Changing tides in Zambian television broadcasting: Digital migration and Chinese engagement

This paper examines the recent shifts and debates in the organization of the television landscape following the implementation of digital migration in Zambia. It ponders Zambia’s experience in the digital migration exercise, playing particular attention to the country’s interaction with the Chinese company, StarTimes. It discusses the implications of this interaction on ownership and control in the new digitalized television landscape, highlighting the political economic implications on the broadcast sector. The paper also highlights various debates relating to local broadcasting policy in a digitalized environment and offers a timely contribution to the growing academic interest in Chinese involvement and interactions with African media.


Introduction
The development and growth of the mass media remains an important legacy of the 20th century.This growth was influenced by many factors including a myriad of technological advances and the sway of global capitalism.In post-colonial Africa, media and mass communications continue to undergo significant changes as a result of these and other factors.In the last three decades alone, most countries have seen their media take on extensive reform and reorientation necessitated by the transition from the mostly authoritarian, state-owned and controlled systems to the more liberal, pluralistic and independent ones, on paper at least.These trends have continued well into the 21st century and have resulted in several noteworthy developments with far-reaching outcomes.The broadcast sector has in recent years seen further changes with the implementation of digital migration.Digital migration is a term used to refer to the switch-over or the migration of broadcasting systems and services from analogue to digital technologies (Abikanlu, 2021;Murunga and Diang'a, 2021).The motivation for the migration emerged from a need to free up and ensure efficient use of the radio frequency spectrum.A freed frequency spectrum meant that more frequencies could be used for wireless mobile broadband services (International Telecommunications Union [ITU], 2010).Member-states of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and signatories of the organization's Regional Radio Communication Conference of 2006 (RRC06) and the Geneva 2006 Agreement (GE06) agreed to migrate from analogue to digital television broadcasting services.As per the resolution, all countries were to complete their migration by 17 June 2015.Digital terrestrial television (DTT) was to come with more benefits besides the creation of more radio-frequency space.With digitalization, there would be greater opportunities for the provision of ICT applications and multimedia services, increased interactivity and the possibility of high-quality video and audio (ITU, 2010).Other benefits include the lowering of broadcast transmission costs (communication towers, energy and so on), the use of shared infrastructure and the possibility of greater and diverse participation in the sector.
For many developing countries, including Zambia, data on the impact of digital migration is only now slowly beginning to emerge.Motsaathebe and Chiumbu (2021) in their recent edited book, Television in Africa in the digital age, have argued that many more studies on television 'in the current technological environment, focus on the European and American contexts' (p. 1).Even with the dearth of data in Zambia, there are some observations that can be made about the country's experience with the switchover so far.For instance, there has been a clear flare-up in the number of private television channels in Zambia.It is still important to interrogate the country's experience in the switch-over, especially in relation to the influence of StarTimes, the Chinese technology and telecommunications company that implemented the migration.Further, it is not known whether this interaction with StarTimes has had any implications on ownership and industry organization in the newly digitalized television landscape in Zambia.
This paper examines the recent shifts and debates in the organization of the television landscape following the implementation of digital migration in Zambia.It ponders Zambia's experience in the digital migration process, playing particular attention to the country's interaction with the Chinese technology and telecommunications company StarTimes.It discusses how this interaction has affected ownership and control in the new digitalized television landscape, highlighting the political economic implications of this interaction on the broadcast sector.The discussion presented in this article is particularly timely as conversations on the impact of digitalization in Africa begin to emerge.It is a functional and timely reflection on what elements such as ownership may imply in the digital era.The paper is also a useful addition to the now established and still growing academic interest in Chinese involvement and interactions with African media.
In achieving this, the paper will begin by providing a contextual summary about broadcasting in Zambia, leading to the implementation of the digital migration.This discussion is necessary as it paints a picture of where Zambian television is coming from, right to the present when the switch-over has taken place.Thereafter, the paper will discuss the juxtaposition of ownership and StarTimes' activities in Zambia.It will then examine China's soft power and the forays of Chinese media into Africa.This will lead into the discussion on Zambia's interaction with StarTimes, which is at the crux of the study.Thereafter, a summative discussion and conclusion will be provided based on issues raised in the study.This section will also highlight some suggested areas of future research.

