Comparing regime types – ‘most similar’ cases in East Asia

The People's Republic of China (PRC), the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of Singapore represent different types of political regimes and provide a fascinating contrast concerning their performance with regard to the global conflict between liberal democracies and autocracies. This paper examines briefly their common historical backgrounds and provides a detailed analysis of common ‘Asian’ cultural features and popular support for democracy on the micro-level. It then systematically assesses their performance concerning liberal democracy and quality, governance scores, and socio-economic development. Finally, the reactions to the Covid-19 pandemic are documented showing again specific regime characteristics. We use most recent V-Dem, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, World Values Surveys and similar data. The conclusions point to possible international consequences and the crucial position of Taiwan.


Introduction
The end of the Cold War has not led to 'the end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992) and a universal victory of liberal democracy and market-oriented economies.Instead, a new 'system competition' between different types of regimes has emerged.In this context, the 'most similar' historical, cultural and geo-political background of selected East Asian countries can shed some light on the respective strengths and weaknesses of these regimes and their future role in international politics.
In an ideal-typical way, the People's Republic of China ('closed autocracy'), the Republic of Singapore ('electoral autocracy'), the 'Special Administrative Region' (SAR) of Hong Kong ('electoral democracy') and the Republic of China (RoC, Taiwan) ('liberal democracy') until recently represented such major political system types with a 'most similar' background.This (simplified) regime classification follows the recent terminology and definitions of Luehrmann et al. (2018: 63).These types are characterized by the following criteria: (Table 1) 'Closed autocracies' comprise sub-types such as absolutist monarchies, theocratic regimes, military dictatorships and single-party totalitarian states.'Electoral autocracies' represent 'hybrid' authoritarian states with some façade democratic features.'Electoral democracies' correspond to Robert Dahl's (1971) 'polyarchy' with high levels of political participation and pluralist multi-party contestation.'Liberal democracies', finally, come closer to the democratic ideal granting basic human and social rights enforced by the rule of law and an independent judiciary.
In the following, we specify in how far the four selected cases correspond to this typology and how they foreshadow the present international system competition.This reflects a 'most similar conditionsdifferent outcomes' design (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009).In this way, the specific features of each type and their respective strengths and weaknesses become apparent.We first discuss some historical and cultural commonalities of these cases including aspects of 'Confucian' political culture and assessments of popular perceptions of regime support and evaluations on the micro-level with World Values Surveys (WVS) data.We then turn to assessments of their system characteristics and performance in crucial areas such as socio-economic development, 'good governance' and the overall functional and normative qualities of these regimes.For this purpose, we employ the latest Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data (Coppedge et al., 2022) and similar most recent UN and World Bank indicators on the macro-level.In this way we combine a 'bottom-up' (micro) and 'top-down' (macro) perspective (for such terms see Inoguchi, 2022).With the outbreak of the current Covid-19 pandemic in late 2019, the system competition has received a new dramatic twist, which we address in a special section.Based on these data and findings, we arrive at conclusions about the future viability and attractiveness (or not) of the four system types and the implications for international politics.These are particularly relevant in the renewed global conflict between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine and the increased tensions in the Taiwan Straits.

Historical background
For our present purposes, the period under consideration begins with the end of World War II and the outcome of the civil war in China in 1949.The revolutionary Communist forces led by Mao The rule of law, or liberal principles not satisfied The rule of law, and liberal principles satisfied Zedong had succeeded and Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the ruling Kuomintang party (KMT), was forced to retreat with his forces and many of his followers to the adjacent island of Taiwan.

