Science, Technology and Foreign, Policy

Transfer of science and technology as well as exchange of science and technology among nations has become a very important part of international relations, particularly since the Second World War. Historically, Government interest in technology was connected mostly with collecting taxes and making thc tools and techniques of war. Technology diffused freely across tlie boundaries of nations in the past becausc the sovereignty of nations could not be cxtendcd to prevent such movenicnts. The stntcs did not Iiavc the ncccssary app:iratus or intelligence to restrict or retard such movenicnts of technology. Gunpowder and guns diffused throughout the world, as did silk, tea, indigo, and jute technologies. As the world contracted and technology spcedcd up, antisepsis, discovered by Joseph Lister and uscd effectively in thc Crimean War, and tlic steam enginc invented by James Watt were wry quickly cniploycd by other countries both in war and in pcacc by the end of the nineteenth century. The penetration of technology into national and Governmental affairs has been quite rapid since thc First World War; it has been phenomenal sincc tlie Second. The mctnl industries of stccl, copper, and aluminium and thc electrical industries of making motors, gcncrators, switches, and electric lamps diffused tliroughout Europc and parts of Asia-marginally cven to some of the devcloping nations. Tlic wzr technologics of making cxplosivcs, guns, and other cquipmcnt also percolated throughout the dcvelopcd nations. Industrial technologies of shipbuilding (including battleships), gasoline and pctrochernicals, tanks and automobiles did not diffuse as quickly or as widely. Nevertliclcss there was a perceptible pressure by tlic developed nations in tliese dircctions. The Second World War specdcd up technological dcveloplncnt enormously. hlass production methods were applied by the United States to the manufxturc of aircraft znd shipbuilding. The Germans developed cnornious productivity in tlic &mufacture of guns, tanks, and aircraft. Moreover, communication equipnicnt and techniques wcrc developed by Germany, thc United Kingdom, and thc United States. Thc war endcd in a burst of

technological innovation in Germany and the United States. Thc V,, V,, and the atom bomb became symbols of the Second World War. Thcsc devclopnients madc the penetration of technology into international diplomatic affairs almost inevitable.
This was pcrhaps most clearly realized imniediatcly after the Second World War in the United States and in more or less degree by scveral other nations. A scientist and Government oficial named Keith Glenna? wrote a report at the instance of President Harry S . Truman in 1950 on technology and foreign affairs. This document was secret for a while, but after Dwight D. Eiscnhowcr became President in 1952, it was released as a public document. Glennan made the point in his report that science and technology were increasingly important factors not only in the internal affairs of a nation but also in tlic conduct of international relations. He sought to warn the US Government that the conduct of forcign aWairs in tlic United States could not bc pursued without a deep awareness of the implications of tcclinology i n the conduct of its forcign rclations. Some of the things that Glennan spclt out clcarly nearly thirty years ago are applicablc to almost cvery nation today. Hc articulated clearly that a Foreign hlinistry or State Department needed to bc aware of the statc of technology in thc world and tlie technological strength and weaknesses of its own society. He wanted Foreign Service officers of the United States to be "technologically literatc". The US Government iniplemcnted Glennan's recommendations and set up an internal planning section within tlie State Department which would devote itself to the requirenicnls of US foreign policy with regard to scicncc and teclinology. Apart from thc internal planning cell within the. Statc Departnient that would keep in touch with scientific institutions within the counlry, it appointed Science Attaches in all it's major cmbassies round tlic world. It is important to note that by the fifties the United States had posted a distinguished professor of the California Institutc of Technology as its first Science Counsellor to New Delhi; our own Government was ablc to reciprocate only some twenty years later. However, US perceptions and actionswerc by no means unique. Thc Soviet Union and the United Kinidom also, either at the same time or soon thereafter, becamc increasingly aware of the technological dimensions of their respective foreign relations. The Soviet Union not only set up bureaus within their State Committee for Forcign Affairs but also established linkages with tlic USSR Academy of Sciences to be ablc to make technological and scicntific assessrncnts and plan for scientific technological and teclinical exchanges with "friendly natjons". Prime Minister Clement R. Attlce of the United Kingdom was aware of his Government's own needs as well as of US thinking in the matter. The British had their own wartime experience which motivated ' them strongly to incorporate technological understanding in the working of their Foreign Office. Unfortunately the British Foreign Office only paid lipservice to tliesc new ideas. Attlce, thanks to the influence of people like Blackett, tried t o encourage ideas of the technological dinlension in the Foreign Oflice, but the British Foreign Ofice was quite tardy about changing their structures and operations to fit in with these new idens. However, in course of time, the United States, the Sovict Union, and the United Kingdom-in that order-did appoint Science Attaches or hlinister Counsellors to look after matters relating to science and tecllnology in their major em~assies/Higl~ Commissions over the ycars.
