole. These include identity verification at the time of membership registration and ballot mail-in, flagging membership irregularities, additional and dedicated funding to political parties to build robust cybersecurity practices, and creating additional content in languages other than English or French to mitigate the influence of state–controlled or sponsored media on immigrant and diaspora communities.


Introduction
Now, more than ever, it is abundantly clear that foreign actors have direct interest in Canada's electoral process.Although Elections Canada is said to have "very robust" measures for the protection of federal elections, 1 allegations of foreign interference continue to arise.Recently, the former Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) Han Dong was accused of receiving electoral funding from the Chinese Communist Party and advocating for the further imprisonment of the two Michaels-Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, both detained by Chinese authorities from December 2018 to September 2021 on espionage groundsalthough an Independent Special Rapporteur subsequently publicized findings to the contrary.
While these allegations, regardless of their validity, should lead to greater public scrutiny of the general election process, another potential threat has yet to receive sufficient attention: (potential) foreign influence on the leadership of Canada's political parties.In our view, foreign actors could also influence the selection process of party leadership, and hence the prime ministership, simply by purchasing party memberships that hand out ballots in leadership races without verifing the identities of new members.
The focus of the scholarly literature on the issue of foreign interference remains with the general election process.While the more cosmopolitan view proposes to allow foreign actors to make their stakes in national elections known, 2 most analysts urge efforts to minimize the possibility of foreign interference.Dov Levin, in his classification of cyber-threats that target the election process, highlights the "dirty tricks," or acts that are designed to directly harm one or more candidates or parties competing against the preferred candidate or party.Such acts may include disinformation campaigns and voter fraud, such as creating fake voters or manipulating voter rolls. 3imilarly, existing literature provides a good overview of the "weapons of choice" for China and Russia in their bid to influence democratic processes abroad. 4However, the literature on party-level manipulations remains scant, and those that exist tend to focus on disinformation campaigns perpetrated by competing political parties. 5he following sections will demonstrate that the threat of foreign interference in the leadership selection process at the party level demands attention from academics, policymakers, and the public alike.The present brief begins by surveying each major federal party's policy on membership eligibility criteria and explaining how the registration process enables foreign actors to potentially influence the prime ministership.It suggests that while some protocols are meant to encourage political participation among young Canadians and new immigrants alike-for example, a fourteen-year-old immigrant may register as a Liberal-they nonetheless create a perilous loophole that is highly susceptible to foreign interference by effectively allowing anyone to become a party member and hence eligible to choose party leaders and subsequently the Prime Minister (PM).In addition, without identity verification measures, the registration process allows foreign actors to purchase memberships using random or fake identities with the aim of influencing leadership election outcomes to favour their own interests.Next, we examine China and Russia's respective strategies to influence the Canadian political process.Whereas China primarily relies on tactics to manipulate and mobilize its diaspora, Russia threatens the political process mainly through the use of information campaigns and cyber tools.Based on these findings, we put forward a few recommendations.These include identity verification at the time of membership registration and ballot mail-in; flagging membership irregularities; additional and dedicated funding to political parties to build robust cybersecurity practices; and creating additional content written in languages other than English or French to mitigate the influence of state-sponsored media on immigrant and diaspora communities.

How could foreign actors influence the prime ministership?
Unlike in the American presidential system, general voters do not directly choose the head of government in the Canadian parliamentary system; instead, much like in the UK where only 0.3 percent of Britons were eligible to select Boris Johnson's successor, the PM position in Canada is assumed by the internally elected leader of the party that holds the most seats or confidence in the House of Commons.While instances of PM resignation that result in an immediate change of the head of government without a general election are rare in Canadian history, they have occurred, notably with Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien stepping down in 1993 and 2003 respectively.Equally important, although a leadership change of the opposition does not directly impact the sitting PM today, it can still significantly influence the future candidacy of the PM.Given this indirect selection process of the head of government, it is as important to safeguard leadership races as to protect the integrity of general elections.