Methodology
The study presented in this paper is part of a larger body of work still in progress that looks at the development of Zambian television in the 21st century.The qualitative study has so far conducted a vast document analysis of various national, regional and international documents as well as news reports and statements available in this period.Bowen (2009: 27) describes document analysis as a systematic process of reviewing, evaluating or examining documents.The documents used for analysis in a study are assumed to be 'social facts' because they capture what is part of society (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997: 47).Documents, when accessible, are inobtrusive and effective and they provide great insights on a phenomenon under investigation and open the door to other areas of relevance to a study.The next phase of the study will be to conduct interviews with the various stakeholders identified via snowballing or their position and participation in the Zambian television broadcasting subsector.These include representatives of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), the national broadcaster, ZNBC, StarTimes (Top Star) and other television stations that have emerged because of digital migration.It must be stated that efforts to get an interview with the IBA over the involvement of StarTimes failed as my requests remained unanswered.It is hoped that within the context of the wider study, more voices of these stakeholders will be heard and presented.

Television broadcasting in Zambia
Television in Zambia dates back to 1961 when the London Rhodesia (Lonrho) Company set up a privately-owned television station in Kitwe, a mining town in the Copperbelt region of what was then Northern Rhodesia.This station catered for the white community, which included expatriates working for the mines and the colonial administrators.The station was linked to Rhodesia Television Limited (RTL), a private broadcaster in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).According to Kachingwe (2014), the RTL station in Zambia became Zambia Television Limited after Zambia's independence in 1964.The following year, an experimental television station was started at the state-owned Zambia Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) in Lusaka, which until then had only radio broadcasts.By 1967, the two stations were completely integrated into ZBC, which had been renamed Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBS) in 1966.ZBS introduced colour television in 1977, and in 1987, it was renamed the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), a name it holds to this day.ZNBC was established as a statutory body by an Act of Parliament, scrapping its status as a government department in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services in the now one-party state (Hamasaka, 2008;Kapeya, 2011).The 1987 Act also dictated the requirements for obtaining broadcasting licences in Zambia.The Act empowered the minister of information and broadcasting alone to issue, cancel or reverse licences at his discretion and at any time as long as it was in the public interest (Kachingwe, 2014).
Zambia's return to political pluralism and the subsequent implementation of liberalization policies in the early 1990s brought the promise of reform to the broadcast sector (Chirwa, 1997;Phiri, 1999;Makungu, 2004;Mambwe, 2019;Pitts, 2000).However, it wasn't until 1998 that the first private television station was established when Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN) Zambia came on air in Lusaka.Before TBN, MultiChoice (DStv) and CASAT had already been established as pay television service providers but they both carried foreign content.A major milestone in broadcast regulation reform took place in 2002, when both the Zambia National Broadcasting (ZNBC) Amendment Act and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act were passed (Hamasaka, 2008;Makungu, 2004).The ZNBC Act transformed the broadcaster from a state to a public broadcaster and established guidelines on the collection of television licence levies and the appointment of the ZNBC board.The IBA Act established the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) as the regulator of the broadcasting industry.Together with its later amendments in 2010 and 2017, the Act gave the new regulator the power to grant, renew, suspend and cancel broadcast licences in Zambia.The IBA was to further promote pluralism and diversity in the broadcasting sector, as well as set standards and monitor licensees for compliance.Both these acts were not fully operationalized until their 2010 amendments, following years of legal contestation over the content and wording of crucial clauses (Mwale, 2015).
By 2012, Zambia had eight free-to-air television broadcasters: ZNBC (state-owned with two channels, TV 1 and TV 2), Mobi TV, Muvi TV, CBC Television, Prime TV, Chipata TV, North-West TV and TBN (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services [MIBS], 2014).All eight stations were terrestrial broadcasters.In addition to these eight, there were only two satellite pay-television providers, Multichoice Zambia with its DSTV bouquets, and Strong Zambia, which provided the My TV bouquet.Television coverage was estimated to reach about 80 per cent of the country's population by 2012 (MIBS, 2014).By 2020, this scenario had changed significantly following the implementation of the migration programme, with over 40 registered content service providers (Media Institute of Southern Africa Zambia Chapter [MISA], 2021).

