If it ain’t Dutch, it ain’t much: Vereeniging Nederlandsch Fabrikaat, the citizen-consumer and Dutch nationalist consumption in the interwar Netherlands

Recent scholarship has paid considerable attention to the emergence of the citizen-consumer in the interwar era. Drawing on the literature from the fields of ethical consumption and consumer history, this paper opts for a broader perspective on the emergence of the citizen-consumer in historical analysis. It combines the polysemic nature of the hybrid citizen-consumer from food studies and ethical consumption, and the socio-historic analysis concerning political and cultural citizenship, by showing how consumption practices have been used to shape Dutch national citizenship. In the Netherlands, the private association Vereeniging Nederlandsch Fabrikaat (VNF) was one of the earliest and most vocal organisations that linked consumerism with an ideal of citizenship. Scholars typically tend to see the rise of the citizen-consumer as a product of three interest groups: the consumers, the state, or the industry. The VNF did not just appeal to consumers themselves, but also the government, and the business community to play their part in the development of the ideal Dutch citizen-consumer. By studying the practices of this association this paper thus offers a new perspective on the emergence of the citizen-consumer within a transnational perspective.


Introduction: The citizen-consumer
In the contemporary western world, where food and goods are often plentiful and where consumption has become a choice, people give meaning and purpose through the way they consume (Ankeny, 2012). Increasingly from the first half of the 20th century, notions of national citizenship gradually converged with notions of consumerism as the practice of consumption became politicized. As a result, the citizen-consumer arose as a new identity frame in which governments, politicians, intellectuals, and consumers explored what it meant to be both a 'good' citizen and a 'good' consumer. This politicisation of consumption and the subsequent emergence of the citizen-consumer was a transnational phenomenon. In different countries all around the world, consumption became a means to express one's nationality (Cohen, 2003;Gerth, 2003;Glickman, 2009;Oldenziel and Hård, 2013;Trentmann, 2007: 149-150). Governments, consumer organizations, private associations and consumers themselves sought to link notions of national identity and citizenship with consumption practices through largescale propaganda campaigns, such as the Hebrew campaign for tozeret haaretz (product of the land) (Raviv, 2001), the Indian swadeshi (home rule) movement, which became massively popular through the figure of Mahatma Gandhi (Bayly, 1986) or the Thai promotion of 'national' textiles after the revolution of 1932 (Phillips, 2013).
In the Netherlands, the private association Vereeniging Nederlandsch Fabrikaat (VNF), or Association for Dutch Manufacture, was one of the earliest and most vocal organisations that linked consumerism with an ideal of citizenship. Founded in 1915, the VNF attempted to 'create' the Dutch national consumer by linking the Dutch citizen to the Dutch producer through consumption. The association argued that the dire economic circumstances of the interwar years were to blame on the Dutch consumers' indifference towards the Dutch industry and its products. Through its propaganda campaigns, the VNF sought to educate the Dutch citizen in what it meant to be a good citizen by becoming a good consumer. By choosing Dutch instead of imported foreign products, the consumer would improve domestic production and thereby improve her or his overall economic position. Ideologically, the VNF considered it to be the Dutch citizen's duty to consume nationally because this person was Dutch.
Recent scholarship in cultural history has paid considerable attention to the emergence of the citizen-consumer and the effects of consumerism within a national framework in this period. Scholars typically tend to see the rise of the citizen-consumer as a product of three interest groups: the consumers themselves, the state, and the industry. The first direction of historical research tends to focus on grassroot consumer groups such as the National Consumers' League in the United States (Cohen, 2003: 22-23), the British Women's Patriotic League in the United Kingdom (Trentmann, 2008: 229-232), Fair Traders (Van Dam, 2017) or vegans (Wrenn, 2019). The second direction of research tends to focus on the state as the main actor in the creation of consumers and how consumption was used by nation-states as an element of nation-building such as the Food Administration, created by the US Agricultural Department in 1917 (Levenstein, 1988: 137) or the Empire Marketing Board (EMB), created in 1926 by the British Colonial Office (Kothari, 2014: 45). The third direction of historical research looks at the commercial and business actors and how they helped to shape a national consumer to sell their 'national' products, and more recently with the introduction of the concept of 'Nation Branding' (Castelló and Mihelj, 2017;Volcic and Andrejevic, 2011).
In the social sciences, the concept of the citizen-consumer has primarily been used as a term to signify the polysemic relationship between sustainable (food) consumption and ecological citizenship (Seyfang, 2006), most notably motivated by environmentalist issues relating to climate change, genetically modified organism, waste pollution, notions of naturalness and so on (Grosglik, 2017: 733). Based on this concept of the citizenconsumer, empirical studies have shown how different sites of consumption such as (organic) supermarkets are sites of contestation and ambivalence when it comes to expressing and selling the idea of the responsible and eco-friendly citizen-consumer (Johnston, 2008). Scholars have thus argued that different groups that operate within different institutional-structural levels have used consumption practices for shaping different ideals of citizenship (Lockie, 2009: 194).
