From empire to nation: Management of religious pluralism in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey

The transition from empire to nation-state poses challenges in managing religious and ethnic pluralism. Empires, characterized by hierarchical structures and diversity, contrast with nation-states, which aim for uniformity and unity. As empires modernize administratively, they grapple with different approaches to pluralism. While Habsburgs were more in favor of a federal plurality, the Romanovs pushed for centralization and assimilation. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottomans vacillated between these two alternative paths. This vacillation is most evident in their approach to millet system which simultaneously followed the contradictory policies of undermining millet boundaries in order to promote a sense of unity across the multi-faith society and policies of promoting and safeguarding the privileges and group-specific rights of non-Muslim communities. Ottoman nationalism eventually shifted towards a homogenizing model, akin to the Romanov approach, leading to the exclusion of religious minorities. This process of homogenization continued in the nationalist policies of modern Turkey and resulted in the secular Turkish Republic being less tolerant towards non-Muslims than the Islamic Ottoman Empire.


Introduction
Academic interest in studying empires has grown significantly in the post-Cold War period.This interest cannot be separated from disillusionment with the ability of nationstates to manage ethnic and religious pluralism.In the post-Cold War era ethnic conflicts and nationalist rivalries have emerged as prominent features of the global order, overshadowing ideological conflicts that were more prevalent during the Cold War period.
This nostalgia starkly contrasts the enthusiasm for modernization theory that dominated the social sciences in the post-World War II period.Especially in the 50s and 60s, with decolonization, there was great optimism about the potential of nations and nation-states as the best form of political organization.For example, Rupert Emerson's seminal work, From Empire to Nation, begins with the promise that 'Empires fell in bad times and nations rose to take their place ' (1960: 3).The tendency to glorify the nation-state has been particularly influential in mainstream American political science.In turn, partly triggered by Cold War conditions, the labeling of the Soviet Union as an empire (in some cases pointing to the anomaly of its existence in the age of nation-states) or indeed as an 'empire of evil' has loaded the idea of 'empire' with pejorative terms such as oppressive, backward, pre-modern, etc. 1  Because of these pejorative connotations attached to the idea of empire, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt's (1963) The Political Systems of Empires remained the only major work on empires for decades.But even in this work, the study of empires clearly remains a historical study of the development and evolution of political systems.Empires, defined as 'historical bureaucratic societies', are perceived as belonging to a distant past and, therefore, not very relevant to the political problems of our time.(Cevik 2015) In this lacuna in the scholarship of the concept of empire, Michael W. Doyle's 1986 study, Empires, stands out as an essential work.Not only as a 'voice in the wilderness' (Motyl 2001, 1) but also as a harbinger of the forthcoming literature.
As the problems of the nation-state system have become more apparent in the post-1991 period, empires as political systems have received more attention from scholars.This new interest has resulted in several valuable publications proposing the study of the empires and their political systems as complex entities that can suggest solutions to contemporary problems (Barkey 2008;Barkey and Von Hagen 1997;Cooper 2005;Esherick, Kayalı and Van Young 2006;Maier 2006;Motyl 2001).In most of these studies, empires are defined as political units that manage to govern diversity much more effectively and peacefully than nation-states.Unlike the previous tradition that called empires 'prisons of nations', this new literature points to 'opportunity structures of empires' (Comisso, 2006).As nation-states became the norm in international politics, empires were portrayed more negatively.As the euphoria of nationalism fades, nostalgia for empires replaces it (Cevik 2015).
A similar attitude can be observed to some extent, especially in studies on Turkish politics, but also in Middle Eastern Studies and Balkan Studies.As most nation-states in the post-Ottoman world have failed to tackle ethnic and religious pluralism, a certain nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire and specific practices, such as the Millet system (described below), has emerged.It is true that the Ottoman Empire, as an Islamic empire, was much more pluralistic and tolerant towards religious minorities than its main heir, the secular Republic of Turkey.This article aims to analyze this contrast by looking at how the Ottoman Empire managed religious pluralism, how and why this compromise became unsustainable from the nineteenth century onwards, and how the republic inherited a less tolerant legacy from the Ottoman Empire.In particular, it draws attention to how the modernization reforms of the nineteenth century transformed the empire and made it more like a nation-state, making religious pluralism more challenging to sustain.

