Foucault as Translator of Binswanger and von Weizsäcker

Foucault’s Introduction to a translation of Ludwig Binswanger’s essay ‘Dream and Existence’ was published in late 1954. The translation was credited to Jacqueline Verdeaux, with Foucault acknowledged for the notes. Yet Verdeaux herself indicates the intensely collaborative nature of their working process and the translation. In 1958, Victor von Weizsäcker’s Der Gestaltkreis was published in French as Le Cycle de la structure, translated by Foucault and Daniel Rocher. Foucault went on to translate and introduce Immanuel Kant’s Anthropology as his secondary doctoral thesis. His engagement with Kant and Binswanger’s ideas has been discussed in the literature, but his role as translator has generally been neglected. His engagement with von Weizsäcker is almost never mentioned. This article critically discusses Foucault’s role in the Binswanger and von Weizsäcker translations, comparing the German originals with the French texts, and showing how this is a useful additional element to the story of the early Foucault.


Introduction
This article discusses Foucault's early work as a translator of two texts, both collaborative. One was Ludwig Binswanger's essay 'Traum und Existenz' [Dream and Existence], which is best known to Foucault scholars because of its long Introduction. It has the publication date of 1954, but printing was delayed, and it did not actually appear until early 1955. Jacqueline Verdeaux was credited for the translation, Foucault for the Introduction and notes, but there are strong indications Foucault was an active participant in the translation process. The other text was a book by Viktor von Weizsa¨cker, Der Gestaltkreis: Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen [The Gestalt Cycle: Theory of the Unity of Perception and Movement], which Foucault co-translated with Daniel Rocher as Le Cycle de la structure. This translation appeared in 1958 but was completed a few years earlier. These translations were made at the time Foucault was beginning his teaching career at the University of Lille and the É cole normale supe´rieure in Paris. They are closely related in production to Foucault's first book, Maladie mentale et personnalite ( 1954). The Introduction to the Binswanger text was the last text written for publication until The History of Madness in 1961 -two book chapters which appeared in 1957 were likely completed a few years before.

Ludwig Binswanger
On 22 September 1950, in the Amphithe´aˆtre Descartes at the Sorbonne, where Edmund Husserl had given his 'Cartesian Meditations' lectures 21 years before, Ludwig Binswanger opened a symposium on 'Analyse existentielle'. An extract of his opening speech was published the following year in the journal L'Ence´phale. The translator was Victor Gourevitch, but when it appeared in print as 'La ''Daseinsanalyse'' en Psychiatrie' in 1951, the translation had been amended by the author with Georges and Jacqueline Verdeaux. 1 Jacqueline Verdeaux had previously co-translated Ruth Bochner and Florence Halpern's The Clinical Application of the Rorschach Test (1945 [1942]) with Andre´Ombredane. Rorschach tests were to be the topic of her next project. Verdeaux was asked by Ombredane to meet with the Swiss psychologist Roland Kuhn and to show him a translation of a work of psychiatric diagnostics (Eribon, 2011: 80). At the same time Ombredane lent her a copy of Kuhn's book Maskendeutungen im Rorschachschen Versuch [On Mask Meanings in Rorschach Experiments] (1944). Verdeaux went to visit Kuhn at his clinic in Mu¨nsterlingen on the Bodensee, and as well as sharing Ombredane's translation, proposed that she translate his book on masks into French. It finally appeared in 1957 as Phe´nome´nologie du masque a`travers le Test de Rorschach (1992). As well as agreeing to her translation of his own book, Kuhn suggested to Verdeaux that she should also translate more of his friend and colleague Binswanger's work (Macey, 1993: 59).
Even before the Sorbonne lecture Binswanger was not unknown in France. He had been cited by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and in some psychiatric work by Euge`ne Minkowski and Henri Ey, and an essay of his had been translated in 1938 (retranslated in 1970: 201-37). Verdeaux and Binswanger discussed some more translation ideas and agreed the next piece should be the 1930 essay 'Traum und Existenz'. Kuhn reports Binswanger as saying that the text was 'conceived as an introduction to the method of work he had been developing until that point ' (2001: 153). Verdeaux began work even though no publisher had been found (Eribon, 2011: 80-1;Macey, 1993: 59).
Binswanger worked at the Bellevue Sanatorium in Kreuzlingen, which he had directed since 1910. It had been founded by his grandfather, then directed by his father. This was not the full extent of the family business -Ludwig's uncle Otto, a professor of psychiatry at the University of Jena, had treated Friedrich Nietzsche. Binswanger had studied with Eugen Bleuler, Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung and Karl Jaspers. Extraordinarily, given the Foucault connection, Ludwig Binswanger also treated the novelist Raymond Roussel, but É lisabeth Roudinesco notes that 'the case history he assembled of his patient has not survived ' (1990: 30). Binswanger's earliest writings show the profound influence of Freud on his thinking, and his philosophical engagement with German thought, especially neo-Kantianism. 2 He kept up a correspondence with Freud which lasted from 1908until 1938, just before Freud's death in 1939(Freud and Binswanger, 1992, 2003see Binswanger, 1956see Binswanger, , 1957c. Schizophrenia was one of Binswanger's key interests, with four major studies published on the topic. 3 Caroline Gros suggests that there are three main periods in Binswanger's work, corresponding to his engagement with Freud, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger (Gros, 2009: 19). It was his engagement with Heidegger that would shape his work most profoundly. He read Heidegger from 1928 (Gros-Azorin, 1998: 24), began a correspondence with him that year, and they met for the first time in 1929. Their correspondence only ended with Binswanger's death in 1966. 4 He was not uncritical, and in particular challenged Heidegger's notion of care as the resolution to issues with a stress instead on love (Binswanger, 1992-4, Vol. 3: 236;1958: 195;see Holzhey-Kunz, 2014: 13). The resulting development of psychoanalysis in the light of Heidegger's work is sometimes known as existential psychotherapy, but Binswanger's own preferred term was Daseinsanalyse. Kuhn underscores that 'Binswanger insisted many times on the fact that Daseinsanalysis was above all a method of scientific research and not a method for psychotherapeutic practice ' (2001: 161). There is no space for a fuller discussion of Binswanger's work here, but by the time he wrote 'Dream and Existence' in 1930, he was in the last of these periods.