The VNF believed that the Dutch citizen would be enticed to consume Dutch once they were familiarized with the Dutch industry. This touches upon Michael Billig's thesis on 'banal nationalism', which suggests that nationhood is always near the surface of [contemporary] everyday life. To legitimize this sense of nationhood, people must be able to imagine the nation. This, in turn, is done by the constant (visual) reminding of the nation, for example, through the waving of the national flag. In this respect, according to Billig the constant reminding of the national image is at once a reminder of the loss of the nation: a sense of threat that the repetition 1 day will no longer be repeatable (Billig, 1995: 93-103). The VNF created an imagined community through the establishment of a national industry, visually repeated in their propaganda campaigns and tangibly manifested in the form of consumer goods. These campaigns were also a reminder of the potential loss of the industry, and thus the nation, if people would continue to buy foreign goods instead of Dutch goods. In this sense, the VNF not only imagined but also 'invented' the Dutch industry and its produce through the visual reproduction of the industry-as-thenation: to sell Dutch, one first had to know what Dutch entailed (Anderson, 1983;Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).
Consumption practices play an intrinsic part in the creation of national identities, specifically national citizenship. Drawing on the literature from the fields of ethical consumption and consumer history, this paper opts for a broader perspective on the emergence of the citizen-consumer within historical analysis. It combines the polysemic nature of the hybrid citizen-consumer from food studies and ethical consumption, and the socio-historic analysis concerning political, cultural and national citizenship, by analysing how consumption practices have been used to shape national citizenship. In this way, this paper looks beyond the relationship between social progressive change and the power of the purse and investigates how the term citizen-consumer can also be used as a concept that places consumption within the domain of national citizenship. By historicizing the emergence of citizenship-consumerism within an institutional, national, and transnational perspective, this paper investigates the structural-institutional levels of consumerism and broadens our understanding of how consumer practices are intertwined with the creation of national identity and how different actors, besides consumers themselves, helped shape it.

Methodology
The paper addresses two questions of research. The first question is divided in three sub questions and forms the basic structure of the paragraphs for this article: Who was the citizen-consumer according to the VNF and what responsibility did (a) consumers, (b) the government and (c) the business community have in shaping it? The second question is: Through what means did the VNF reach out to these actors?
The VNF did not just appeal to consumers themselves, but also to the government and the business community to play their part in the development of the Dutch citizenconsumer. By analysing the propaganda campaigns of the VNF, this paper seeks to understand what this association considered to be the ideal Dutch citizen-consumer and what they considered to be the role of the state, the industry, and consumers themselves in shaping it. This paper draws attention to one propaganda campaign in particular: the Koopt Nederlandsch Product or 'Buy Dutch Produce' campaign, which ran from 1933 until 1942. It was one of the first major campaigns in the Netherlands where ideas about national citizenship and consumption converged.
The 'Buy Dutch Produce' campaign was by far the most elaborate campaign ever organised by the VNF, which they hosted together with interest groups such as the government and different private associations. The slogans during the campaign attained nationwide recognition in the 1930s, as for this campaign the VNF used an array of audio-visual material such as posters and films; it organised the so-called factory visits (fabrieksbezoeken) for elementary and secondary school students; it organised industrial expositions (nijverheidstentoonstellingen); and it organised shopping weeks (winkelweken), where shopkeepers were actively encouraged to sell Dutch products. The association also published a monthly journal for its members, which served two purposes: firstly, it was a means for the VNF to reach Dutch citizens and educate them in what it meant to be a proper Dutch consumer; secondly, it offered Dutch manufacturers a platform to promote their companies and produce. By acquainting and familiarizing the readers with the Dutch industry, the VNF hoped to entice the Dutch citizen to consume nationally. This paper is based on extensive archival research of textual and (audio-)visual sources from the VNF's archive at the Dutch National Archive in The Hague, from the period 1915-1942, with an emphasis on the 1930s. Some jubilee-editions of the monthly journal were found in the University of Amsterdam's archive, Bijzondere Collecties, as well as the 'Buy Dutch Produce' campaign plan. Most of the association's propaganda films are kept in the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision (Beeld en Geluid, 1933), of which some are digitalised. Furthermore, this paper draws on a plethora of newspaper articles from the digital database of Delpher.nl and booklets published by the VNF itself.

Propaganda and the consumer
In the local newspapers of Winter 1915, the notable Sir C.W.F.C. van Lidth de Jeude called on the people of the Netherlands: the Dutch had to show more appreciation for their produce (Courant, 1915). The rest of the world was engaged in a terrible war and as a result, the global economy had crashed. Subsequently, due to the shortages of import material, the Dutch market was hit by scarcity and thus became more dependent on its national produce. According to Van Lidth de Jeude, the Dutch industry was not prepared for this crisis because of the population's lack of interest in their national product, which, in his views, had made the national industry weak. He thus made it his mission to educate the Dutch population in what it meant to be a national consumer. Together with other notables, Van Lidth de Jeude founded the VNF on the 31st of March 1915. The mission of the VNF was to enhance the Dutch industrial production by linking the Dutch consumer with the Dutch producer. In doing so, the VNF envisioned an active role for the citizensas-consumers, as they could lift the nation out of the crisis through their purchasing power (Algemeen Handelsblad, 1915).