Empire vs nation-state
I understand an empire as a large and composite political structure formed by a conglomeration of peoples and territories.These conglomerations stand side by side and are linked indirectly to the political center.The center has limited control over these territories and communities and rules them only through intermediaries.These intermediaries are usually local leaders who cooperate with the imperial center.They may be members of a landed aristocracy or community leaders such as religious leaders.This indirect rule provides the peripheral communities with internal autonomy, resulting in a plurality of administrative rules and regulations throughout the empire.These features starkly contrast the nation-states' egalitarianism, direct and uniform means of rule, their tendency to homogenize, and the 'one nation, one state' principle (Cevik 2021).
These features of empires have resulted in empires being generally much more successful in allowing diversity and plurality compared to nation-states.However, at this point, Dominic Lieven reminds us not to forget that 'it was far easier to sustain a civilized acceptance of diversity in a pre-modern empire in which government did not aspire to do much more than fight wars, raise taxes and preserve order ' (2007, 409).The increase in the state's capacity to deliver services also comes with the burden of increased obligations to the state.In contrast, the diverse, tolerant and cosmopolitan nature of imperial societies is also a result of the lack of penetration by the imperial states.Therefore, Maier argues that nation-states are better at belonging and equality, while empires are better at tolerance (2006,29).
This contrast, which many scholars in the literature on nationalism have emphasized, is significant.Still, given that few nation-states live up to homogeneous egalitarian claims, it is 'relative rather than absolute' (Kumar 2010: 131).Empires and nation-states share a common historical trajectory: 'Most nation-states, or what became nation-states, were the result of conquest and colonization, as were most empires' (Kumar 2010: 125.See also Niebuhr 1959).At the same time, through increasing centralization efforts, empires acquired the characteristics of nation-states, such as higher levels of egalitarianism, uniformity and direct rule.Esherick, Kayalı and Van Young point out that facing the threatening success of European nation-states, 'the ruling elites (of empires) responded (to strains of modernity) with economic and political reforms akin to those of the nation-state projects of Western Europe, thus throughout the nineteenth century they displayed a pronounced trend toward national and ethnic self-definitions ' (2006, 12-16).
The establishment of direct state control over subjects through modernization reforms leads to administrative and legal homogenization.Maintaining social and cultural pluralism in the face of increasing state intervention and administrative homogenization is a challenge all modern states face (Young 1968).And when empires began to emulate Western nation-states, they faced similar problems of nation-states in dealing with diversity.While all empires responded to this challenge by promoting an 'official nationalism', their responses differed in formulating it.In the following sections, I will first analyze the social and political setting of the Ottoman Empire from a diversity-hierarchy perspective.I will then analyze the evolution of the empire towards nation-building and how this created new challenges in managing diversity.I will conclude by pointing out how the Turkish Republic inherited these challenges.
Ottomans: A hierarchical co-existence of religious plurality 'Whoever claims that all people are equal must be hopelessly mad', wrote a resident of Ottoman Aleppo in the eighteenth century in his personal notebook, among other sayings (Marcus 1989, 37).As in all empires, inequality was inherent in the social and political fabric of the Ottoman Empire.It was a society that was both hierarchical and stratified on many layers.The basic hierarchy in society was between the ruling elite, consisting of civil servants, religious and military leaders, who exercised authority on behalf of the Sultan and ruled over the re'aya (literally 'flocks').Ottoman society was also hierarchical in terms of religion, with Islam taking precedence over other faiths as the state and court religion.Thus, the social pyramid of the Ottoman Empire was structured along two axes: horizontal and vertical.While the vertical axis separated Muslims from other monotheistic religions, the horizontal axis divided society into different social classes.The ruling elite was drawn from all three recognized religions (Bieber 2000, 14-15).
The Ottomans remained an Islamic Empire from its foundation until its collapse.Traditional Islamic law formed the main component of the legal system and, at least in principle, was superior to the Sultan's law.Despite differences in their individual religiosity, all Sultans publicly endorsed and glorified Islam, as Ottoman administrative institutions were defined and legitimized in Islamic terms (Findley 2010, 64).Religion was central to social organization as it constituted the primary form of belonging in traditional societies.Despite the ethnic diversity of the empire, religion transcended ethnic boundaries; at least, it certainly did until the nineteenth century.An ethnic Albanian could therefore be Muslim, Greek Orthodox or Roman Catholic, and these identities primarily shaped his social relations.There was no ethnic consciousness comparable to nation-states (Hanioglu 2008, 24-27).
The insignificance of language and ethnicity as identity markers is also evident in censuses.The first official census of 1830 was based entirely on religion, while ethnic and linguistic differences were almost wholly ignored (Karpat 1985).In addition to the official dominance of Islam, the 1830 census points to the demographic dominance of Muslims, as they constituted the majority of the population.But even then, Christians made up more than a third of the population, which was too large a minority to be easily ignored.Moreover, they constituted the majority in the European territories of the empire, including the Balkans, the empire's core.The prominent importance of religion in social life and the vast non-Muslim population led to a very delicate management of this religious diversity, known as the Millet system.