The rapid development of nuclear weapons, the problcms of nuclcar power, and thc diffcultics of nuclear proliferation Iiavc been niatters of international discussion c w r sincc thc Second World Wiir. Tlic Foreign Ministries of many nations were intcrcsted in participilting in the debate, but in ordcr for tlieni to deal with tliesc matters effectively there was need of scientific and technological expertisc of a high order. In countries like France, the Sovict Union, the United Statcs, the Unitcd Kingdom, and so on, the Governments were able to niake adjustmcnts to the new situation by incorporating science planning cells or scientific evaluation cells in their Forcign Ministries. In our country, the interests of Jawahar-la1 Nchru and Honii J. Bhabha in nuclear energy and powcr led to the Department of Atomic Energy having a small cell of its own to deal with foreign relations with regard to nuclear matters. Whilc this strengthencd the Government of India's ability to participate in the nuclcar debate in the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and othcr international forums, it also in some ways fractionated the totality of foreign relations in technological matters and delayed the development of foreign policies over the entirt range of science and technology. It also created a certain amount ?of resentment as bctwcen the other Departments of Government dealing with scicncc and the Department of Atomic Energy. The' anxiety and suspicions of the Ministry of External Affairs extended not only to the Department of Atomic Energy but to the other Departnients concerned with scicncc; for that Ministry looked upon atomic energy as a successful intcrloper, and it looked upon others as intending interlopers. When additional problems came up, which had substantial scientific and technological components such as the divclopnient of aircraft industrics, ballistic missiles, and satellites, problems of occan resources and the petrolcuni technologies, our External Affairs Ministry sonietinies found itself occupying a back seat because of its lack of internal cxpettise couplcd with the absence of close understanding of the Indian and world tccli~iological scene which 'could only dcrivc from close association of scientists. When, in 1962, after the debacle on the Sino-Indian borders, we asked for technology for aircraft industry, the only taker was the Soviet Union for political reasons of its own. Sufficient technological backup expcrtisc would have madc sucli an agreement far niorc fruitful.
Pcrhaps it is unreal to expect politicians or Foreign Office bureaucrats to seize opportunities in bilateral discussions or intcrnntional debates or to understand tlie technological and economic implications of exchanges with rcal cffectivcness without a fair measure of scientific understanding. The result is that in India, as in most devcloping nations, political discussions tend to centre on rather fixed positions derived from prepared briefs, or ideological positions, or both. O'ur politicians and bureaucrats are often unable to seize opportunities indicatcd in views and argumcnts to open up IICW options as and when they become available.
Energy, special niclals, and rcsources of mctnlliferous ores, transnat iona I environment a I pollution, occ anbed rcsourccs, c t c. h ave now bccome international issues. Thc large scientific and technological components of these issues have t o be borne in mind. Without sufficient teclinological backup it is oftcn possible for a bureaucrat to convince liimsclf that tlie rtrgunients presented by his own country's claims are not as justified as the claims made by the devclopcd nations and so accepts disadvantagcous positions. That is why tcchnological literacy is so important. What is not oftcn understood by political leaders and burcaucrats is that scientists and teclinologists scrve better as partners than when they are treated as if they were on tap.