In the first decades of the 20th century, the Dutch preferred foreign products because the national industry was indeed seen as backward (Tjong Tjin Tai et al., 2015: 263-264). The Netherlands industrialized relatively late compared to the other western European nations, such as Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom or France. Nevertheless, the VNF believed that a lot of sectors of the Dutch industry did produce decent and sometimes excellent consumer goods. It was their firm belief that the Dutch citizen should always consume Dutch, provided that the produce was of the same or better quality and price (Snoek and Plate, 1934: 12). This reasoning was also the VNF's defence against allegations of protectionism. Living in a small country with limited national resources, the Dutch were active traders, so the Netherlands traditionally pursued an open-market economic policy. However, in the interwar years, other countries progressively imposed import tariffs on Dutch products, whereas the Dutch tried to maintain economic neutrality and therefore barely imposed any import tariffs on foreign products. As a result, it became increasingly harder for Dutch producers to sell their products on foreign markets, while foreign products easily found their way to the Dutch market (Tjong Tjin Tai et al., 2015: 257). The VNF considered this to be unfair and tried to change the status quo by transforming the Dutch citizens into national consumers.
Financially, the VNF largely relied on membership contributions. Once a public member of the association, you would be updated on the VNF's program through their monthly members magazine. The magazines served the dual purpose of acquainting the audience with the Dutch industry and country and of exposing the readers to a plethora of advertisements of Dutch companies. Between 1927 and 1940, the VNF also expanded their magazines with a special edition focused on the Dutch East and West Indies (Hogenkamp and Lauwers, 1993: 3). Because it was the VNF's self-imposed mission to educate the Dutch citizen in what it meant to be a 'good' consumer, the informative texts were of a didactic nature. To prove their legitimacy in educating the Dutch populace, the VNF invited prominent Dutch figures to write articles for publication in their magazines. Ministers, industrialists or presidents of other big private associations often wrote articles for the members magazine.
The people who spoke in the interest of the VNF all had the same message: the 'good' national consumer bought Dutch products. But even for the most well-willing Dutch citizens this could prove to be a difficult task, as foreign products were sold under Dutch names. Inzdeed, one of the incentives of the founding of the VNF was the discovery that German milk was being sold under the Dutch banner: an outrage! To eliminate such confusion and help the Dutch citizen-consumer to consume Dutch, the association instituted a nationality label, the contrôlemerk, in 1915 as part of its larger propaganda efforts (VNF jubilee edition, February 1940, p. 53, Bijzondere Collecties Amsterdam, 1940. From its foundation, propaganda played an essential role in the operations of the VNF. Within its organisational structure, propaganda was the first department out of 10 to be established. The chairman for the VNF's propaganda effort was H.F.R. Snoek, a position he held from the mid-1910s until the 1940s (Nationaal Archief, 1983) (Nielen, 3-4).
A concrete way of connecting the Dutch public with its industry was found in the organisation of industrial exhibitions. These so-called 'travelling exhibitions' (reizende tentoonstellingen) were showcased across the country and gave Dutch consumers a chance to discover the wondrous manufacture the national industry had to offer. The VNF hoped that once the people would be acquainted with the industry, they would feel more inclined to buy from it and simultaneously it would 'prove' that the Dutch manufacture was of the same or even better quality as foreign manufacture (NL-HaNA, 2.19.042.07, inv.nrs. 19, 134, December 1938, 138) (Barendsen, 1930). Snoek was also the secretary of the Association for Exhibition Interests and was well-connected internationally (Nationaal Archief, 1934, Nielen, 47). Together with the VNF, the Association for Exhibition Interests association founded the Jaarbeurs (yearly fair) in 1916 -an industrial exhibition that still exists to this daywhich in its beginning exclusively showcased Dutch manufacture, a legacy of the VNF that survives to this day (VNF jubilee edition, February 1940, p. 11).
Film played an important part in the propaganda-apparatus of the VNF as well. Between 1921 and 1923 the VNF experimented with silent movies across the country and in 1925 Snoek founded the VNF's film department 'recordings for industrial films.' Together with small-or middle-sized companies, the VNF created virtual tours of factories in which the entire production process of different products, undertaken by happyworking countrymen, was recorded. Once again, the aim of this propaganda was to make the audience familiar with the industry. Within 2 years, the VNF produced 60 titles and played the films all over the country, with at its peak a total of 241 screenings in 1930 (Hogenkamp and Lauwers, 1993: 4-5).