Translating Binswanger
Verdeaux had worked with Jacques Lacan and was working and studying at the Hoˆpital Sainte-Anne in Paris. This work and her previous translation experience meant that the psychoanalytic and clinical vocabulary of Binswanger did not pose many problems for her, though there were greater challenges when it came to the philosophical language, especially regarding Heidegger and phenomenology. While Kuhn had referenced Heidegger in Maskendeutungen im Rorschachschen Versuch concerning angst, innerworldly-being and being and appearance (Kuhn, 1992: 68, 215), Binswanger's text was of a different order of magnitude. As Verdeaux was less familiar with that technical language, she turned to Foucault for help. Verdeaux had known Foucault since his childhood, as her parents had been friends of Foucault's. She had spent the war with her brother in the safety of Poitiers, and during that time she became the assistant anaesthetist to Foucault's father, Dr Paul Foucault (Eribon, 2011: 79;Macey, 1993: 6-7).
Foucault had been a serious reader of Heidegger since his student years, and this was an ideal opportunity for him. It combined his professional interest in psychology, which he was teaching at the time in both Paris and Lille, with his background in philosophy. He knew the specialised vocabulary and had ideas of how to render it in French. Indeed, relatively little of Heidegger's work was translated at the time, and Foucault and Verdeaux were partly shaping the vocabulary themselves, rather than simply rendering it consistent to existing works in French. The resulting translation was attributed to Verdeaux alone. Verdeaux's reports of their working practices to Eribon and Macey suggest that the translation was rather more collaborative. They met in the late afternoon or evening at the Ecole Normale Supe´rieure after Verdeaux had finished work at Sainte-Anne, and they discussed the best way to render the terms into French (Eribon, 2011: 81;Macey, 1993: 60). Work on the translation began at the end of 1953, and was completed in February 1954, when a copy was sent to Binswanger. 5 While Foucault does not get a translator credit, he was credited for the notes. In fact, some of these notes are Binswanger's own, though the distinction is not marked. Some of the additional notes are simply to provide a reference: Foucault spells out that Maler Nolten (Binswanger, 1992: 101;1954: 140;1993: 84) is a reference to Eduard Mo¨rike's novel Nolten, the Painter (in Binswanger, 1954: 140 n. 1); or that an unreferenced quotation (1992: 103; 1954: 143-4; 1993: 85-6) is from Goethe's Faust (1954: 144 n. 1). There are other unreferenced quotations which Foucault does not provide. Another note is an editorial reference that a phrase appears in French in Binswanger's German text (1992: 97;1954: 134;1993: 82;1954: 134 n. 1); Foucault also adds a reference to a Binswanger's Wandlungen in der Auffassung und Deutung des Traumes [Transformations in the Perception and Interpretation of the Dream] which is only mentioned obliquely (1992: 105;1954: 146;1993: 86;1954: 146 n. 1;Binswanger, 1928). Two notes are, however, much more interesting than these mechanical ones, because they give an indication of translation choices. These notes have not been republished in this form, and since the original translation is hard to find, I include the French text below before a translation.
With the author's agreement we have translated Dasein as 'pre´sence [presence]'. Of course, this translation does not mean to foreground existence within the spatio-temporal coordinates of the hic and nunc of objectivity, but it seems more useful to us than the usual 'existence' in order to give the significative structure of the German word Dasein ('eˆtre la`' [being there']). Is it not the case that 'presence' expresses both the facticity of existence in a situation -presence here -and at the same time -its opening to a world (presence to the world)? (1954: 131 n. 1) In the 1971 reedition of the text, this note is incorporated into the Glossary, with Foucault and Binswanger being acknowledged for the formulation (Verdeaux and Kuhn, 1971: 30).
Macey has commented that, 'in terms of translation practice, the most interesting feature of the text is the joint decision, reached after lengthy discussion, to render Dasein as ''presence in the world''' (Macey, 1993: 59). While it is 'presence', not 'presence in the world', the point is well made. Dasein is a standard German word which means existence and can be found in philosophical texts before Heidegger. But in his 1927 book Sein und Zeit [Being and Time], Heidegger uses it in a stressed way to examine the particular structures and characteristics of human existence, their experience of being. Heidegger also uses the word Existenz, of Latinate rather than Germanic roots, and translations try to find some way of marking the distinction. For example, Heidegger says that 'the ''essence'' of Dasein lies in its existence [Existenz]' (1927: 42;1962: 67). 6 Heidegger importantly highlights the word's linguistic sense of Dasein, literally there-being or being-the-there. While Heidegger stressed that the 'there' should not be understood in a simple, spatial, sense of location, some early French translations or adaptions, notably Jean-Paul Sartre's L'eˆtre et le ne´ant [Being and Nothingness], used the term eˆtre-la`, and some English translations followed suit with 'being-there'. Early Elden 5 French translations, such as Henry Corbin's 1938 translation of What is Metaphysics? as Qu'est-ce que la me´taphysique? had used the term la re´alite´humaine (i.e. 22; see Bligh, 2011). Simply keeping the German word Dasein has become standard practice in modern English and French translations, indicating the distinctive philosophical weight Heidegger gives it. Binswanger adopts the distinction between Existenz and Dasein from Heidegger, and so Foucault and Verdeaux had to face this challenge. They translate Existenz as existence (i.e. 1992: 96; 1954: 133; 1993: 81) and Dasein sometimes in the same way (1992: 95, 96; 1954: 132, 133; 1993: 81, 82 (1992: 99; 1954: 138; 1993: 83), and 'dieses Wir, das Subjekt des Daseins' as 'ce nous, sujet de la pre´sence', 'this we, the subject of Dasein' (1992: 100; 1954: 139; 1993: 84).