Digital migration policy and implementation in Zambia
In line with the 2006 ITU resolution to migrate broadcasting systems from analogue to digital, Zambia began the long and meandering journey to implement digital television.Following wide consultations, Zambia adopted Digital Video Broadcasting -Second Generation Terrestrial (DVB-T2) as the transmission standard for terrestrial; Digital Video Broadcasting -Satellite -Second Generation (DVB-S2) for satellite broadcasting, and Digital Video Broadcasting -Handheld (DVB-H) for mobile TV (MIBS, 2014).The National Digital Migration Policy was drawn up and launched to set the guidelines under which Zambia's television sector would migrate and operate thereafter.The policy was developed with multisectoral inputs brought together by the Digital Migration Task Force.It addressed essential aspects of what would constitute Zambia's new broadcast regime, including the market structure, the licensing framework and technical and content standards.
The policy (MIBS, 2014) determined that that under the new broadcasting regime, licensees would either be signal distributors or content service providers, for which corresponding regulations were later developed.Licensees would be given one of the two licences, not both.The policy also indicated that all analogue frequencies would be revoked, and only signal distributors would be given frequencies.Existing broadcasters with valid licences at the time of implementation would be given content service provider licences.Additionally, the content providers would be required to enter into distribution agreements and pay user fees to the signal distributors.The signal distributors would provide the infrastructure to receive and distribute (broadcast) content from providers and manage subscriptions to their platforms.Further, the content service provider was to ensure that content was delivered to the signal distributor using the prescribed standards.
Another important policy measure was the establishment of a public signal distributor whose role would be 'to provide national-wide coverage and services to Content Service Providers (licensees) on a non-discriminatory basis in order to provide universal access' (MIBS, 2014: 8).The policy also paved way for private signal distributors, who, like the public distributor, would provide national-wide coverage and service to the content service providers (licensees).ZNBC was designated as the National Public Content Service Provider and was to continue operating both commercially and with public funds to meet universal service obligations.Private broadcasters, also called private commercial content service providers in the policy, could now have district, provincial or national licences.Further, these licences could be either free-to-air or subscription-based.Additionally, a category for private non-commercial content service providers was created for licences issued to non-profit entities.
Other regulations included ensuring that content service provider licences were issued to Zambian citizens or to companies in which a minimum of 75 per cent shares were owned by Zambian citizens; requiring signal distributors to adopt common technologies for devices to be used by the public for access; and guaranteeing the promotion of local media production houses to increase the production of local content (MIBS, 2014).
The implementation of the project took a phased approach.Broadcasters, now referred to as content service providers, began with simulcasting both the analogue and digital signals.The signal carriers carried the content made available at no cost in this period, as recommended by the policy.Despite missing the ITU 15 June 2015 deadline, and the earlier regional 31 December 2013 deadline, set by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Zambia officially implemented its migration on 1 October 2017 (MISA, 2017).
In line with the digital migration policy, regulatory bodies linked with the broadcast sector took to realigning regulation to meet the new demands.The IBA was central to the success of the new regulations.The broadcast regulator established several standards relating to the new digitized environment to guide the sector.For instance, regarding signal distribution, the new standards required that signal distributors provide up to five free-to-air programme channels for public service in addition to the requirement to develop non-discriminatory service-level agreements with content service providers as had been stated in the policy.The IBA also established three broad licence categories, namely public content service provider; private commercial content service provider and the private non-commercial content service provider.

Ownership and structural concerns in the digitalized broadcast space
The question of ownership in the digitalized broadcast space has helped bring to light some concerns about the country's legal and policy framework.The visible increase in private participation in the sector, an obvious and celebrated benefit of digitization, has not been met without challenges.One of the major disputes that illustrates how ownership and the way the sector is structured are a key source of contention is the designation of the public signal distributor.Answering the question of who owns the public signal distributor in Zambia is not a straightforward endeavour.In attempting to do this, we must return to the early stages of the implementation process.
In 2011, private satellite television provider MultiChoice Zambia obtained and rolled out the first DVB-T2 licence through GOtv.Though GOtv could have easily become the main provider of digital terrestrial television in Zambia, considering that the product was a partnership between the public broadcaster ZNBC and Multichoice, there were overwhelming calls for a public signal distributor that was entirely Zambian, non-commercial and neutral.The government, through a sector-representative working group, worked through the modalities of how Zambia would meet the fast looming deadlines and migrate.With the guidance of the Digital Migration Policy, and after much deliberation, which included industry and public debate, the government took the process to tender.