For the 'Buy Dutch Produce' campaign, the VNF used a negative discourse in their propaganda, because it was assumed that a negative rhetoric would more easily affect peoples' emotions. The propaganda for this campaign had to be ubiquitous. The people had to be 'seized and then kept for months' by the latest advertising techniques that were then available (Koopt Nederlandsche Waar!, p. i, Vereeniging Nederlandsch Fabrikaat, 1935). Of particular importance was the 'discovery' of the subconsciousness by Freud. Inspired by psychoanalysis, the advertising industry increasingly emphasized the psychology behind the buying process in order to influence it (Schreurs, 2001, 121). Instead of focussing on the rationality of people, the VNF now wanted to emphasize their emotionality. The global crisis of the 1930s seemed to give the perfect testing grounds for these new propaganda techniques; people would be more susceptible to emotional arguments if they would be jobless. In their propaganda, the association promoted what it deemed to be 'ancient motives of mankind', such as vanity, pride, honour and the supposed herd-instinct of peopleancient motives that the people were 'luckily' unconscious of. These motives were also translated to the poster campaign of 1933, where the VNF continuously claimed that there was a direct link between unemployment and the Dutch people's lack of interest in their national product (Koopt Nederlandsche Waar!, p. 3-6).
The VNF translated these emotional discourses to their films as well. De Macht van het Kleine (The Power of the Small), the association's first true 'modern' film, was seen as a truly modern propagandistic movie. It was sponsored by the government, which helped fund the start of the 'Buy Dutch Produce' campaign (Hogenkamp and Lauwers, 1993: 5). In this film, the VNF held the consumer directly responsible for the economic crisis of the 1930s: A young girl fills her grocery basket with foreign products. This image is followed by scenes of crisis and despair: factory pipes stopped emitting their smoke, empty streets, dilapidated and abandoned factory, people are jobless. When the girl later returns to the store to fill her grocery bag with Dutch products instead of foreign products, the movie continues with images of a vibrant economy. Shopping streets are full of joyful people, a man can afford new shoes and a woman tries on a fancy new hat. The message is clear: The behaviour of the consumer has a direct effect on the prosperity of the nation.
The VNF also actively targeted the housewife. In the VNF's propaganda, the woman is portrayed as the 'housemother' who was deemed responsible for buying the groceries and hence an interesting target group for the VNF. For instance, the association published a household booklet, in which housewives could keep track of their 'Dutch' purchases (VNF jubilee edition, February 1940, p. 6), as well as small booklets which advised women in how they could best shop 'Dutch ' (Snoek and Plate, 1934). The housewife had to buy Dutch because it would directly strengthen the economy and so benefit Dutch workers: their husbands and sons.
Starting from the end of the 19th century, women in the Netherlands slowly started to recognise their role as consumers and the rights and duties that supposedly came with it. Middle-and upper-class women became increasingly aware that they had a certain amount of influence on the economic lives of working-class women, who often worked under deprivable working conditions. By consuming more consciously, these women sought to improve the lives of the women working in factories for a meagre salary (Bervoets and Ruth, 2002: 274-276). The focus on the woman-as-consumer was a transnational phenomenon in the interwar years, as women around the world started to organise themselves as consumers, such as in the 'National Consumers' League' in the USA (Cohen, 2003: 22-23) or the 'British Women's Patriotic League in the UK (Trentmann, 2008: 229-232). In Thailand as well, the nationalist government that came to power in 1932 actively targeted female consumers as harbingers of modernity in the new emerging consumer culture (Phillips, 2013, 684).
The new government in Thailand proved to be a powerful actor in the shaping of the new Thai citizen-as-consumer. Unfortunately for the VNF, the Dutch government abstained from strong intervention.

VNF and the government
The VNF envisioned the state as an active actor both in protecting the Dutch industry and in forming the citizen-consumer. This 'activity' had to come in three different ways: financially contributing to the VNF's propaganda effort; the establishment and promotion of the nationality label; and better protection of the Dutch market. Because the association did not have the adequate financial resources needed to fund their propaganda campaigns themselves, the VNF's operations heavily relied on donations, membership fees and governmental support. It was thus important for the VNF to keep good relations with the government, which in turn helped fund the VNF's propaganda efforts, albeit reluctantly (NL-HaNA, VNF, 2.19.042.07, inv.nr 128, 9 February 1934).
The Dutch government was not involved in the founding of the VNF, but after the association's establishment in 1915, government agencies swiftly started to cooperate with the VNF. The first form of this cooperation was through the Rijksnijverheidsdienst (RND, Technical Information Agency), a publicly financed agency for technical information. Companies who applied for the VNF's nationality label were audited by the RND to test whether they qualified for the label (i.e. if the products were 'Dutch' enough) (Tjong Tjin Tai and Davids, 2016: 620) (Nationaal Archief, 1933) The cooperation between the RND and the VNF went relatively harmoniously, although there were some complications. For example, it was unclear what 'Dutch' meant; how was the RND to act if a producer did not produce 'Dutch' but was an important employer for Dutch employees? And at what price difference would it be acceptable for a producer to use foreign resources instead of Dutch resources? And would a producer be allowed to use the nationality label if the RND would qualify a company and its products different than the VNF would (Nielen, 31)?