In his 1950 Paris lecture, Binswanger had noted that he rejected the use of the French term 'existence' and that he would use the German Dasein instead. Although the symposium was on 'Analyse existentielle' he says it should be on 'Daseins-analyse'. Dasein, he notes, is an 'almost untranslatable' word, and even suggests 'Analyse anthropologique phe´nome´nologique' as a possibility (1951: 108). He underlines that 'phenomenology is the only method appropriate to anthropology ' (1951: 110). By anthropology he means the same kind of thing Foucault did in a Lille and ENS course of the same period, namely a science of the human in the broadest sense, the issue of being human. 7 One of the reasons Binswanger resists 'existence' is that it evokes the idea of 'existentialism' and, to his mind, 'Heidegger is an ontologist philosopher and not an existential philosopher in the manner of Sartre ' (1951: 108-9). The second reason is that '''Dasein'' includes the soul and the body, the conscious and the unconscious, the voluntary and the involuntary, thought and action, emotivity, affectivity and instinct and that an idea which includes all of this can only be that of Being itself, to the exclusion of any qualification ' (1951: 109). It might therefore be questioned why, a few years later, Verdeaux and Foucault, with Binswanger's support, chose to render Dasein as pre´sence.
As Henri Maldiney underlines, this term is fundamental to understanding the approach which Binswanger develops: 'Daseinsanalysis is first an analysis of the structural and temporal structures of pre´sence ' (1973: 92). However, it is worth stressing that Verdeaux and Foucault do not use the term pre´sence simply as a translation of Binswanger's use of Dasein, but also for Heidegger's use. This is found when Binswanger quotes Heidegger, and the translators adopt this term there. One example is helpful in giving a context to Binswanger's use for his focus on the relation between dream and existence: Hier ist, um mit Heidegger zu reden, das Dasein vor sein Sein gebracht; es ist gebracht, insofern als ihm etwas geschieht, und als er nicht weiss, wie und was ihm geschieht. Das ist der ontologische Grundzug all Tra¨umens und seiner Verwandtschaft mit der Angst! [4] Tra¨umen heisst: Ich weiss nicht, wie mir geschieht.
To use Heidegger's words here, 'Dasein is brought before its own being' -insofar, that is, as something happens to it and Dasein knows neither the 'how' nor the 'what' of the happening. This is the basic ontological element of all dreaming and its relatedness to anxiety or angst [12]. To dream means: I don't know what is happening to me. (1992: 134; 1954: 190-1; 1993: 102) It is clear that Binswanger sees this insight as profoundly significant for his project. The notion of Angst, generally translated into English either as anxiety or angst, is here angoisse, anguish or fear. Binswanger indicates that dreaming is an excellent example of this detachment which Heidegger speaks about. The note makes a reference to Heidegger's What Is Metaphysics? though the quotation is from Being and Time (1927: 184;1962: 228). In the note Binswanger comments: Wir betrachten die Angsttra¨ume als den Prototyp der im Dasein als solchem gelegenen existentiellen Urangst. Vgl Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?
Nous conside´rons les reˆves d'angoisse comme le prototype de l'angoisse existentielle originelle, de´pose´e dans la pre´sence en tant que telle (Cf Heidegger, Qu'est-ce que la me´taphysique?) We view anxiety dreams as the prototype of the Dasein's (as such) primal essential anxiety. See Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics? (1992: 134 n. 4;1954: 191 n. 1;1993: 105 n. 12) Indeed, this status which Binswanger accords the dream as 'eine bestimmte Art des Menschseins', 'une modalite´particulie`re de l'eˆtre humaine', 'a determined mode of human being' is crucial (1992: 102; 1954: 142; 1993: 85). He sees the dream as an addition to Heidegger's privileged modes of access to ontological understanding. For Heidegger, thought, as opposed to philosophy and poetry, were central. Binswanger suggests that for insight into the 'essential ontological structure' [of 'tottering, sinking, falling'], there are three aspects: 'Language, the imagination of the poet, andabove all -the dream ' (1992: 99; 1954: 137; 1993: 83). Yet while this third addition is Binswanger's major contribution in the essay, Verdeaux and Foucault push him still further. Binswanger says 'den die Sprache ist es, die fu¨r uns alle «dichtet und denkt», noch ehe der Einzelne es zum eigenen Dichten und Denken gebracht hat', which we might render as 'for it is language which ''poetizes and thinks'' for us before the individual themselves is able to poetize and think'. Extraordinarily, Verdeaux and Foucault chose to render 'dichtet und denkt' as 'reˆve et cre´e' -'dreams and creates ' (1992: 95; 1954: 132; 1993: 81). A literal translation of their translation would read: 'For it is language which ''dreams and creates'' for us before the individual themselves is able to dream and create'. For Heidegger, especially in his readings of Friedrich Ho¨lderlin, and following him Binswanger, there is a close relation between thinking and poetizing, something entirely missed in Verdeaux and Foucault's rendering.