While recognizing the inequality between Islam and other religions, the millet system was a highly tolerant system that allowed the Ottomans not only to rule by force but also to incorporate non-Muslims at various levels.Although it is still a matter of debate when the millet system actually emerged and to what extent it was institutionalized, millet refers to sectarian communities governed by their religious leaders.These communities enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in the conduct of social affairs, such as the collection of religious taxes and the financing and maintenance of religious services, and maintained a social, legal order based on the relevant religious law, especially concerning private law.Another aspect of the millet system that will become very important in the age of nationalism is that millets have their educational institutions, which are funded and managed by the community and, therefore, not subject to government regulation.
The state further reinforced the sense of separate corporate existence in minority communities by treating them as units with collective administrative responsibilities, such as imposing various lump-sum taxes on entire communities or holding the entire community accountable for the behavior of its members (Marcus 1989, 43).The different nationalities were treated as legal entities and allowed their own internal structures and hierarchies, which the Ottoman state even encouraged by dealing only with their leaders rather than individual members (Poulton 1997, 48).
Given these considerations, the millet system represents an ideal form of imperial rule over distinct but separate communities through intermediaries.The millet system is central to the Ottoman indirect administration of different religious communities and should, therefore, be understood as an administrative strategy used by the Ottomans to manage such a diverse society effectively.In this context, Karen Barkey (2008) effectively uses the concept of 'legibility' developed by James Scott (1998).By creating nations, the Ottomans transformed their religious diversity into legible units that enabled them to effectively maintain control and mobilize resources.

Era of reform
As the Ottomans fell behind the Western European powers and the Habsburg and Romanov Empires, they embarked on a reform policy that significantly altered this sociopolitical environment.In line with other empires, these reform policies aimed to strengthen the state and the army through centralization of the administration and modernization of the country.
However, this was not a typical process of centralization aimed at increasing the center's power vis-à-vis the periphery.In the classical imperial form, centralization meant reorganizing the division of power between the center, the periphery and intermediary power holders in favor of the central power.Therefore, centralization meant ensuring a more efficient flow of resources from the periphery to the center and guaranteeing the flow of orders from the center to the periphery.In a typical centralization, numerous agreements are made to maintain the vertical integration of power from the periphery to the center through intermediary power holders (Barkey 2008, 264).The nineteenth century Ottoman centralization, however, aimed to eliminate these intermediaries. 2'It was clear that… a loosely bound association of disparate, semi-independent territories could not expect to survive long in the Napoleonic era... To survive, the empire's leaders had to do more than change the state; they had to reinvent it' (Hanioglu 2008, 40-41).The main features of the traditional empire, such as indirect rule through intermediary power holders and the plurality of political and administrative arrangements, were unacceptable in this new form of state.
The overall restructuring of state and society relations required a new social contract fundamentally different from the centuries-old social system of the empire.In general, administrative homogenization increased direct control, and the elimination of intermediary power holders inevitably led to the need for a more egalitarian social system.Thus, the Ottoman social fabric classically divided along two axesthe horizontal axis that divided society into two social classes, the ruling elite, and the re'aya, and the vertical axis that divided society into the separate and hierarchical entities of monotheistic religions (millet system)had to be reinvented in a more egalitarian and uniform manner.In fact, the classical social organization was already obsolete: On the one hand, the Christian superiority in trade and education challenged established hierarchies (Issawi 1982), and on the other hand, due to the difficulties of maintaining the diverse and heterogeneous nature of society in a period of administrative homogenization, separate coexistence began to fragment.Mahmud II pointed to the need for a new social organization when he said, 'From now on, I do not want to recognize Muslims outside the mosque, Christians outside the church, Jews outside the synagogue' (as cited in Hanioglu 2008, 74).This search for a new social contract first materialized in 1839 with the proclamation of Tanzimat.This degree also marked the beginning of a new period in Ottoman history known as the Tanzimat period (1839-1876).With the Tanzimat, which literally means restructuring, a series of reforms were implemented that completely transformed the state structure, centralizing and bureaucratizing the empire.The radical transformation of the state structure required a new social contract between the state and society based on the primacy of the state, direct loyalty to the state instead of religious or other intermediaries, and equality among subjects.
The ideology accompanying these transformations is called Ottomanism: promoting an Ottoman national identity.In this sense, the Tanzimat was the first step in a series of attempts to eliminate both the horizontal and vertical axes that divided society and to bring these categories under the banner of the newly formed Ottoman nation.'As such, the edict was an important first step towards transforming the hitherto Muslim, Christian, and Jewish subjects into Ottomans' (ibid.).