More problematic was the cooperation via commissions, where deputies of both parties represented their groups' interest. Through these commissions, the association actively tried to influence the governments' economic policy. Likewise, the government tried to influence the association's course. Partly because of this, the relationship between the VNF and the Dutch government was more often bad than good. For example, The VNF wanted to focus their propaganda efforts exclusively towards the promotion of the Dutch industry, while the government also wanted to include the Dutch agricultural sector. These tensions made the cooperation highly ineffective. Minister of Economic Affairs and Work T.J. Verschuur (r. 1929Verschuur (r. -1933 eventually told the stubborn VNF that they should 'beg for money from the industry.' (Nationaal Archief, 1933) Apart from the financial mismanagement of the VNF and disagreement on which sectors should benefit from the propaganda campaigns, there were two other factors which explain why the relationship between the two parties was at times abrasive. First, the VNF wanted the government to actively interfere in the industrial sector, while the government opted for a laisser-faire economic policy. Second, the tone of the VNF's message was protectionistic, while the government was committed to a free-trading policy. This ideological mismatch explains why both parties viewed each other with a certain distrust, especially during times of economic crises, as was the case in the 1930s. Hendrikus Colijn, leader of the Christian reactionary party and Prime Minister of five governments between 1925-1926 and 1933-1939, was especially an avid free trader. In the interwar years, the Dutch government held on to a free-trading policy, even though other countries increasingly adopted a protectionist economic stance (Kennedy, 2017: 310). According to the VNF, this was a deathblow to the Dutch industry because of the unfair competition this resulted in. The VNF wished the Dutch industry to be favoured over foreign competitors, which made the VNF indeed susceptible to allegations of protectionism, precisely what the government hoped to avoid.
Colijn's economic policy was aimed towards cutting government expenses and economic changes were to come from the industry itself, not from the government. His policy was named as one of 'adaptation' (aanpassingspolitiek): According to this philosophy, the crisis could be overcome if the Dutch consumer adapted to the new economic situation. The government gave the example on how to do this, which effectively meant austerity. Ironically, these austerity measures meant that people became increasingly dependent on governmental support (Bosmans et al., 2011: 30-34).
An important reason for Colijn to commit to this adaptation policy was the fact that the Dutch government wanted to stick to the gold standard. The government stuck to the gold standard because it believed in combating the crisis internationally and so it wished to avoid all allegations of protectionism. Critics of Colijn's policy, including the VNF, accused the government that retaining to the gold standard made the crisis last longer than necessary. But to Colijn, devaluating the Dutch guilder was considered to be a humiliating act (Bosmans et al., 2011: 34). Ultimately in 1936, Colijn abandoned the gold standard which helped the Dutch economy to recuperate (Kennedy, 2017: 311).
Followers of the VNF called for an import label and better judicial protection for the term 'Dutch manufacture', but the Ministry of Economic Affairs did not agree to this 'protection'. The VNF denied all allegations of protectionism by claiming that Dutch citizens should only consume Dutch if the products were to be of the same price and quality as the foreign products. It also claimed that 'protection is a legally enforced measure against foreign countries, and such is a negative measure, whereas [the VNF] is a spontaneous action, that does not target foreign countries in the first place' (NL-HaNA, VNF, 2.19.042.07, inv.nr 19, February 1933, p. 22, 24, 31).
However, the VNF did repeatedly call for a protective economic policy (protectie) from the government. A salient example is a lecture given by Henri Gelissen in 1933. Here the soon-to-be minister of Economic Affairs and Work called for an active economic policy from the government to protect her industries, especially from countries that imposed heavy tariffs on Dutch imports. This protection would primarily consist of quotas on foreign products. The VNF wanted the government to use these quotas to bargain tariffs on different countries (Gelissen, 1933). Naturally, the government had little interest in such a policy. In a leaflet published by the VNF in 1932, Minister Verschuur wrote that the government firmly believed that every intervention in the industry and every obstruction of import would have negative consequences for the Dutch economy (Snoek and Plate, 1934: 11-12). When Gelissen became minister against his will in 1935, he was forced to change his rhetoric to comply with the Dutch governmental ideological convictions, although it seems he never completely withdrew from his protectionist ideas (Gelissen, 1935).
For the start of 'Buy Dutch Produce' campaign in 1932-1933, the propaganda commission received a one-time contribution of f 100.000,-(roughly €2.000.000 today) from the government (Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1931-1932 kamerstuknummer 2 X ondernummer 2, 0000049770). This huge amount money did not directly go to the VNF as under the pressure of Verschuur it was decided that a share of this money also had to go to other associations and companies who were willing to promote Dutch produce. This was the first time that a Dutch government was willing to pay such an amount of money for propaganda and advertising, and is peculiar, as it contradicts the government's ideological stance on monetary support. But the Colijn government considered propaganda to be an effective and above all modern instrument which could be exploited in service of the state (Schreurs, 2001: 95). This belief in the workings of propaganda and mass-psychology is exemplary for the domestic political climate of the 1930s, where political parties such as the Social Democratic Party also heavily invested in new forms of advertising (Rulof, 2005). Domestic political competition likely was a motivation for Colijn to invest in propaganda as well, as he could show that under his leadership the Netherlands would be lifted out of the crisis, all the while appearing politically neutral.