Stimmung
The second note by Foucault to the French text is also revealing and relates to the term bestimmte cited above. Binswanger makes a note of the distinction found 'Im Bild und in der stimmungsma¨ssigen Reaktion auf dasselbe' -'in the image and in the affective response to the image', which Verdeaux and Foucault render as 'l'image et dans la re´action thymique'. They add a note at this point: Binswanger emploie le mot Stimmung pour de´signer aussi bien la coloration affective d'une expe´rience ve´cue que le caracte`re re´ceptif de l'existence humaine conside´re´e au niveau de l'existentiel ontologique (cf plus haut, le mot re´ceptivite´). En effet, aucun mot franc¸ais ne nous a paru correspondre, a`lui seul, a`une acception aussi large, nous l'avons traduit par 'humeur' chaque fois que le mot Stimmung e´tait analyse´surtout au niveau de l'expe´rience psychologique.
Binswanger employs the word Stimmung to designate as much the affective coloration of a lived experience as the receptive characteristic of human existence -considered at the level of an ontological existential (see, above, the word re´ceptivite´). However, no single French word seems to correspond to this broad meaning, so we have translated Stimmung as 'humour' each time the word Stimmung is analysed at the level of psychological experience. (1954: 151 n. 1) In the 1971 reedition of the text, this note appears as a translator's note in an earlier location, with the omission of the comment on re´ceptivite( 201 n. 2). In place of the original note, there is a cross-reference to the earlier discussion (208 n. 6).
The reference to re´ceptivite´is important. It comes when Binswanger's 'Geworfensein der Stimmung' is translated as 'l'abandon a`la re´ceptivite´'. While the French would be literally rendered as 'the abandonment (or surrender) to receptivity', a more Heideggerian reading of the German would be something like 'the being-thrown of mood ' (1992: 98; 1954: 135; 1993: 82). It is clear that the note in the text shows a deep understanding of the notion of Stimmung, even if we might quibble with the choice of humeur as its principal translation. 'Mood' or 'attunement' are more common English renderings, and there is arguably a lineage to more recent discussions of 'affect'.

Other Choices
Some other translation choices are also worth noting. For the German Erlebnis they use, not the simple 'experience', but 'l'expe´rience ve´cue', 'lived experience', to stress the German word for life, Leben (1992: 95;1954: 132;1993: 81). They chose to translate the German Trieb as instinct, instinct, rather than as pulsion, drive (1992: 132; 1954: 188; 1993: 101). Given Freud marks a distinction between the German Instinkt and Trieb, the choice is potentially confusing. This has been a theme much discussed in terms of how Freud should be translated into English.
One of the key aspects of Heidegger's work is that Dasein is always already embedded in a world -not first a subject which then encounters a world, but his hyphenated term of In-der-Welt-Sein, being-in-the-world. He also uses the term Welt, world, in compounds such as Umwelt, Mitwelt -literally the surrounding world and the with-world, often translated as environment and shared-world -and Eigenwelt, the ownworld of self-reflection. The notion of Umwelt is much used in environmental psychology, especially in work following the biologist Jakob von Uexku¨ll, and in French is often translated as milieu. Yet when Binswanger uses the phrase 'Umund Mitwelt', Verdeaux and Foucault chose to render this as 'le monde exte´rieur et le monde d'autrui', literally 'the exterior world and the world of the other ' (1992: 96; 1954: 133; 1993: 81). This is arguably a misunderstanding of both terms: the world is not exterior to Dasein, but surrounding, enveloping, of which Dasein is an essential part. Similarly, Mitwelt is not the world of others, but the world of our encounter with others, shared or together. Binswanger also stresses the importance of Mitsein, being-with or co-existence. Heidegger begins to develop themes around this question in Being and Time, even if his main focus is on Dasein and its engagements in the world and with other beings as a means of access to the question of being itself. As Maldiney puts it, the notion of with-man [Mit-Mensch] is crucial to Binswanger, whose work is more concerned with the inter-personal: 'the man of the with; the man who exists to encounter [l'homme de l'avec, l'homme qui existe a`rencontrer]. Dasein is Mitsein ' (1973: 209).
There is one significant difference between the original 1930 version of Binswanger's essay in Neue Schweizer Rundschau and the 1947 reprint in Ausgewa¨hlte Vortra¨ge und Aufsa¨tze. Although Binswanger notes the omission in his preface to the 1947 version, the paragraph does not appear in the French translation (1947-55, Vol. I: 11). 8 While its content is not especially important, a reader should have been alerted to its absence. Equally, in one passage, there is some of the quoted Greek missing from the French translation (1992: 126; 1954: 178-9; 1993: 98). Verdeaux and Foucault's translation is thus not a critical edition of the text, and, at times, even a little careless. Nor are these issues addressed in the reprint of the text in 1971. But it cannot be stressed enough the challenge they faced, with relatively little of Heidegger's work translated into French at the time. Verdeaux and Foucault were forging a path not just in the translation of Binswanger, but also in his use of Heideggerian terms.

Introducing Binswanger
Having completed the translation, Verdeaux recalls saying to Foucault: 'If you like the book, do a preface for it' (quoted in Eribon, 2011: 81). Verdeaux continues that while she was in Provence on holiday over Easter 1954, she received a large envelope. It contained a long sprawling text, just over twice as long as the essay it introduced. Foucault's note simply read: 'Here is your Easter egg' (cited in Eribon, 2011: 81-2). This story should be taken with some scepticism, as there was discussion of an introduction earlier that year. But its length seems to have surprised everyone. Verdeaux was enthusiastic about the text, and so Foucault sent it to Binswanger on 27 April 1954. In a letter to Binswanger accompanying the text, Foucault says that he has two purposes: 'to show the importance of the dream for existential analysis [analyse existentielle]' and 'to show how your conception of the dream implies a complete renewal of analyses of imagination'. 9 Binswanger's reply to Foucault of 6 May 1954 shows that he not only read the Introduction with interest, but shared it with Kuhn and Wilhelm Szilasi, a former colleague of Husserl and Heidegger, now living in Switzerland. 10 A few days later, on , he wrote again, saying that Foucault had done 'an excellent job', which was a 'great scientific honour' to him, especially praising his work on the 'movement of the imagination', and extending his work on the dream, as he had done to Freud. 11 The letter goes on to note a number of qualifications to Foucault's Introduction, which Foucault says he will address in its revision. 12 It is not clear how many actually were addressed, since the published text contains the issues Binswanger raised.