According to Nkaka and Mukumbwa (2016), the tender to supply, deliver and install the country's broadcast system was advertised in January 2014.Star Software Technology Company Limited, popularly known as StarTimes of China, was in July of that year successfully awarded the tender over five other Chinese companies.StarTimes was to implement Phase I of the process.Rønning (2016) has described the StarTimes business model in Africa as follows: it starts by offering cheap subscriptions through set-top-boxes that offer access to digital television and many more channels at a higher quality than the analogue possibilities that exist.At the same time the company enters into negotiations with state broadcasters and governments aspiring to obtain the contract for being the provider of digital migration before the deadline of the closing down of analogue signals has been reached (p.68).
Using this approach, the company has broken the dominance of Multichoice's DStv in anglophone-Africa and challenged French giant Canal Plus' position in francophone Africa (Dubois de Prisque, 2011).By offering cheaper technologies and promising to keep subscriptions to services significantly lower, StarTimes increased its appeal to many African governments.
It must be noted that when StarTimes ventured into Africa, it did not enjoy the government support that other public or private Chinese companies such as Zhongxing Telecom (ZTE) or Huawei enjoyed.State support begun when the company was added to the list of companies that, according to the Chinese government, were involved in the export of Chinese culture in 2009 (Dubois de Prisque, 2011;Jedlowski, 2021).By this time, StarTimes had demonstrated that it was not only providing ICT infrastructure and services to countries around the world, but that it was also promoting Chinese culture on its platforms to the world.As an exporter of Chinese cultural products and services, the company was contributing to the rise of China's influence globally and was eligible for state funding (Dubois de Prisque, 2011).
This first phase included the installation of transmitters from Chililabombwe to Livingstone, or what is called 'the line of rail' between the Copperbelt and the Southern Provinces.Meanwhile, in order to finally catch up on the migration target, or at least begin to do so, ZNBC, in partnership with StarTimes, formed Top Star Zambia Limited as the official DTT provider.The IBA recognized and designated Top Star as the only mandated public signal distributor in Zambia.This effectively meant that the public function of the public signal distributor was surrendered to a private firm.
The Zambian government contracted a loan of US$ 273 million from the Export-Import Bank of China through StarTimes.The loan, which became a controversial matter because of the substantial amount involved and alleged corrupt practices in its contracting, was meant to complete Phase II and III ( Hedley, 2018;Malakata, 2018).Phase II and III included activities such as the modernization of ZNBC production studios, the replacement of the remaining analogue transmitters dotted across the country and the setting up of a signal distribution uplink station.Additionally, and perhaps more contentious, is that the loan agreement would be made through Top Star, which is 60 per cent owned by StarTimes and 40 per cent by ZNBC.It was agreed that Top Star would collect all ZNBC revenue from advertising and tower rentals for a period of 25 years, which was the loan period (Hedley, 2018;Malakata, 2018;Zambian Business Times, 2017).As a result of this arrangement, the broadcaster's financial situation was reported to have been dismal to the point of affecting operational costs (Hedley, 2018).Political economists would argue that the next step would be increased commercialization for the public broadcaster, since privatization is still seen as undesirable.However, the 25-year loan deal may easily be interpreted as a form of privatization, a temporal form.
The status of ZNBC as a national broadcaster is thus brought into question.The current unusual arrangement principally places StarTimes, a private corporation, at the helm of public broadcasting operations in the country.This has occurred in two stages: (1) the awarding of StarTimes the implementation of digitalized broadcasting in Zambia; and (2) the formation of Top Star and contracting a loan from China through StarTimes to enable the completion of the process.Both elements can be viewed from the context of the growing influence of China over Zambia's economy.

Controversy over ownership
Following the setting up of Top Star as the nation's signal distributor, widespread concern emerged over the commercialization and privatizing of what should have been a national entity.Ownership and control of the public signal distribution was left in the hands of a private company, at the expense of public interest.While ZNBC maintains a reasonable shareholding in Top Star (40%), the public nature of the signal carrier was nulled by the financial and resource position of StarTimes in the business arrangement.Fears that StarTimes, the interests of which are both commercial and strategic, might affect the public interest obligations of the national broadcasters were not unfounded.Further, the organizational arrangement of Top Star essentially meant that it was both a national signal distributor and a content provider (through ZNBC and other StarTimes channels), a development that was widely criticized.An intervention by Zambia's Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) helped address the outcry over Top Star's status as both content provider and public signal carrier.Afraid that 'allowing a private company to control content was putting the security of the country at risk', the CCPC assigned ZNBC the role of content provider, while Top Star would be the signal distributor (Malakata, 2018) Another example of the concerns over increased Chinese influence came to light in 2017, when ZNBC and Top Star disconnected free-to-air channels on their main competitor GOtv (MISA, 2017).MultiChoice and GOtv initially sought an injunction to restrain ZNBC and Top Star from taking this action.An injunction was granted but was later overturned.However, GOtv dropped the case and decided to instead negotiate and implement separate contracts with the free-to-air channels.By 2017, eight such agreements were made to represent eight free-to-air channels (MISA, 2017: 8).This is an example of the worrying arrangement in which the national broadcaster finds itself.