Even if some voices within the government initially could be sympathetic to the VNF's cause, they had to alter their views according to the government's official standpoint. The Dutch governments' commitment to production instead of consumption is peculiar seen in a transnational context; in the interwar years, governments around the world increasingly committed to the creation of the citizen-consumer, not unusually in collaboration with civil society. A reason for this absence can be found in the fact that the Netherlands was not involved in the First World War, where consumption proved to be a powerful means of mobilization (Levenstein, 1988: 156). The Dutch were stuck in an international limbo between the Allied and the Axis powers through the politics of neutrality. The Dutch neighboured the heavily industrialized and militarized Germany, which was perceived to be a threat for their mainland and at the same time was their biggest trade partner, while the United Kingdom was perceived to be the main threat for the Dutch colonial empire, notably the Dutch East Indies (Hellema, 2014: 74-81;Den Hertog, 2009: 180).
Following World War I, the 'Food Administration' was established in the United States. This organisation actively tried to influence the consumption pattern of US citizens. 'Consumption' became associated with notions of patriotism; the American citizen consumed for and with the nation (Levenstein, 1988: 137-142). Likewise, in the United Kingdom the consumer and consumption became heavily politicized. Partly due to the success of the EMB, a hallmark for British and British colonial products was introduced in 1926 via the 'Merchandise Marks Act'. Unlike the VNF's nationality label, this hallmark was in fact launched by the government through the Ministry of the Colonies (Trentmann, 2008: 18, 299, 239). The British government reasoned that greater protection of the British market through the promotion of empire foodstuffs and other consumer wares would help sustain the British metropole and colonial empire.
J.J. Nielen writes in his doctoral thesis that another explanation in the government's unwillingness to support the association can be found in the industry's lack of interest for the propaganda campaigns of the VNF. The government would have been more willing to support the VNF if the industry were to be more interested as well (Nielen,40).

Big and small businesses
The VNF did not primarily consist of businessmen, despite the centrality of the industry to the ideology of the association. Nevertheless, the 'industry', or the business community, was a fundamental target group for the VNF's propaganda effort. For the VNF, this community consisted of two groups: industrialists and shopkeepers. Behind the 'Buy Dutch Produce' campaign, the VNF called for the big-business owners to firstly produce Dutch, although it was unclear what 'Dutch' meant; and secondly, to produce for the Dutch. This effectively meant that the Dutch industry had to switch its focus from production for export to production for domestic purposes. Concerning the small-business shopkeepers, the VNF envisioned them as the frontline soldiers in the battle for consumers: they were the ones who could most easily make a positive impact in the hearts and minds of Dutch consumers by offering and promoting Dutch goods in their stores.
The relationship between the VNF and the industrialists was difficult. In general, the communication between the VNF and industrialists went through backdoor commissions, similar to the VNF's contact with the government and sometimes through the same commissions (Nielen, 34). Shopkeepers fulfilled an intermediate role in the eyes of the VNF; they were seen as the bridge between the consumer and the industry. There was a strong assumption within the VNF that the business community would cooperate. Would it not be in their advantage to do so? The industrialists, however, were anything but enthusiastic for the VNF's cause, unlike the shopkeepers, who proved to be more sympathetic to the message.
A manufacturer could become a producer-member of the VNF. Being a member, however, did not grant any influence on the course of the association, but it did allow manufacturers to promote their company and produce within the VNF's magazines. Some advertisements had the form of a virtual factory tour, which fitted the didactic character of the VNF's propaganda. Once a member of the VNF, the cooperation between the two parties could start.
The most successful cooperation between the VNF and the industrialists went through the film department 'recordings for industrial films', which was founded by Snoek in 1925. Only producer-members of the VNF were allowed to take part in these documentaries and were for them an opportunity to promote their companies and products. The industrial films were exhibited across the country and were received with great enthusiasm, even the government praised this form of propaganda (Nielen, 28)! In addition to virtual tours, the VNF cooperated with producers-members in organising physical tours in factories for students (Nationaal Archief, 1940) Producer-members could also showcase their products at the VNF's industrial exhibitions. The recruitment of manufacturers for these exhibitions were heavily advertised in the association's member's magazine. The 'travelling exhibitions' travelled to more than 40 municipalities and visitors had to pay a minor fee of f 0.25. To showcase products, a producer-member had to pay a fee of f 950. These exhibitions allowed the Dutch consumer to see that the Dutch products were of the same or even better quality as foreign products. Another important purpose that these exhibitions served was that it was a perfect platform for shopkeepers to get in contact with the Dutch manufacturers (VNF jubilee edition, February 1940, p. 11). According to the VNF, these 'resellers' (weederverkopers) had the obligation to the national community to sell Dutch. Again, the VNF reasoned that once these shopkeepers would be acquainted with the Dutch industry, they would automatically be more inclined to sell Dutch products.