The People's Republic of China
On the mainland, Mao founded the People's Republic of China, a Marxist-Leninist Communist regime 'with Chinese characteristics' and a state-controlled economy.After Mao's death Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 and initiated major economic reforms.This led to the creation of a mixed economy with significant market-oriented elements and an opening up towards world markets.
Politically, a new constitution was adopted in 1982 granting some autonomy to the 22 provinces under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).Some speak of a 'de facto federalism' (Zheng, 2007).The regime became 'milder' in certain ways, but massive student protests in 1989 whichencouraged by Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Uniondemanded greater democratic rights were put down with brutal force on Tiananmen Square in Beijing.Subsequently the leading role of the CCP was reasserted, with the Central Committee with about 200 members (plus alternate members) and its Polit Bureau with about 20 members as the leading decision-making bodies.As head of the party serves the Secretary General who usually also becomes China's President and Chair of the Central Military Commission, thereby combining the three most important political offices in the country.The maximum of two five-year terms for President was removed in the constitutional reform of 2018.President Xi Jinping now serves in all three positions without any term limits.Next in line as head of government is the Premier, who chairs the State Council and the respective ministries.
The 'National People's Congress' with about 3000 members is the official parliament.The latter, however, is convened only once a year.At the top of the judiciary is the 'Supreme People's Court', headed by the Chief Justice.The provinces are administered by Governors appointed by the central government.Below this level there is a multitude of prefectures, counties, townships and villages.At the local level there are regular, often competitive multi-candidate elections, originally initiated by Deng's reforms in the late 1970s.
Apart from these formal structures, the actual functioning of the various institutions is a different matter.Some portray the regime as a modern version of Confucian traditions, emphasizing its 'meritocratic' and mostly efficient and benevolent nature (Bell, 2015).Other observers are more critical and point to the rampant corruption at many levels and the rent-seeking behaviour of many incumbents (Pei, 2016).This seems to be especially prevalent at the regional and local levels.Competitive elections at the village level are apparently insufficient for curtailing corruption and malfeasance (O'Brien and Zhao, 2014).The official authority to deal with this problem lies with the 'Discipline Inspection Commissions', but even these are often used by higher ranks to forestall the rise of potential political rivals.Other possible checks such as independent media or effective civil society organizations are non-existent or severely curtailed.This has led not only to waste and inefficiency, but also to expressions of local and regional discontent.
Nevertheless, economically China's model since Deng's reforms has been successful with very high growth, industrialization, urbanization and literacy rates.It also has created a new affluent middle class.This has fostered a more general acceptance and de facto legitimacy of the regime as long as it is able to keep the 'authoritarian bargain' of improving living conditions for large parts of the population under strict control by the ruling party.At the same time, the regime applies severe forms of crackdownincluding torture and killingson actual or perceived opposition by political dissidents as well as ethnic and religious minorities such as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province or Buddhists in Tibet (UNCHR, 2022;Yang, 2018).
Today, the PRC is not only the most populous country on Earth (with about 1.4 billion inhabitants), but also the third largest economy after the US and the EU in terms of nominal gross domestic product (GDP).In terms of 'purchasing power parities', China is even ahead; per capita GDP, however, is still much lower.On the downside are high levels of pollution and ecological degradation as well as strongly increasing social inequality.Under Xi, China attempts to extend its international influence and assert its strength vis-à-vis its neighbours, most notably Taiwan.Military expenditure has risen enormously, and China has become a formidable military power.The 'Road and Belt Initiative' has been created as the modern 'silk road' to forge new ties with sympathetic regimes around the world providing credit and technical support for infrastructure projects.At the same time, the creation of 'Confucius Institutes' in many countries and at many universities serves as 'soft power' to enhance its influence (Benner et al., 2018).
The most recent step to cement President Xi's position was the third 'Historical Resolution' passed by the Central Committee in November 2021 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiachina-59229935).This puts him on a par with the first historical resolution passed on behalf of Mao Zedong consolidating his leadership in 1945 and the second endorsing Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 1981.Together with the removal of presidential term limits in 2018, this increases the focus on Xi and the accompanying increasing personality cult (for a strong critique by a former insider see Cai, 2022).Such a strong concentration of power can, however, lead to a 'system overload' as in Soviet times and severe succession problems.We cannot go into details here, but the comparisons in the section 'Macro-level analyses' below will provide a more balanced picture of the overall regime performance.