Foucault's friend Maurice Pinguet recalled that Foucault found it amusing to have written an essay over twice as long as the text it introduced (Pinguet, 2009: 52). There was some difficulty persuading the publisher to accept a long text by an unknown thinker introducing a translation by someone who was scarcely known in France. Le reˆve et l'existence did not receive much attention when it was published. While a few hundred copies were sold quite quickly, a couple of years later the 'remaining copies were pulped' (Macey, 1993: 60-1). There were only two critical discussions in the 1950s. One was in an essay by Henri Ey in L'Evolution Psychiatrique in 1956, which mentions Foucault's 'magnificent and substantial introduction' (p. 109 n. 1). A review by Robert Misrahi in Revue de Me´taphysique et de Morale appeared in 1959. Misrahi describes the importance of the Introduction, outlining in some detail its conceptual moves and the use Foucault makes of Binswanger's text. It is critical of Foucault's neglect of Sartre, though Misrahi does agree with Foucault -who is himself following Heidegger and Binswanger's approach -that philosophy must begin by being an anthropology before becoming an ontology, and finally 'an ethics of history and historicity' (Misrahi, 1959: 105-6). Yet what is perhaps most interesting about this review is that it is much more about Foucault than Binswanger, and as well as being the most significant discussion of the Introduction, is the first sustained engagement with Foucault's work at all.
Foucault's text is more than just an introduction, as Binswanger himself noted. It also promises a future work continuing its themes, which was never published (1994: 65; 1993: 31). Yet a fuller manuscript on Binswanger was written around this time and is discussed by Elisabetta Basso elsewhere in this issue. This seems to be the text which Foucault indicated. The manuscript, like the Introduction, develops themes from some of Foucault's teaching in this period. 13 Rather than needing to be persuaded by Verdeaux to write an introduction to a text for which he had discovered a real enthusiasm, it seems that Foucault had a wealth of material on Binswanger already prepared in relation to his teaching, and that this project gave him a suitable outlet. Basso has also suggested that reading this introduction in the light of the Lille lecture courses allows us to see that this concern was not merely a 'misstep' in Foucault's career, but that it links to the work that went into History of Madness (2016: 40-41; see Basso, this issue). Yet the path there is not straightforward, and Foucault's inquiries went down many detours (see Elden, forthcoming). Of course, since Foucault's profile rose, the limited attention to this text has changed somewhat, though it remains a neglected part of his work (see Revel, 1992;Monod, 1997;Sabot, 2006;Smyth, 2011).
Verdeaux continued work on Binswanger after this initial essay, acting as translator of one of his case studies on schizophrenia, the Le cas Suzanne Urban (Binswanger, 1957b). Though it is credited to Verdeaux alone, Basso has suggested that Foucault and Kuhn should share the translator credits for this work too (2007: 319), while Binswanger's preface to the translation simply thanks them as his 'friends' for their 'precious advice' (Binswanger, 1957b: 11). Verdeaux also translated Jakob Wyrsch's Die Person des Schizophrenen (1956Schizophrenen ( [1949). Foucault's links to Binswanger ended after he moved to Uppsala in 1955: the only letter from Foucault after 1954 was a note thanking Binswanger for sending him a copy of his Erinnerungen an Sigmund Freud in 1956. 14 In 1971 Verdeaux was the lead translator of a collection of Binswanger's work that appeared in the Arguments series edited by Kostas Axelos with Les É ditions de Minuit. This text has a preface by Roland Kuhn and Henri Maldiney, and a glossary by Kuhn. The 1954 translation of 'Dream andExistence' is reprinted in this collection (1971: 199-215); a more recent translation was made by Franc¸oise Dastur in 2012. Foucault's role goes unmentioned in the 1971 reprint: even his notes are now incorporated as either translator notes or into the glossary. Verdeaux's later translation projects seem to be disconnected from the psychological works -they include writings on theatre, ethnography and libretti.

Viktor von Weizsäcker
While Foucault's introduction to the Binswanger text is fairly well known, his role as a co-translator of a text by Viktor von Weizsa¨cker, Der Gestaltkreis, is rarely discussed at all. Von Weizsa¨cker was a physician and neurologist, who became Professor of Neurology and Director of the Institute of Neurological Research in Breslau, formerly in Germany, and now in Wroclaw in Poland. Von Weizsa¨cker, who died in 1957, was one of the founders of medical anthropology (see Hahn, 1991;Ce´lis, 2004Ce´lis, , 2007Wiedebach, 2009). He came from a very distinguished elite family. His brother was the naval officer and Nazi diplomat Ernst von Weizsa¨cker, and Viktor was therefore the uncle of the future president of Germany, Richard von Weizsa¨cker, and the physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker. In his work he was critical of claims of a pure, objective science, and played a crucial role in the development of 'psychosomatics and social medicine' (Bo¨hme, 2007: 18).
Quite how Foucault came to be involved in the translation is unclear. Daniel Rocher, his co-translator, was also a former philosophy student from the É cole Normale Supe´rieure. Henri Ey provides an introduction. Ey was a major figure in French psychiatry for almost 50 years, though little of his work is in English (see Ey, 1950Ey, -4, 1969. Foucault would have heard Ey lecture at Sainte-Anne (Eribon, 2011: 75-6;Macey, 1993: 41), and this may have been the link that brought him to the project. Binswanger occasionally references von Weizsa¨cker in his work (i.e. -4, Vol. 3: 240-1, 1958; and as Gros suggests, his work has a relation to von Weizsa¨cker on the subject of illness as a creation of phenomena (2009: 8). Georges Canguilhem also had an interest in von Weizsa¨cker's work (i.e. Canguilhem, 1977: 167). The only other book by von Weizsa¨cker in French is Pathosophie (2011; see Palem, 2012); none of his books are in English.