The VNF actively aimed their propaganda towards the middle-class shopkeepers. The VNF tried to raise the shopkeepers' awareness of their moral obligation to sell Dutch. Shortly before the founding of the VNF, Van Lidth de Jeude complained that: 'ask in a store for a bar of soap and the odds will be 10 against one that they will sell you foreign soap, if you would not express your desire to acquire Dutch manufacture.' (Courant, 1915). The VNF reasoned that the shopkeepers' neglection for their moral obligation to sell the nation's products was a reason for the Dutch consumer's indifference towards the national industry. By bringing the propaganda in the shops, the VNF revealed the Dutch nation that was in the shops all along, hidden in the products to be sold.
One of the biggest propaganda efforts in cooperation with the shopkeepers were the shopping weeks. These were organised across the country for 'Buy Dutch Produce!'. Internationally, shopping weeks were used as a propaganda tool with success: the EMB, for example, organised the 'Buy British' campaigns together with women's organisations. The arguments were quite similar like those of the VNF: The British believed that once their citizens would consume British, the national purchasing power would rise and as a result would make the British economy flourish. In turn, this would mean that the British citizen could use its purchasing power to help people elsewhere in the British empire and the world (Trentmann, 2008, 236). Such ethical reasoning is what we find within the VNF too. Minister of Social Affairs Dr J. van den Tempel said that 'if this endeavour of the VNF remains within the limits […] will the increase of our people's power help us better serve others.' (Emphasis added) (VNF jubilee edition, March 1940, p. 77, NL-HaNA, VNF, inv.nr 136). The limits, of course, being the VNF's protectionist rhetoric.
By helping the VNF organising the shopping weeks, the shopkeepers would at the same time help other people around the world. More importantly, if the shopkeepers were to promote Dutch products, the Dutch consumer would have greater access to these products, which in turn would improve the standards of living of the many Dutch people that were affected by the crisis. Guilders spent on Dutch products would directly go to the Dutch employers employing the Dutch employees. The propaganda movie De Macht van het Kleine showed this duty of the shopkeepers. It was not just the Dutch citizen's indifference towards the Dutch industry that caused the crisis; this economic malaise was also caused by the shopkeepers who mainly sold foreign products (De Macht van het Kleine, Sound and Vision). Here we once again find a parallel with the EMB poster campaigns, where Uma Kothari argues that the core dual message within these campaigns was that 'being an 'empire buyer' enabled empire building' (Kothari, 2014: 49). In the case of the VNF it was not so much the empire that had to be built, as De Macht van het Kleine shows, but the metropolis itself, through the consumption of Dutch products.
The VNF tried to help the shopkeepers in multiple ways. After the First World War, the VNF published the leaflet Winkelinrichtingen, or shop interiors, in where they advised the shopkeeper how to present their shop in the most attractive way possible for their customers. As decorations for their shops, the shopkeepers could also acquire the posters of the VNF with the catchphrases of the association. The VNF also organised the Dutch Manufacture-Display competitions across the country, where shopkeepers could compete with each other by exhibiting the 'most Dutch' possible display, in an attempt to increase awareness of what the Dutch industry had to offer (Nationaal Archief, 1940).
The VNF's message was very accessible to shopkeepers, as their clientele consisted mainly of Dutch people. On top of that, it was easy for the shopkeepers to join the propaganda campaigns, since at the same time they could also be used as a powerful promotional instrument. The displaying competitions, for example, were not just a way for the VNF to spread its message, but also a very practical way for the participating shopkeepers to promote their stores.
Although the relations between the VNF and the shopkeepers seemed to be successful, the relations between the association and the industrialists were rather bad. Nielen writes that the industry strongly believed that the VNF did not function properly. A series of letters written by J.M.B. van Vlijmen, the director of the company N.V. Boldoot in Amsterdam, can be taken as an example. Van Vlijmen writes that the content of the VNF's monthly magazines cannot be taken seriously; that the VNF's administration does not respect the wishes and interests of the industry; and that the VNF should be considered a private advertising agency. This disinterest is also found at the start of 'Buy Dutch Produce'. For this campaign, the VNF sent 13.000 circulars in where they asked for a small contribution for the propaganda fund, from which only 240 returned. A lot of industrialists were sceptical about the organisational capacities of secretary Snoek, as the VNF continuously had too little money to realize its ambitions. This becomes evident in the organisation of and disinterest for the big industrial exhibitions: out of the six planned exhibitions, only four were organised, of which three concluded with a financial loss. The first reason for this malaise was that the VNF did not have the financial capacities to properly organise these exhibitions in the first place. The second reason can be found in the industrialists' fear of being part of an imposed competitive medium, where profit potential was low. At these exhibitions, the companies that partook in it firstly and foremostly were trying to win over new customers, while the VNF's goal was to promote the Dutch industry as a whole.