Promoting an imperial national identity that would encompass the entire empire and unite the variously segregated subjects into co-nationals is a common feature of all modernizing empires of the period.The literature on nationalism defines an empire's promotion of a national identity as official nationalism (Seton-Watson 1977).In the context of modern state formation, official nationalism aims to fully mobilize the energies of society in the service of the modern state without undermining the dynastic and patrimonial principles that underpin their political legitimacy (Roshwald 2001, 8).

Ottomanism and varieties of official nationalism
There are essential differences among the universal land empires regarding how official nationalisms were formed.The two most essential land empires of the nineteenth century, the Habsburgs and the Romanovs, pursued different strategies in creating official nationalisms and can be considered to have created two different ideal types.The Habsburg model was based on a more federalist approach, while the Romanov model was based on extreme centralization.The difference between these two models is not insignificant, as the Habsburg model, in its most extreme form, would mean a confederation of nationstates.In contrast, in its most extreme form, the Romanov model would lose its imperial character and take the form of a unitary nation-state.The Habsburgs tried to preserve the plural identities of their empire and presented the Habsburg identity as an umbrella concept.This entailed a more federalist organization of the state structure and greater autonomy for local groups in exchange for their submission to the imperial identity.Thus, they did not seek to erase sub-identities but to present the Habsburg identity (framework) as the overarching ideology of a multinational state.The most extreme outcome of these policies was the Ausgleich ('compromise') in 1867, which transformed the empire into a dual monarchy.On the other hand, the Russians pursued a strong policy of centralization and assimilation.They used Orthodoxy and Russification as a means of creating an official nationalism.Their turn towards nationalism was more complete and radical than the Habsburg model, which aimed to preserve imperial pluralism within a federal-national system. 3 The Ottomans did not consistently follow both paths in their efforts to spread Ottomanism.The trajectory of Ottomanism can be read in this dichotomy and uncertainty between the federalist-pluralist Habsburg model and the centralist-assimilationist Romanov model.The desire to build a nation out of the peoples of the empire inevitably raises the question of the relationship between this new national image and the existing socio-political categories of the empire.In particular, 'the reconciliation of this new, nonsectarian ideological basis of the state with the traditional centrality of Islam in the legitimizing framework of the empire remained the most sensitive and challenging issue' (Hanioglu 2008, 74).This uncertainty is also evident in their approach to the millet system, which simultaneously pursued the contradictory policies of weakening millet boundaries to promote a sense of unity in the multi-faith society, and promoting and protecting the privileges and group-specific rights of non-Muslim communities.
Overall, the religiously divided nature of society remained the main obstacle to Ottomanism.Nationalism still did not exist among Muslim communities, so separatist nationalism was only a Christian problem.In this context, the conversion of people of various nationalities into non-Muslim Ottomans was the 'acid test of Ottomanism' (Findley 1982).To this end, Ottoman statesmen took bold steps, and despite European criticism, the progress made by the Ottoman Empire far exceeded what European Empires had achieved on their soil.In the final analysis, however, the Tanzimat failed to create an Ottoman nation and to incorporate non-Muslims into this national identity.Moreover, the Tanzimat period created a backlash among Muslims in the empire and paved the way for the emergence of Muslim nationalism in the future.Thus, the Tanzimat reforms resulted in the deepening of the very divisions they sought to erase.
The peaceful coexistence of different religious communities was the dominant feature of Ottoman history before the Tanzimat.But this stability was based on a particular worldview in which each community had a legitimate place and rank, and no one attempted to step outside their legitimate sphere.This stability was already weakened by the emergence of a Christian bourgeoisie as intermediaries between European capitalism and Ottoman markets.This group's increasing dominance of trade across the empire Çevik destabilized the previous social order.However, the fundamental destabilization of the previous equilibrium occurred with the Tanzimat reforms, particularly the 1856 Reform Edict, which introduced formal equality between members of different religions.The sense of loss of superiority in the social and political spheres, coupled with the growing dominance of non-Muslims in the economic sphere, led to a strong sense of resentment among the Muslim masses against the ongoing changes.European interventions on behalf of non-Muslims further fueled feelings of resentment.
Finally, the empire also underwent a demographic and territorial transformation throughout the nineteenth century.While the empire lost most of its European territories, this also meant that the Christian-majority regions shrunk significantly while the proportion of Muslims in the empire's overall population increased.This process also weakened the urgency to incorporate non-Muslims into the Ottoman nationality.