Translation
The translation was published on 3 February 1958 but was completed sometime before this. Foucault first mentions the translation as complete in 1953, when he was asked by the Universite´de Lille for a list of his publications, and the text was submitted to the press in late 1954. Defert's indication that Foucault was still working on it while in Uppsala in March 1956March (1994 must refer to a stage in the book's production process. The German text was first published in 1940; the translation is of the 1948 fourth edition. While the second and third editions have brief prefaces, the text was substantially the same, with just some additions to the notes (1973: 4-5, 5; 1958: 34, 34-5). The fourth edition had a much more substantial preface (1973: 6-22; 1958: 19-31). Von Weizsa¨cker stresses that the preface is not an attempt to rewrite the work, but to indicate some marginal thoughts concerning themes he has returned to and others which have arisen since its first publication (1973: 7; 1958: 20). The translation again appeared with Descle´e de Brouwer, in the series on 'Bibliothe`que Neuro-Psychiatrique de langue franc¸aise', which had also included Phe´nome´nologie du masque and Le cas Suzanne Urban, as well as works by Ey (1950-4), and an early co-authored study by Lacan (Bonnafe´et al., 1950).
The translation is interesting in multiple ways. It begins with the title -Der Gestaltkreis. Foucault and Rocher render this as Le Cycle de la structure. Structure is rather a restrictive translation of Gestalt, which is often untranslated. Gestalt literally means shape or form, but it has a specific sense in psychology, where it is used to describe the way that the mind forms a coherent whole which is not simply the combination of individual perceptions or reactions. Indeed, Kurt Koffka, one of the founders of Gestalt psychology, made the claim that 'the whole is other than the sum of the parts', suggesting this was a more accurate claim than it being 'greater than the sum ' (1999: 176). For Koffka the point was difference, not excess. While the projects should not be conflated, there is a resonance. As Ey stresses, for von Weizsa¨cker it is not 'a simple structure in a circle [structure en cercle] (Kreisgestalt), but a ''Gestaltkreis'', that is a cycle of structure [cycle de la structure] ' (1958: 11). While 'structure' as a choice is not in itself inaccurate, it certainly fails to capture the specific sense of the German term. Indeed, in the preface to the fourth edition von Weizsa¨cker notes that the term had an aspect and advantage he was not aware of initially: it does not imply a precise 'cyclic structure [Kreisgestalt]', but something which is not yet achieved. 'This is the internal conflict between the perceptible image (suggested by the words ''structure'' and ''cycle''), and the concept without figure which produces the composition of these two words ' (1973: 6; 1958: 19).
The subtitle Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen [Theory of the Unity of Perception and Movement] is also significant -the book indeed offers a theory to unify the psychological and the physiological. While this is therefore a work engaging with both disciplines, the literature which von Weizsa¨cker utilises is much wider. The work included in this book is, he says, not something which can be labelled 'biology, psychophysics or philosophy of nature', but a development of themes in each of these domains in relation to 'experimental research, as well as an attempt to base new pathological and medical research on new foundations ' (1973: 17; 1958: 27). In his terms, Gestaltkreis connects to biology, medicine and philosophy (1973: 22; 1958: 30). Von Weizsa¨cker's resources include biologists such as Hans Driesch and von Uexku¨ll. In addition, he draws on concepts from philosophy, like 'form, movement, object [Gegenstand], etc.', and some from 'philosophy of nature, such as space, time, function ' (1973: 21; 1958: 30). Husserl and Heidegger are also important to his project, which helps to explain Foucault's role in the translation and, presumably, his interest in the text. Ey thinks it is remarkable that the only French authors mentioned by von Weizsa¨cker are Henri Bergson and Sartre, and he suggests that Merleau-Ponty may have been an inspiration (1958: 7, 10). Yet as the 1946 preface to the third edition notes, some of the key works -Sartre's 1943 Being and Nothingness crucially -were published after the first edition had appeared in 1939 (1973: 5; 1958: 34-5). Merleau-Ponty's The Structure of Behaviour first appeared in 1942, and Phenomenology of Perception not until 1945. Add to this the complications of printing and intellectual exchange during the war, and it makes more sense to imagine a partly-shared intellectual project and references than straightforward influence. Yet this does not mean the approaches are the same. In the third edition von Weizsa¨cker suggests that Sartre's book fills out what was only an 'anticipation' in his own work, but adds rather cuttingly that this is 'with the brilliant and decisive energy available to the philosopher who is better protected from the inextricable entanglement of empirical relations ' (1973: 5; 1958: 34-5).
One of the most important aspects of von Weizsa¨cker's work is that he broadens the psychological sense of Gestalt to encompass physiological issues, notably movement. He sees perception and movement as being flexible responses, not fixed, and reworked and tuned through experience. His focus on movement includes the nervous system and motor functions. Hence the book's first theme is 'movement of living beings [lebender Wesen/eˆtres vivants] but not just any bodily or purely imaginary movement in the spatio-temporal system ' (1973: 23; 1958: 37). The focus is rather on self-movement, 'spontaneity or auto-mobility [Spontaneita¨t, die Selbstbewegung/spontane´ite´, «auto-mobilite´»] ' (1973: 23; 1958: 37). He notes that 'this implies that we admit the existence of a subject, of an active being for themselves and for their own ends ' (1973: 23; 1958: 37). He argues that 'to study the living being, we must take part in life'. He is interested in life in its broadest sense, from birth to death (1973: 3; 1958: 33). For him, 'Biologie ist Formenkunde'; 'biology is science of forms ' (1973: 198; 1958: 170).