The activities of multinational corporations (hlNCs) represent another dimcnsion of international transfer of technology. The MNCs have set up industries in the various developing countries, and many of them have been able to obtain terms which are not equitable or justified owing to lack of technological unders!anding on the part of the bureaucrats and political leaders responsible for the issue of licences etc. This kind of thing creates subsequently a feeling in the latter that they have been imposed upon by the hlNCs. It also gives rise to a certain amount of distrust and unhappiness both in thc rccipicnt nation and in the nation of origin of an MNC. It can in some cases even lead t o closure of an MNC,in a developing nation to the unhappiness of both the Governments concerned. There are instances of such occurrences l o t h in our country a n d elsewhere. hlany of these problems arise bccnuse of lack of technological evaluation ?nd failure t o set down clear terms that would safeguard tlie interpts of both the Governments and people concerned and the MNCs. This problem has taken a ncw turn for us since we began to export tcclinobgy to South-East Asia and to Arab arid African lands, for some of our own corpprations there tend to behavc somewhat like the way the MNCs have behaved with us. Our bureaucrats and politicians are hot always as cautious or carcful as tlicy should be mainly bccausc thcir lack of technological iinderstanding makes it easy for them to acccpt tlic arguments of our cntreprcncurs when they invcst abroad.
In foreign trade likcwise thcrc arc a large nunibcr of non-tariff barricrs which often act to thc disadvantage of the dcvcloping nations. These barriers may be in the form of packaging standards, quotas, environmcntal standards, and so on. The arguments madc against them by a less developed country (LDC) arc often rountercd by various other arguments, both technologicnl and economic, Bhich tlic bureaucrat is often unablc to meet. Acccss to special materials svch as chromium, molybdenum, tin, nickel, uraniuni, and coppcr has also pronipled somc developcd nations to iisc double standards in thcir economic and tcclinological dcalings with tlic dcvcloping countrics. Onc gl:irin& example is that of Soutli Africa. Otlicrs arc Angola, Namibia, and Zairc.
Scvcral kinds of scicntific and technological problcms arisc between two nations when they arc obliged to sharc resourccs sucli as water-fiows or when they are called upon to address thcmselves jointly to questions such as water managcnient and pollution in contiguous arcas (such as the areas of the Gang3 systeni in Bangladesh and India or the Danube aiid Rhine basins in Europe).
The unrcstrictcd process of accdcration of technological devclopmcnt crcates numcrous problcms of dcpcndcncy, access to raw materials, markcts, 'and political influence-all or some of tlicse combined in various ways. The wide rangc of these instanccs provides a strong basis for arguments in favour of promoting understanding of the tcchnological content ofrelations bctwccn nations in modern times. There arc also often not very obvious technological or scientific aspccts of international relations which can be discovcrcd' onl! through close analysis; The selling of a sophisticated computcr by the United States tG thc Soviet Union becomes a matter of diplomatic cxchangc; as docs thc linking of the two spacecraft Soyuz and Apollo. Such dccisions are not just scientific; nor arc they niercly political. We have examples in our country of multiple import of the same technology by diffcrent companies leading to highcr costs and foreign-exchange drain. In Japan this is effectively prevented by the Ministry of Industries (MITI). MlT1 examines every proposal for import of tcchnology,;.and it can compel a Japancsc company to buy technology from it rather than from a foreign company and thus prevent any exclusive usc of a technology obtaincd from abroad. Japan has been able to dcvclop the electronic industry by effcctivc use of such tcchnology ownership clauses and internal competition and buy-back clauses in thcir I agrecnicnts with the United States as would enable it to sell back in the United States both electronic goods and clectronic knowhow.