Yet, while general elections are protected by "very robust" procedural and IT measures as well as citizenship and identity verification mechanisms, 6 similar protocols are absent in the leadership election processes, which are controlled by the individual political parties.At the technical level, due to financial barriers, parties are hesitant to invest in measures that would otherwise protect them against foreign interference, with the government providing little support beyond security briefings to the relevant parties. 7At the procedural level, the membership registration processes of all major federal parties enable foreign actors to potentially influence the parties' leaderships and, potentially, the prime ministership.To start with, both the Liberals and NDP adopt an "open door" policy for any resident who wishes to join the party.The Liberals welcome anyone aged fourteen or above who either "ordinarily live[s] in Canada" or is a citizen living abroad, and who is not affiliated with another federal party. 8Similarly, the NDP's constitution makes its membership available to "every resident of Canada, regardless of race, colour, religion, sex, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, or national origin…who is not a member or supporter of any other political party" (the NDP does not set an age requirement). 9ndeed, by encouraging residents of all identity characteristics to become party members, both the Liberals and the NDP demonstrate a fervent adherence to facilitating early voter participation and diversity that are key to Canadian democracy.Yet, while we do not suggest that foreign nationals residing in Canada inherently pose a security threat to the political process, if foreign actors could manipulate the role of their overseas students, who are by legal definition residents of Canada, in the Canadian political process, as China allegedly did in Dong's nomination process, 10 then they could also instruct the same overseas students to purchase party memberships and vote for a candidate who is likely to align with their country's interests.
Although the run-off system used in leadership races necessitates a more sophisticated strategy of influence, the number of foreign residents relative to the amount of party members makes leadership elections highly susceptible to interference.As of 2021, Chinese international students residing in Canada alone constituted 141,085 people. 11This is compared to 124,000 members who took part in the NDP's last leadership race in 2017, 12 269,469 and 675,000 members as of the 2020 and 2022 Conservative leadership races respectively, 13 and 300,000 Liberal members shortly after Justin Trudeau assumed office. 14Taking into account such factors as member (voter) turnout and historically close election results, which include the 2012 NDP leadership race, the tight contest between Stéphane Dion and Michael Ignatieff in 2006, the close call between Andrew Scheer and Maxime Bernier in 2017, and yet another close call between Erin O'Toole and Peter Mackay in 2020, even a relatively small number of foreign nationals residing in Canada being manipulated into party membership and certain electoral behaviours could sway the outcome of leadership races, and thus influence the prime ministership.
Even though the Conservatives welcome only citizens and permanent residents aged fourteen or above to join their caucus, 15 the citizenship/permanent residence requirement itself does not make CPC's internal elections less susceptible to potential foreign influence.In reality, none of the three major federal parties have any identity or (permanent) residence verification measures in place.While conducting this research, we attempted to register for membership in each party-Liberal, Conservative, and NDP-using random identity information, and were granted membership from all three parties.All we had to do is to declare that we met the membership criteria (and make a small donation).As Right Now describes, memberships are "the bread and butter of the party, so the parties make it [the registration] super easy…; in fact, you can join online." 16In addition, as leadership races use mail-in ballots, there is no verification process, even at the time of voting.
At best, this situation creates a perilous loophole that is highly susceptible to foreign interference by effectively allowing anyone to become a party member, and hence eligible to choose party leaders and subsequently the PM.At worst, using fake or random identities through the online registration process, foreign actors could purchase large numbers of memberships without needing to resort to diaspora manipulation or mobilization.
Prima facie, manipulating this loophole appears to require extensive logistical preparation and resource allocation.Not only would a substantial number of accounts need to be created, but a payment (donation) may be required with each profile estalished.Nevertheless, foreign actors may see it as a small investment with big returns in the sense of influencing party leadership races.Compared to traditional tactics, such as (dis)information campaigns and diaspora manipulation, which demand either substantial investments in building media legitimacy or exerting extensive influence and control over immigrant communities, memberships are affordably priced at $15 or less ($15 for the CPC, $10 for the NDP, and free for the LPC).Assuming one hundred thousand memberships would be needed to achieve a real impact on a leadership race, it would cost foreign actors at most C$1.5 million.In comparison, it is believed that whereas China spent U$280 million to influence American politics alone over a six-year span, 17 the Kremlin allocated at least U$300 million on political campaigns worldwide. 18f equal importance is that even if foreign actors do not acquire enough memberships to influence the outcome of leadership races nationally, they could still interfere with nomination contests where a small number of voters could exert outsized impacts in certain ridings.Logistically, while each ballot must be physically received and mailed in despite the online registration process, several post-office boxes or residential addresses could feasibly surmount this impediment, and a few "volunteers" could effortlessly address the need to physically send ballots.