His focus requires him to discuss space and time in some detail, as a way of making sense of the encounter of the living being with their environment. Indeed, in the book's only diagram, von Weizsa¨cker puts the two in direct relation -Organismus [O] and Umwelt [U] (1973: 200; 1958: 171). This circle is, von Weizsa¨cker stresses, closed, a cycle which does not have an exterior or entry/exit point. He says that 'we call the genesis of the forms of the movement of organisms the Gestaltkreis ' (1973: 200; 1958: 171). As so many other theorists of this relation, von Weizsa¨cker draws upon von Uexku¨ll's work on the Umwelt. In distinction to the translation of 'Dream and Existence', Foucault and Rocher translate Umwelt sometimes as milieu ou monde environnant -milieu or environing world (1973: 237; 1958: 197; see 1973: 31, 32; 1958: 43, 44, etc.), though when Umwelt is contrasted with Eigenwelt, own or self-world, they translate it as 'l 'univers environnant et l'univers propre' (1973: 24; 1958: 38). All of these choices give a sense of the complexity of the German term, missed with a simple translation of environnement or environment.
In understanding this spatial sense of a milieu, a key theme of the book is 'orientation in space ' (1973: 12; 1958: 23), and von Weizsa¨cker stresses that we 'must distinguish between physical-mathematical and biological integration of space ' (1973: 36; 1958: 47). As he expands: Physical-mathematical integration has a system of references constant in time. Its coordinates must be in a state of total immobility, and all bodies which refer to it are thus without contradiction between themselves. Biological integration only has a momentary value [Augenblicksgeltung/valeur momentane´e]; its 'system of references [Bezugssystem/syste`me de re´fe´rences]' can certainly have a certain duration, but also in each moment it can be sacrificed in favour of another. It is not therefore a system strictly speaking, but an arrangement [Einordnung/agencement] of biological operation in the present. (1973: 36; 1958: 47) In common with Husserl, Heidegger and many who came after them, von Weizsa¨cker argues that lived space needs to be opposed to mathematical space (1973: 214-15; 1958: 180-1). 'If space is only biologically determined in relation to time, there follows from this -as with biological time -a net difference in structure from mathematical space ' (1973: 215; 1958: 180).
Yet it is worth underlining that space is not a theme for him just in relation to physiology, but also in terms of psychology, with a stress on the importance of spatial aspects of perception as much as temporal ones (1973: 159-60; 1958: 142-3). He argues that space and time take their order from a situation [Situation/situation] and event or appropriation [Ereignis/e´ve´nement]. So, rather than an event or situation being located in space and time, they give rise to its definition and form. 'Things are not in space and time, but space and time arise in the development of the happening [Geschehens-Fortbildung/la continuite´des e´ve´nements] and are thus founded in, or on, things. The world and things in it are not in space and time, but space and time are in the world, in its things ' (1973: 175-6; 1958: 154).
Indeed, in the note he provides here, von Weizsa¨cker quotes Heidegger on space, a passage from Being and Time which is interesting for Foucault and Rocher's translation of Dasein as, again, pre´sence: Der Raum ist weder im Subjekt, noch ist die Welt im Raum. Der Raum ist vielmehr 'in' der Welt; sofern das fu¨r das Dasein konstitutive In-der-Welt-Sein Raum erschlossen hat.

In English, Heidegger's lines would read:
Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space. Space is rather 'in' the world, to the extent that being-in-the-world, which is constitutive of Dasein, opens space. 15 It is important to underscore that Foucault and Rocher grasp the importance of the complicated notion of Ereignis, which von Weizsa¨cker uses in a Heideggerian way. Ereignis is an event, but it is also tied to the notion of eigen, own or proper, and can be rendered in English as 'propriation'. Foucault and Rocher chose e´ve´nement, which is an event, though they rather muddy the waters by using the same term for Geschehens, which has a similar sense of an event in an unstressed way but is for Heidegger simply what happens.
There are only two brief translator notes from Foucault and Rocher, both of which say the same thing, that the French percevoir, to perceive, translates the German Wahr-nehmen, 'literally take for true [vrai]' (1958: 44 n. 1, 122 n. 1). Accordingly, they translate the crucial Wahrnehmung as perception -one of the two key terms of the work along with Bewegung, mouvement. Von Weizsa¨cker also uses the compounds Selbstbewegung [automouvement -self-movement] and Selbstwahrnehmung [autoperception -self-perception]. Part of the reason for the lack of translator notes or a preface is that the text has a detailed glossary, provided by von Weizsa¨cker with an explanation of key terms. The translation of this provides the German term, before a French equivalent, and then von Weizsa¨cker's gloss (1973: 291-4;1958: 227-30). A separate set of notes on translation choices is thus largely unnecessary. One choice is also notable for showing that Foucault had, perhaps, not fully assimilated Heidegger's work. Abbau is rendered as disparition (which is also used to translate Ausfall, failure), rather than the literal unbuilding or dismantling: Abbau and Destruktion being the two terms Heidegger uses for his challenge to the philosophical tradition, which Jacques Derrida would of course capture in the term deconstruction. Indeed, part of Derrida's critique is of what he calls the 'metaphysics of presence'.