Another practical objection for the industrialists in supporting the VNF was found in the VNF's nationality label. This label did not guarantee quality and was not supported by the government. A producer nevertheless had to pay a fee for using the label and would be subjected to a bureaucratic inspection by the VNF and the RND. In addition to that, some sectors did not want to be known for their 'Dutchness', as was the case for the textile industry where English textile was considered to be of the best quality (Nielen,(41)(42)(43)(44)(47)(48). Besides, as noted, because the Netherlands was and is a country poor on raw resources, Dutch manufacturers imported a lot of semi-finished products and other resources. Being or producing 'Dutch' did not always have the same positive implications for industrialists as it did for the VNF. Added to that, most companies focussed their production on export, unlike the shopkeepers who sold the products in their local communities. Whilst the VNF wanted the companies to produce Dutch products for the Dutch people, this was not the first concern for these companies.
In line with government policy, most industrialists operated in a climate of free tradethinking, as it would be more profitable for most companies. During the interwar years, the prices of consumer goods dropped and competition from foreign companies increased. But, instead of finding the reason for these economic hardships at the consumer's indifference towards the national industry, companies tried to reform their structure, mostly through rationalisation and perfecting production processes (Pijl, 2013: 47-48). For a company with ambitious leadership, this seemed to be a logical step in combating the crisis and sustaining a healthy business.

Conclusion
It almost seems a historical law in the logic of liberal nation-states, that anxieties about globalization, unemployment, and loss of identity and selfhood during times of economic crisis bring forth a popular demand to protect the national industry and economy. These fears typically face a traditional liberal political domain, that instead prefers not to intervene in the market. Recent examples are the 'America First' campaign run by former US President Donald Trump in 2015-2016 and the Brexit campaigns of 2015-2016. The arguments used for the right to national self-determination often belong to the domain of consumption: During the Brexit campaigns, for example, it was (wrongfully) claimed that the European Union banned bendy bananas (The Sun, 2016). It shows that consumption practices play an intrinsic role in the creation of national citizenship because it is precisely here where we see the intertwining of everyday life and banal nationalism.
In many countries around the world, the interwar years formed a pivotal moment in the shaping of the citizen-consumer, as the nation-state consolidated itself as the political frame of reference while simultaneously the manifestation of consumer society unfolded at a rapid pace. This paper has illustrated how private associations such as the VNF partook in the shaping of the citizen-consumer. In moulding the citizen into a national consumer, the VNF not only called on consumers themselves but also on the government and big and small businesses. The Dutch had to discard their presupposed indifference towards the national industry and instead consume nationally. 'Buying Dutch' was seen as a remedy for the international economic crisis which rampaged big parts of the world in the 1930s. The VNF hoped to cure the economic malaise by making the consumer acquainted with the national industry and its produce. By buying national products, the consumers actively helped in the building of the Dutch nation: national buying enabled nation-building.
Behind the scenes of the 'Buy Dutch Produce' campaign, the VNF sought aid from the government in the form of monetary support and economic policy. Despite denying allegations of protectionism, the VNF repeatedly argued for a more protectionist stance from the government, which caused friction as Dutch policymakers operated within an intellectual climate of free trade-thinking. The VNF also appealed to big and small businessmen. Local shopkeepers answered the VNF's call with far greater enthusiasm than owners of largescale production companies because their clientele was Dutch. Industrialists, on the other hand, did not only produce for local Dutch communities and so the protectionist role that VNF assigned to them conflicted with the goal of their businesses. In addition, a lot of manufacturers imported resources from different countries because it was cheaper or because the Netherlands simply lacked the natural resources required for the production of certain goods.
The citizen-consumer, according to the VNF, was a polysemic relationship between institutions and consumer society, where consumers, the state, and the business community all had to contribute in their way. In doing so, the VNF imagined a national community that was founded on the idea that Dutch citizens had to be Dutch consumers. Not doing so would bring the existential threat of losing this national industry and thus the national community. It, therefore, had to 'invent' the national industry through the visual reproduction of the industry-as-the-nation in their propaganda campaigns. The VNF believed that the Dutch citizen would be enticed to consume Dutch once they were familiarized with the Dutch industry. The VNF's conception of the citizen-consumer was multi-levelled, precisely because of the reciprocal relationship wherein consumers had to buy Dutch, businesses had to make and sell Dutch, and the government had to protect and facilitate Dutchness.
The 'Buy Dutch Produce' campaign proved to be the VNF's last big campaign; after the liquidation of the association's assets by the Nazi-German forces in 1942, the VNF never proved to be able to launch such a big campaign again. After the Second World War, the idea of consumption and the consumer became intertwined with notions of liberty and democracy in much of Western Europe (Van Dam and Jonker, 2017: 4-5), which meant that the VNF's emphasis on protection and nationalism did not correspond with society's vision on consumption and the consumer anymoreif it ever truly did.

Author's Note
This paper is a translated and reworked version of my BA-thesis.

Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.