Considering the magnitude of the potential impact, cost effectiveness, and minimal logistical obstacles, utilizing the loophole could be a highly desirable tactic for foreign actors.

China's strategy to influence Canadian politics
Beijing's strategy appears to be centred on actively shaping the electoral and foreign policy outcomes of specific countries by exerting direct influence on their processes.Across the Taiwan Strait, Chinese authorities are believed to have directed pro-China media outlets to promote Han Kuo-yu, who ran for the 2020 presidency on a Beijing-friendly platform. 19In Australia, the former outer shadow minister, Sam Dastyari, was said to have received funding from state-backed Chinese donors and was alleged to push policies in China's favour. 20Similarly, former New Zealand MP Jian Yang, who had a fifteen-year background in the People's Liberation Army prior to emigrating, is believed to have contributed to a more accommodating posture towards the People's Republic of China (PRC). 21nsurprisingly, China, too, has its stakes in Canadian politics.As CSIS concludes in its leaked report, the PRC intended to ensure the election of the third Trudeau parliament (albeit a minority one) and the defeat of Conservative Chinese-Canadian candidates who oppose Beijing. 22While somewhat counterintuitive, there is no evidence to suggest that China has targeted all Chinese-Canadian MPs who have criticized it.Notably, although both Jean Yip (Liberal) and Jenny Kwan (NDP) have openly criticized the PRC's treatment of the Uyghur people and Hong Kongers, 23 they seem not have been targeted to the same degree as Conservatives Kenny Chiu, Michael Chong, or Alice Wong have.
This seeming contradiction is perhaps best explained by the PRC's (correct) understanding of Canadian politics.On one hand, as the third party in an effectively twoparty system, the NDP is unlikely to succeed in any federal election.On the other hand, while they are becoming less favourable to Beijing, especially after ending the 2016 "comprehensive engagement policy," 24 the Liberals remain the least antagonistic, if not the most favourable, party to China. 25This is reflected in the Liberals' record against (re)establishing the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations.In addition, given the prevailing partisanship in Canada, even Liberal MPs who criticize China are still compelled to vote in accordance with the party's overall stance, as Yip's "nay" in the motion to (re)instate the committee demonstrates.While there is no evidence that China has targeted leadership races, Beijing's sophisticated understanding of Canadian politics underscores the urgent need to close the membership loophole to prevent its potential abuse.
Even more alarming are the specific tactics that the PRC could potentially use to influence our political process.While intimidation and harassment (such as in the case of Chong), ethnic and linguistic isolation (e.g., linking actions against foreign interference with racism), information manipulation, and cyber-attacks (such as in the case of Amnesty International Canada) arguably are all included in its playbook, 26 Beijing seems to view diaspora mobilization and manipulation as the key strategic tool to influence Canada and other democracies alike. 27As the leaked CSIS report notes, "a key part of [China's] interference operation is to influence vulnerable Chinese immigrants in Canada," who, according to an anonymous Chinese consulate official, are "easy to influence…and agree with the PRC's stance." 28Alarmingly, the very same tactic could also be used to manipulate leadership races by instructing some Chinese-Canadians to purchase party memberships and vote for Beijing's more favoured candidate.In fact, if the allegations against Han Dong hold true, then it is likely that Chinese interference operations have already extended to the membership process, as a Liberal membership would be required to nominate his candidacy to run in Don Valley North. 29

Russia's strategy to influence Canadian politics
Russia has allegedly employed a two-fold strategy to influence the Canadian political process.One facet involves creating a threat to compromise the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.The other uses (dis)information campaigns to influence public opinion.Compared to the Chinese strategy, Russia's Canada strategy seems to focus more on spreading doubt and distrust among the public towards the system.
As the recent report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security highlights, Russian cyber warfare and intelligence collection are the most serious and relevant threats to Canada's public safety and national security, particularly in relation to critical infrastructure. 30Together with the US and a number of other countries, Canadian ministers issued a joint statement in April 2021 regarding a "Russian cyber-espionage campaign that exploited the SolarWinds Orion platform."According to Global Affairs Canada (GAC), the networks of more than one hundred Canadian entities were compromised through the use of malware, which necessitated "costly mitigation activities and may have undermined public confidence in downloading software updates." 31Canada assessed that a Russia-backed hacker group was responsible for this malicious activity.