Thus, the combination of the Christian nature of separatism and growing Muslim resentment, as well as changing demographics, gave Ottomanism its Islamic coloration.During the reign of Abdülhamid II, a significant shift began from an all-encompassing and supra-religious imperial ideology to a more Islamically oriented imperial ideology.This can be called the beginning of Muslim nationalism in an imperial context.It can also be considered the end of the Ottoman paradox of maintaining pluralism in a centralized state and the reformulation of Ottomanism on a more centralized-assimilationist Romanov model.Ultimately, the Ottoman state was transformed from a Muslim-dominated pluralist empire into a Muslim nation-state (Zurcher 2000).
At this point, it is important to underline that the Islamization of Ottomanism and the rise of Muslim nationalism were not related to the ideological-religious inclinations of the rulers.The Committee of Union and Progress, which deposed Abdülhamid II and whose leadership was composed of primarily secular reformers and officers, continued to pursue an Ottoman nationalism colored by Islam.The parameters of nation-building pushed the Ottoman leadership towards a more Islamic version of nationalism.

Ottoman legacy and the new republic
The evolution of Ottoman official nationalism from a more secular and trans-religious understanding to a more religious formulation has also shaped the nationalism and religious policies of the Republic of Turkey.From the very beginning, national identity in Turkey has been shaped by religious concepts.The Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which forms the basis of the new republic, defines nationality through religious affiliation.Accordingly, the nationality that constitutes the Republic of Turkey is defined as Muslims, while non-Muslims are defined as official minorities.The population exchanges between Turkey and Greece, which was accepted with the Lausanne Treaty, followed the same formula.Accordingly, 1.2 million Muslims from Greece had to migrate to Turkey and 400 000 Greek Orthodox from Turkey had to migrate to Greece.Since religion was the only criterion in the migration parameters, many non-Turkish Muslims in Greece had to migrate to Turkey, while Turkish-speaking members of the Greek Orthodox Church had to migrate to Greece.Moreover, the same religious pattern continued during subsequent waves of migration to Turkey.
Given the central importance of secularism for the Turkish state and the assertiveness of its secularist policies, especially during the founding phase (see Kuru 2009), this construction of national identity along religious lines poses a dilemma for scholars of Turkish politics.However, this dilemma is solved if the nation-building process of the new Republic is contextualized as a transition from an empire to a nation-state.
As Ümit Cizre (2001, 365) points out, 'From the inauguration of the Republic, the national community had to be constructed from the embarrassing diversity of the demographic reality that was the legacy of the Ottoman mosaic'.The history of Turkish nation-building is, in a way, the history of overcoming this diversity.In this context, members of the old millet system became a minority and thus an obstacle to nation-building and homogenization.To homogenize this diversity, a dual policy of religious exclusion of non-Muslims (mainly through population exchanges, pogroms and subsequent flights of non-Muslims) and ethnic assimilation of non-Turkish Muslim communities was implemented (see Cevik 2018).Here, however, Islam serves as a marker of identity and a means of homogenization rather than a faith.Thus, while the republic adopted an ambitious version of secularism aimed at limiting and even eliminating religion from the public sphere, it also placed a nominal emphasis on Islam to sustain homogenization and nation-building.

Conclusion
Overall, the empire is characterized as a hierarchical political system with non-uniform ruling mechanisms and structures, embracing diversity through its cosmopolitan, multiethnic and multi-religious nature.These attributes sharply contrast with the egalitarianism, direct and uniform rule, and homogenizing tendencies of nation-states, which adhere to the 'one nation, one state' principle.While empires inherently embody heterogeneity and plurality, nation-states strive for homogenization and unity.
The challenge arises in managing this plurality, particularly in its ethnic, linguistic and religious dimensions, during administrative modernization and centralization within empires.Various empires adopted distinct approaches and models based on their unique circumstances.For instance, the Habsburgs favored a federal plurality, the Romanovs promoted centralization and assimilation, and the Ottomans oscillated between these paths throughout the nineteenth century.This oscillation is evident in the Ottoman approach to the millet system, which simultaneously aimed to undermine millet boundaries to foster unity across the multi-faith society and to promote and safeguard non-Muslim communities' privileges and group-specific rights.
In the late 19th and early twentieth centuries, however, Ottoman nationalism shifted clearly to a Romanov-style homogenizing nationalism, marking the transition from an empire to a nation-state.This process required further homogenization and ultimately resulted in the exclusion of non-Muslims from the emerging Ottoman nationalism.Turkey later inherited this legacy, despite the secular sensibilities of the new republic.