Political Controversy
Von Weizsa¨cker is a controversial figure, though it is unclear how much of this Foucault could have been aware of in the mid-1950s. There is certainly no record Foucault met von Weizsa¨cker, who died a year before the French translation appeared. Von Weizsa¨cker can be judged both for his thought and his actions. In 1933, shortly after the Nazi party had gained power, he gave a lecture at the University of Freiburg on the invitation of Heidegger (Bo¨hme, 2007: 18). This was shortly after Heidegger had been appointed as rector of the university, a political appointment which led to his joining the Nazi party. The lecture was part of a programme of political education for students, held at the Paulus concert hall in the town, since the university did not have a room of sufficient size.
It has been suggested that because von Weizsa¨cker was not a Nazi, the invitation shows that Heidegger was still taking a distance from the regime (Young, 1997: 20). Indeed, Heidegger interrupted a student speech on the National Socialist revolution before the lecture with the instruction: 'This jabber [Geschwa¨tz -nonsense] will stop immediately!' (Picht, 1977: 198-9;1990: 162-3). Heidegger's political involvement with the Nazi regime has been widely discussed, and that is not the point here. Rather, it concerns von Weizsa¨cker and the politics of his work. The Freiburg lecture was published in 1934 in the Nazi journal Volk im Werden (reprinted in 1986: 143-57) and, in it, Von Weizsa¨cker advocated euthanasia and the political control of medicine. This was because he argued that illness could be a social problem, not caused by the social, but a problem for the social and therefore of importance beyond the individually sick body. Given that the nation was an organism, the pathogenic elements may need to be removed (see Bo¨hme, 2007: 22;Roth, 1986).
While von Weizsa¨cker was not tried for his actions during the war, some of his medical research was also complicit with the Nazi regime. In its early years he was supportive of the shift from a social insurance system to forced labour projects. Much more seriously, Gernot Bo¨hme suggests that writings such as this 1933 lecture develop 'a mode of thought that could be used to legitimate crimes against humanity ' (2007: 18). Bo¨hme argues that 'von Weizsa¨cker never actually committed such crimes himself, though he shares some responsibility for at least one' (Bo¨hme, 2007: 18;see Baumann, 2012). This is by far the most damning charge. The institute he directed used the brains of children and young people murdered at the Loben (now Lubliniec) hospital for research. 16 The hospital was notorious for evaluating paediatric patients, treating some and poisoning others. That von Weizsa¨cker's research should have used the bodies for research is abhorrent.
Some of his advocates ignore, or are ignorant of, this political controversy, which has only really become known since his death. 17 Raphae¨l Ce´lis, for example, in a brief biographical note to his study of von Weizsa¨cker's medical and clinical ethics, says that 'during the Second World War he devoted all his energy to caring for injured soldiers at the military hospital in Breslau' (2007: 23 n. 1). Hartwig Wiederbach is even more evasive, not mentioning the war, and simply noting that 'in 1941 he was appointed, as successor of Otfrid Foerster, to the most prestigious chair in Neurology in Germany at the University in Breslau. In 1945 the Heidelberg Medical School established a chair in General Clinical Medicine especially for him ' (2009: 361). This is the same formulation used in the prospectus for his Gesammelte Schriften, published by Suhrkamp. 18 Wiederbach's only recognition of political links comes when he mentions his family and his brother's role as a Nazi diplomat (2009: 375 n. 2). The Viktor von Weizsa¨cker Gesellschaft similarly glosses over this aspect, adding only that in January 1945 he escaped Breslau. Though unstated, this was part of a mass exodus as the Russians advanced and shortly before the siege of the city. 19 Like the Binswanger translation, von Weizsa¨cker's Le Cycle de la structure does not appear to have sold well: few libraries stock it and second-hand copies are hard to find. There was only a single brief review note at the time of the book's publication (Colnort-Bodet, 1958). Foucault does not refer to von Weizsa¨cker in works he published, and there are only limited notes on his work in the archive. 20 The request to take on the project could have come direct from the press, with whom he had worked on the Binswanger volume, or through an intermediary such as Binswanger, Canguilhem or, most likely, Ey. It may well have just been a commission for a recently graduated student, trying to supplement his income. The translation of von Weizsa¨cker's Der Gestaltkreis is an important element in the story of the early Foucault, as it gives a further sense of how his work was shaped by the practice of translation. But given what we now know of von Weizsa¨cker's politics, it is a disturbing one too. Ey's preface to the translation gives no indication of this, which is more damning than it is for the text's translators, since Ey was clearly a key figure in facilitating its publication in French.

Conclusion
After these two texts, the last major work Foucault translated was Immanuel Kant's Anthropology, first published in 1964 but completed a few years before, which, together with a long introduction, served as his secondary thesis alongside his History of Madness (2009Madness ( [1964). This interest develops from a course on philosophical anthropology, delivered in Lille and Paris in the mid-1950s, through to the von Weizsa¨cker translation. The Kant translation was published in 1964, accompanied only by a short 'Historical Note'; the introduction was available in archives and published only after his death (Foucault, 2009). This translation is examined in detail in my book The Early Foucault (forthcoming, Ch. 7). Foucault's only other translation was a short essay by the literary theorist Leo Spitzer (1970). Unusually, this text was translated from English -although Spitzer was Austrian, this essay dates from his time at Johns Hopkins University. 21 Those translations are topics for another place. Foucault's earliest translations, of Binswanger and von Weizsa¨cker, taken with his published and unpublished writings of the 1950s, set the scene for the much more famous work that follows. They indicate paths taken and those not taken, show his deep knowledge of the traditions of philosophy and psychology, and are crucial elements of the biography and intellectual formation of his work as an original thinker.
Much of Foucault's work is a dialogue between languages. In his earliest writings and especially in his teaching this is a dialogue between his French and German texts in philosophy and psychology. In the 1970s, he is reading a lot of historical texts in English, and then in his final years he was engaging with a range of Greek and Latin sources. As such, a focus on his own practice as a translator seems a worthwhile addendum to discussions of his work and its translation.