While leadership races may not by definition be part of critical infrastructure, these instances underscore the urgency to close the loophole in party membership registration.If Russia can conduct cyber-attacks against the Canadian critical infrastructure, then it certainly is able to undermine the web-based party membership registration process by "creating" fake voters or manipulating voter rolls.
(Dis)information campaigns are another aspect of Russia's strategy.Among significant instances where (dis)information was employed, the "Freedom Convoy" -the occupation of Ottawa and various crossings along the Canada-US border by antivaccine protestors in early 2022-appears to be the most consequential thus far.In a prolonged standoff between the protestors and the Canadian government, RT (formerly Russia Today), the Russian state-funded media outlet, tried to "exploit their grievances, amplify social divisions and delegitimize the Trudeau government." 32he convoy's three-week occupation of Parliament Hill and border crossings prompted the government to invoke the Emergencies Act before police cleared the blockades.In response, RT produced the highest volume of convoy-related coverage among international media outlets. 33It sent correspondents to do on-the-ground reporting in Canada, which mostly consisted of interviews with convoy organizers and supporters.As a result, RT's coverage was shared widely on social media by Canadian supporters of the protest, through which the media outlet built a connection with the domestic audience and built legitimacy around its image. 34he armed conflict in Ukraine, which accelerated in February 2022, started an additional cycle of (dis)information targeting the Canadian public.As the military confrontation has continued, the Communications Security Establishment has noted increased numbers of "false narratives [that] included doctored images of Canadian Forces Members in Ukraine and false claims about Canadian Forces committing war crimes." 35In particular, the CSE points out the existence of a "false narrative about the presence of Canadian Forces Members in the Donbas region, which was timed with news of the arrival of the Canadian Forces Members in Ukraine to secure the Canadian Embassy in Kyiv." 36 Russian cyberwarfare and (dis)information campaigns are aimed at attacking the credibility of the Canadian political system and interfering with the political process.Although the success of these operations remains relatively modest, the strategy is not void of impact.More importantly, the membership loophole represents another area where the Russians could potentially undermine Canada's political process, especially by creating mistrust among the public.As we have seen in the US, mistrust of election results can create massive political disorder and chaos.

Policy recommendations
We hope that this commentary rings an alarm bell on a serious loophole outside of the general election process that could catastrophically undermine the Canadian political process, if utilized by foreign actors.Immediate action must be taken.First and foremost, while creating an in-person, on-site identity verification process could be costly, each party must strengthen its membership registration process.Existing technology such as Interac (which operates through bank login) can not only ensure secure and reliable identity verification for party membership applicants, but also prevent foreign actors from purchasing a large number of memberships using random or fake identities.Furthermore, the parties should flag membership irregularities, such as a flux of registrations with a single IP address, same banking information, and/or physical address to prevent foreign actors from illicitly purchasing online memberships for the purpose of influencing leadership election outcomes.
As for the federal government, it should assist Canadian political parties-who tend to be reluctant to spend money outside of electoral campaigns 37 -to invest in measures (such as those mentioned above) that would protect them against foreign interference.Since it is difficult to counter cyber-attacks-as the saying goes, the best way to counter a cyber-attack is to attack-we recommend an additional layer of identity verification at the time of ballot mail-in (e.g., through Canada Post).
These technical improvements alone are unlikely to be effective against such techniques as diaspora manipulation.Therefore, the government should also increase investment towards producing media content that targets not only French-and English-speaking audiences but also includes the languages of other ethnic communities widely represented in Canadian society.These are not limited to Chinese and Russian diasporas and could potentially include Iranian and Indian communities, among others.Many newcomers continue to rely on media outlets from their home countries to inform themselves about world events.Many state media outlets in 36.Ibid.37. Esselment, "Digital campaign threats."

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International Journal 79 (1)     those countries support Chinese and/or Russian international policies and purposefully or involuntarily refurbish and reproduce the content that the Russian and Chinese governments attempt to spread.As such, particular attention should be paid to the creation of Mandarin Chinese, Russian, Punjabi/Hindi/Urdu, Arabic, and Persian-language media content (e.g., similar to BBC Zhongwen or Voice of America) through the creation of multi-lingual media outlets in Canada.With these problems resolved and the loophole closed, it would become more difficult for foreign actors to create distrust toward the Canadian political process.