Because it has control over the state infrastructure, Top Star was able to switch off GOtv, a major competitor.It also speaks to the need for caution as Amadou Mahtar Ba warns.According to Ba, as quoted by Parker (2014), [g]overnment-controlled media should not be allowed to come and control sections of our national media or our continental media landscape'.Though StarTimes is not controlled by the government, it enjoys and maintains strong links to the Chinese government.
Recent developments also show that though Top Star is the national carrier, government bodies seem to have their hands tied on how much they can get involved in dealing with conflicts between the carrier and the content producers.For instance, early in 2019, the Media Owners Association of Zambia (MOAZ) accused Top Star of delay in switching on more licensed local stations (Lusaka Times, 2019).MOAZ stated that despite the approvals by the regulators, Top Star had failed to carry the new licensees.MOAZ's vice president, Evans Banda, argued that much of the capacity on the platform had been allocated to Chinese channels and that the carrier was mostly interested in channels that would be broadcast in Lusaka and the Copperbelt provinces.According to Banda, the 'act alone of prioritizing foreign content is tantamount to discrimination as 17 million Zambians do not understand the Chinese language being promoted on those channels' (Lusaka Times, 2019).Top Star stated that the delays were the result of various technical problems the station was still attending to.There was no public response from the regulators.

China, soft power and the media
China is not only one of the largest investors in Zambia's economy, but also one of the southern African state's biggest sources of aid (Kurlantzick, 2007: 140).While a soft power argument can be made about this growing influence, it appears that Chinese soft power is somewhat different or an extension of Nye's (2004) elucidation of the concept.According to Nye, soft power, 'the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion', also involves the efforts intended to form sustained positive attitudes about that country.However, Kurlantzick (2007) argues that above the use of public and cultural diplomacy, China has employed coercive economic and diplomatic levers such as aid and investment.As a result, countries such as Zambia have found themselves very receptive to and uncritical of Chinese influences.As Carmody (2008) posits, China has had a more developed and established 'geo-economic strategy' in Zambia that has included the provision of loans for infrastructure and investment in mining, manufacturing, construction and other sectors.
Displays of China's growing influence in Zambia are fast becoming endemic.For instance, in the run-up to the 2006 general elections, the then Chinese ambassador to Zambia Li Baodong warned of a possible break in diplomatic relations if the opposition candidate at the time, Michael Sata, was elected president.Sata had been an outspoken critic of Chinese investment and the labour practices of Chinese firms in the country.He had also on several occasions publicly stated that he would recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan, against the 'One China' policy (Reed, 2006).The ambassador's warning was both a show of strength and a call for the incumbent government led by Rupiah Banda to ensure that this break in relations did not happen.Officers with the Zambian Police failed to act against a counterfeit mineral water operation set up by Chinese nationals.It is alleged that a Chinese business leader present at the scene reminded the officers of the substantial support the police service had received from Chinese people (Tembo, 2017).
In view of this, it is not surprising that the StarTimes deal with the Zambian government and ZNBC has been a source of concern (Malakata, 2017).The company's expansion into Africa is but one of the many examples of the way China is asserting itself on the continent.Kaiman (2017) argues that StarTimes is itself a state-funded private firm that has aligned with China's ambitious foreign policy and economic agenda.By 2017, it was estimated that StarTimes had over 10 million subscribers in 14 sub-Saharan African countries (Forrester, 2017).The pay television market was long dominated by South African giant Multichoice, but that company has faced its biggest challenge yet from StarTimes, succumbing to it in some markets thanks to the latter's new and cheaper options (Mohammed, 2015).The company has successfully positioned itself as a leading technology and broadcasting firm in the implementation of digital migration, winning broadcast licences and digitalization contracts in several countries.Tom McGregor (2016), a CGTV commentator, reported that StarTimes had a reach that could cover 90 per cent Africa's population and had an enormous distribution network that included '200 brand halls, 3,000 convenience shops and 5,000 distributors'.