The few instanccs mentioned above indicate that modern diplomacy, trade, and foreign relations have a large technological and scientific component. We may call this technological diplomacy. The example of space diplomacy in thc Soyuz-Apollo cxpcrimcnt cited above sliows how the political leaders of the two countries were able to overrule their mutual suspicions of their respective military burcaucracics because of the mutual intcrests and curiosity of their scientific communities to get somc insight into what was a sensitive area for both thc countries. In the process they insulated the joint excrcise from their political problcms as reflectcd in the mutual suspicions and the ups and downs oiddciifc, A complex programme such as Apollo-Soguz cannot be turncd on and off. It has to bc carried out consistently and steadily over four or five or more years. It was thus both a technological and a diplomatic task to insulatc thc Apollo-Soyuz agreement from other aspects of US-Soviet relations. Similarly the Soviet recognition of the Federal Republic of Gerniany some years ago had a curious scientific angle. The Soviet Union wanted thc titanium technology developed in the Federal Republic of Germany niainly for use in its space and aircraft industries. West Germany decided to use technology as a bargaining counter and secure recognition from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union in its turn insisted on thc recognition of West Germany's recognizing the German Democratic Republic. Both nations got what they wantcd.
Indian diplomacy has suffered from the limitation that thcrc was ngt enough science and technology help or assistance available to the Ministry at the time of Independence to devote to international purposes. However, there has since then bccn an enormous growth of science and technology within the country, especially during the last twenty-five years; so much so that thc country now .ranks third in scientific and technological capabilities. There is already somc significant effort to export technology, by both private 2nd public enterprise, and on thc Govcrnmental level. There is also an effort to work in partnership with another developcd country to set up manufacturing facilities in a third developing country. While the Ministry of External Afhirs gives its blessing to these various efforts, it has yet to take cognition of the possibility of harnessing science and technology to its diplomatic objectives in a consistent and long-range manner. A few years ago it madc its first attempts at inforpiation-seeking by initiating the process of positioning of Scientific Attaches in our embassies in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Japan. There has not yet been a significant follow-up of this first step although the first step was taken a few years ago.
-There are perhaps several reasons why, in spite of the many facets of science and technology that we have come across in our forcign relations, the MiGstry of External Affairs lias not been able to dcvelop a forcelful and consistent foreign policy with regard to science and technology. And awareness of the role of technology in foreign policy with regard to nuclear matters developed early, thanks to Homi Bhabha and Ncliru, but our nuclear foreign affairs were dealt with separately by the Dcpartnicnt of Atomic Energy, thereby creating in the Ministry of External Affairs a certain antipathy to dealing with technological situations. The service bureaucrats in the Ministry were to an extcnt also unfamiliar with the new dimensions of technology and often missed their implications for furthering marginal sophistication in our forei&n policy. For example, issues such as artificial satellites, spies in the skies, and ground truths did not create any anxiety t o understand their overtones in international affairs or in national issues. Similarly export of niinerals such as mica, manganese, and iron-ore was not uscd to strengthen the national technological base or to protect long-term national interests.
There was, besides, no structure in the Ministry of External Affairs to act as a consultant and guide and to help the bureaucracy and policyniakcrs in anticipating issues, in keeping themselves abreast of the changing state of technology in the developing and the developed world, or in estimating our own strengths and we a k nesses.
Finally wc had no clearly articulated foreign policy with rcgard to science and technology. What were our priorities? What did we scek from the rest of the world, particularly the developed world? What were we capable of giving, or willing to give, in return to the developing and to the developed world? What sort of science and technology do we need in our foreign policy delineation in India? D o we imitate the precedents of the United States or the United Kingdom o r the Soviet Union? Or do we stritc out on our own? A little thinking would show t t a t we really cannot imitate those precedents. Our constraints, traditions, technological status, and resources H ould not allow us to imitate,successfully. However, these are the common points for consideration of all scientific policies connected with our foreign relations. To deal with such a wide range of topics which embrace many national and intcrnational issues a systematic approach to policy matters is necessary. This means a structure of sonic sort which can receive and process information. A sound information system is a basic requirement. For the purposcs of a Foreign Ollice, both information flows and deliberate collection have to be ensured. The Science Attaches are another source. Published material, such as scientific journals, reports, and newspapers, has also to be scanned. Inforniation can also come uscfdly from our scientists working in our universities, research institutions, and Governmect laboratories or from those working abroad.