As Parker (2014) observes, there has been a swift increase in Chinese investment in African media in the last few years.This 'internationalisation', according to Wekesa (2013), is driven by the idea that its media must be a part of the country's 'going out' or 'go global' project (Wu, 2012;Xiaoling, 2010) that other sectors have also embarked on.This 'going out' has included activities such as 'sending strong marketing and distribution abroad; deepening knowledge of local media ecologies; inviting media practitioners to mainland China; funding outbound Chinese media, and offering media assistance to African media' (Wekesa, 2013: 64).Some of these activities have been played out in the Zambian media landscape by Chinese firms such as the Global Max Media Group (GMMG), whose interests include partnerships with radio stations and newspapers, and StarTimes in television.The role that the media could play in Sino-Africa relations has also been highlighted in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, 2006) framework.According to the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2007)(2008)(2009), 'the two sides encouraged their respective news media to play a positive role in enhancing mutual understanding and friendship'.China agreed to support training for media staff, provide staff exchanges and expand cooperation in radio and television.
It is not entirely clear whether Chinese interest in African media is roused strictly by commercial motivations.African media industries may not count as the most profitable sectors for investment.It is therefore plausible to argue that this expansionist interest is part of a larger strategy that is rooted in influence rather than profit.For Amadou Mahtar Ba of the Africa Media Initiative (AMI), as quoted by Parker (2014), this investment is not entirely for business purposes but is largely about 'strategy and geopolitics'.This expansion, Parker argues, is meant to 'complement Beijing's diplomacy, foreign aid, project investment, business links and socio-cultural programmes in Africa and to promote China's interests in the continent'.Further, Kaiman (2017) unreservedly calls out Chinese investment to argue that much of the invested billions of dollars into 'soft power' are in fact meant to convince the world of the cultural and political success of China.In other words, China's investment in media in Africa does not end at mere soft power, nor is it accidental.It is part of what can be conceived as a 'grand design' that also seeks cultural image building, increased Sino-Africa cooperation, improving its image among Africans, as well as the countering the West's domination of global news and information flows (Wasserman, 2014;Wekesa, 2013;Zhang and Mwangi, 2016).
We can also look at StarTimes and other Chinese media's expansion into Africa from the perspective of Daya Thussu's propositions on contra-flows.According to Thussu (2006: 21), there is 'evidence that global media traffic is not just one way -from the West (with the US at its core) to the rest of the world, even though it is disproportionately weighted in the favour of the former'.Thussu further notes that private media corporations, such as StarTimes with its Chinese content in this case, have been 'more successful' in fast-tracking these contra-flows in media products.However, what remains to be determined is whether the expansion of firms from the Global South into other countries in the Global South is also re-creating a form of cultural or media imperialism, or indeed cultural domination, previously seen mostly from Western media giants (Ndlovu, 2003: 298).
However, it is important to note that Chinese investment in media and communications in Zambia is yet to reach levels seen in countries such as Kenya and South Africa.In Kenya, for example, investments have included China Radio International (CRI) partnerships with local stations to establish new channels; Xinhua helping launch Africa's first mobile newspaper; the setting up of a China Central Television (CCTV) Africa news centre; and the entry in Africa of an influential English language newspaper from China, China Daily (Zhang and Mwangi, 2016).In South Africa, interests in media have included StarSat's investment in and takeover of Top TV, and holdings in News and Media SA (Madrid-Morales and Wasserman, 2018).For StarTimes, expansion into Africa is also a business strategy for it has been responsible for the majority of the digitization that African broadcasting has undergone in the last 15 years.The expansion has been necessitated by an aim 'to enable every African household to afford digital TV, watch good digital TV and enjoy the digital life' and, according to its chief executive, Pang Xinxing, provide an alternative to Western media's 'exaggerated and biased reports' about China (Kaiman, 2017).
It is also important to note how scholars such as Jedlowski (2021) and Voci and Luo (2019) are critical of approaches explaining the expansion of Chinese media in Africa solely through the lens of soft power.According to Jedlowski (2021: 1), such approaches have formed a 'top-down approach' that places China at the centre of all activities related to interactions with Africa, neglecting the role of African players in the field or other varied realities that are specific to respective countries.There is need, as Voci and Luo (2019: 8) suggest, to look past the top-down perspective and include both the bottom-up perspectives as well as 'parallel and rhizomatic interpretations' that may exist.For instance, in a chapter on the implications of China's financial interventions and investments on the transition to digital television in Africa, Abikanlu (2021) includes a brief discussion on the Zambian experience in the implementation of the migration to digital television and the interactions with StarTimes.While this discussion is welcome, its focus on Zambia's interaction with StarTimes solely from the perspective of the more recent Chinese 'going out' soft power projects is problematic.In a way, it fails to acknowledge that Zambia-China relations are not new.This relationship dates back to 1964 and has involved various infrastructural support projects such as the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, which was important for landlocked Zambia's access to the ocean (Mwanawina, 2008;Rapanyane, 2020).Further, Rapanyane (2020) argues that China's engagement in Zambia is also driven by local conditions which permit the Chinese investors to do business without any worry or instability.This takes the focus from China only and includes Zambia and the contextual arrangements there that work parallel to Chinese policies.This is an example of soft power perspectives that do not always show the full picture.Nevertheless, what is key is that they are taken in context, and they acknowledge the varied country-specific realities.

Where do we go from here?
As stated in the Digital Migration Policy (MIBS, 2014), it is crucial that the policy framework driving the management and regulation of new technologies in the broadcast sector be 'forward-looking and responsive to the changing times'.However, an assessment of the broadcasting framework in Zambia raises a number of issues.For instance, any regulations as enforced by the IBA, no matter how positive or progressive, will continually be under a self-birthed and growing cloud of cynicism and doubt because of the institution's direct linkage to the government of the day, and, by extension, the policies of the party in power.The failure of the IBA to address concerns about the status of the national signal distributor and other issues related to the newly digitalized environment give credence to this cynicism.Further, while migration has taken place, it appears that events such as the StarTimes-ZNBC partnership and the questionable loan arrangements, have gone ahead of policy and regulation.This paper examined the recent shifts and debates in the organization of the television landscape following the implementation of digital migration in Zambia.It has given a broad overview of some of the shifts in ownership and structural organization of the television landscape in Zambia following the implementation of digital migration.It has shown some of the emerging debates relating to the broadcasting policy in a digitalized environment.For example, some of the concerns arising from the surrender of the national carrier to a firm that is mostly Chinese-owned have been highlighted.These concerns about Chinese interests are valid when one considers how much power and control global media firms can wield over a national government and its agencies.As Thomas and Lee (1998: 2) observe, these global media corporations can 'enjoy an enormous leeway to negotiate and protect interest from the vantage of prior monopoly positions'.The concerns over StarTimes can also be examined in the context of debates surrounding global information and cultural flows.For the first time, more pay-television subscribers in Africa have access to international news and entertainment content that is not from predominantly Western channels or sources, as provided by the continental media giant DStv.Still, the question that begs an answer is whether the growth of StarTimes in Africa is really a problem for Africans or is it only an issue because it shifts the balance from the enduring status quo as far as information flows are concerned?
As Nyamnjoh (2004: 58) states, debates on media ownership and control 'are informed by and largely focussed on the effects of globalization and neoliberalism on media scenarios throughout the world'.As the globalization of media continues to take hold, political economists have observed an increase in the commercialization of public media, concentrated ownership of the media and a desire for firms to increase their profits and global reach (Chomsky, 1999;McChesney, 2001).The paper has shown how commercialization has been prioritized in the case of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation as it strives to meet its loan obligations.The concentration of media is however yet to be observed.
In conclusion, it remains to be seen how the various fears or hopes will play out as further changes begin to emerge.It is my argument therefore that the story of digital migration in Zambia, and Africa for the most part, is a complex one that is far from complete.Debates on critical topics such as ownership, control, regulation, China and soft power, will linger for years to come as policy makers, stakeholders and content providers grapple with the dynamism of broadcasting and the fast-changing technologies that are driving it.I also posit here that the themes discussed in this paper are reflective as well of a larger conversation on what role the state should play in broadcasting, particularly for countries in the Global South such as Zambia.This is increasingly more visible as broadcasting continues to move from being predominately state-driven to an arena where much of that state involvement is being neutralized by technologies and private investment that include local entrepreneurs and global media corporations.In this regard, future studies should consider examining the new patterns of ownership in the television landscape and the attendant issues, debates or consequences of the new ownership structures in the digitalized broadcast ecosystem.Further, there is need to consider how various emerging trends in broadcasting have interacted with the power structures within which they operate and what the implications have been or could be.