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The collected inforniation has to be collated, selected, and systematized. This collation, selection, and systematization should be one of the main tasks of a scientific bureau in the Foreign Ofice. Only those working in the hlinisfry ofExtcrnal Affairs arc awarc of the nccds of the Government and the orientation of future policy. The collation and systematization has to bc deliberately geared to thcsc ends. Thc burcau \vould necd guidance in terms of policy requirements, but a n.cll-run burcau can bring to the notice of the hlinistry important new features and events. It can also indicate new dircctions and the changes likely in the technological situation and enable the hlinistry of External Affairs lo bc prepared for them.
The ncxt stage in the work of the bureau in thc Foreign Ofice would be to niakc assessments and evaluations of the teclmology and rcsourccs of the countries we arc dealing with in connexion with our own intcrcsts and other aspects of our relations lvitli thosc coimtrics. Such evaluation would includc uscful comparisons, areas of coniplemcntarity, advanta gcs or disadvantages of rcsourccs, and rclativc position in the world teclmology systcm in all the areas of importance. Such assessments or evaluation of technology and resources have to be analytical to give some force of predictability on which the hlinistry of External Afhirs may depend in formulating policies that will have some staying power. In relation to such assessments the problems of Indian resoilrccs and technological directions may have to bc clearly enunciated and juxtaposed so that the policies take into account our possible riccds and the priorities of the future.
At the next stage the integration of science and technology objcctives with other aspects of forcign relations has to bc cnsured so that an integrated foreign policy of the country may develop. In the execution of policy, however, back-up rcquirenients of thc scientific manpower of the bureau would often be called for. What is equally important, however, is a continuing review, study, and emluation of policies with regard to binational or multinational relations and to note the progress, particularly of their scientific and teclmolog?cal components, in relation to expectations. If the benefits expected arc not accruing, o r if there are dificultics or problems, then studies necd to be undertaken to find out what has gone wrong either in formulation of policy or in implc~nentation. Such studies arc valuable in correcting errors or refining policies. They can also bring out inconsistencies or contradictions between thc science and technology policies and other aspects of policy and ensure that the various policies arc at all tirncs well co-ordinatcd. All of thesc tasks from information to review of implementation constitute a single packagc of considerable magnitude. To carry them out within the hlinistry of External Affairs would require a complenient of scientists and technologists who are capable and who can work well in partnership with the bureaucracy in thc Ministry. It would take time to structure such an organization, but it is more than time that a beginning was made. There is an additional issue which has to be kept in view. If scientists and technologists become' isolated from their science for far to3 long, they can b x o m c stale and turn into bureaucrats. There should be sufiicicnt flexibility in the system to enable them periodically to stay and work for some lengths of time in universities and research institutions both in India and abroad so that they may renew theniselves periodically. It is possible even to conceive that many of them would wish to go back to their institutions of research and that others would take their placc so that some circulation of ideas and attitudes may take placc without detriment to the careers of these people.
Modern technology has made foreign policy a n exercise in knowledge and sophisticntion--in addition, perhaps, to the classic requirements of patience nnd 'clarity. The important area of foreign policy would nced much greater study by students of foreign affairs with science backgrounds to bc able to appreciate and understand the nuanccs brought in by technology. I t is not enoug!i for the Foreign Ministries to study them in their own imnicdiate practical interest. Studies by academics with scientific as well as foreign policy and history backgrounds arc likcly to be fruitful and lend to new perceptions and definitions of our objectives and improve our understanding of the policies of other countries.