Republic of China (Taiwan)
When Chiang Kai-shek arrived in December 1949 he brought with him about 2 million emigrants.The main island and some smaller surrounding ones originally had been settled by groups of Polynesian descent, followed later in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Han Chinese immigrants from the mainland.Today's population is about 23 million.Formally, Chiang Kai-shek's government claimed to represent the RoC, founded in 1912 after over 2000 years of Imperial rule.The regime was recognized by many countries and occupied the seat of China in the Security Council of the UN.Only with the change of the US China policy under President Nixon in 1971 did the PRC take this seat.International recognition of the RoC and formal diplomatic relations meanwhile have dwindled, but many states maintain liaison offices and consulates.To impose his rule, Chiang Kai-shek declared a state of martial law.In the beginning, this created a period of 'White Terror' and the elimination of many actual or suspected KMT opponents.The KMT maintained its single-party authoritarian rule until 1986 when the first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was allowed to be founded.Martial law was finally lifted in 1987.
After widespread popular protests led by students (the 'Wild Lilly movement') in 1990, elections to the Legislative Yuan (parliament) were held for the first time in 1991, followed by the first competitive presidential elections in 1996.The KMT was able to maintain its lead until 2000, when the DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian was elected.Chen attempted to normalize the international status of the country, giving up the formal claim to represent all of China, but a referendum failed to achieve the necessary quorum.After some corruption scandals triggered widespread protests (the 'Red Shirt Movement'), the KMT was returned to power in 2008 with Ma Ying-jeou becoming the first female president.In this period, trade relations with the mainland improved and direct mutual travel became possible.The official 'Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement' initiated by President Ma in her second term in 2014, however, ran into strong opposition from groups of protesters fearing a threat to Taiwan's independent and democratic status.The 'Sunflower Movement' succeeded and in the 2016 legislative and presidential elections the DPP was returned to power under President Tsai Ing-wen.(Hsu and Chen, 2017).This was seen by Beijing as a threat to its unification hopes and the CCP launched a massive cyber smear campaign against her.This, however, backfired and mobilized strong support for President Tsai, who was re-elected in the 2020 elections by a landslide (Hartnett and Su, 2021).
In this way, Taiwan has become what can be termed a consolidated 'liberal democracy'.In the meantime, Taiwan had become one of the fastest growing economies.It became known, together with Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, as one of the 'Asian Tigers'.Today, Taiwan is one of the most technologically advanced countries in the world.
The international status of the island still remains disputed.The PRC considers Taiwan to be one of its provinces with its declared 'One China' policy.The majority of islanders today, however, insist on a separate identity and international sovereignty founded on basic human rights and democratic legitimacy in the tradition of Sun Yat-sen, the first provisional president of the Republic of China and the first leader of Kuomintang.As such, he is still revered as the 'Father of the Nation' in the RoC and as 'Forerunner of the Revolution' in the PRC.A Sun Yat-sen Memorial has also been established in Singapore, indicating the common historical and cultural links.In particular, the democratic aspect is the main raison d'être for Taiwan's present independent status that, however, remains threatened by President Xi's aggressive stance and a possible 'Crimean solution' à la Putin (Chu and Chang, 2018).At present, only the continuing military presence of the US and its allies in the region can guarantee this status (Ringen, 2018).

Hong Kong
The island of Hong Kong became a British colony after the end of the first Opium War in 1842.The territory was later extended to include the adjacent peninsula of Kowloon.A 99-year lease agreement with Britain in 1898 added some 'new territories' on the mainland.When the lease expired in 1997, Hong Kong came under the authority of the PRC as an SAR.In a joint Sino-British declaration negotiated with Deng Xiao-ping in 1984, China guaranteed to maintain the independent economic and political status for another 50 years after the transfer (i.e. until 2047) under the formula 'one countrytwo systems'.
Under British rule, Hong Kong became a major port and, after World War II, an important financial and industrial centre as the first of the Asian 'tigers'.When the end of the lease approached, governmental and administrative reforms were introduced by the outgoing colonial administration to safeguard the rule of law and the autonomous status.The existing Legislative Council became fully elective for the first time in 1995.Hong Kong is formally governed under the 'Basic Law' agreed upon in the Joint Declaration.The Chief Executive replaced the Governor and appoints the Executive Council (cabinet) and principal officials.The Chief Executive is appointed by the Chinese State Council after nomination by the local Election Committee of business and community leaders.The Legislative Council has 70 members, half of whom are directly elected in geographical constituencies; 30 more in 'functional constituencies' represent business and other special interest groups; the remaining five come from members of Hong Kong's 18 District Councils.
The SAR has maintained a separate jurisdiction based on the traditions of British common law (Young and Cullen, 2010).
The special status of SAR has a number of advantages for the PRC.Hong Kong is a major hub for international trade and financial relations.The port is the most important container terminal for the industrial southern China region.International capital transfers are freely possible.The Hong Kong Dollar is convertible and linked by a currency board to the US dollar within a small range of exchange rates.Many international banks and companies keep their headquarters or offices and highly qualified staff in the SAR.
The standard of living is among the highest in the world.This prosperity, however, also has its downsides with extremely high housing costs owing to the limited territory.Socio-economic inequality is favoured by a tax system with very low company and income taxes and no taxes on capital returns.The Gini index of 0.47 is considerably higher than in Singapore (0.36) or the US (0.39) (World Bank, 2020).
Social inequality and increasing political pressure from the PRC under Xi since 2012 have led to several waves of protest.Attempts by Beijing to implement a pre-screening of candidates for the Chief Executive triggered massive protests by the 'Umbrella Movement' in 2014 (Bland, 2017).These were followed by even greater protests of over a million people in 2019 directed against a proposed Extradition Amendment Bill, which would allow the extradition of fugitives to mainland China.In spite of this pressure, a strong civil society has emerged comprising many strata and groups favouring democratic and emancipatory values (Ma, 2018).
In the course of time, the citizens of Hong Kong have developed a distinct identity, which is reinforced by the repressive measures introduced by the PRC.A survey in 2019 by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme (now closed under political pressure) showed that 53% of the adult population identified themselves as 'Hongkongers', and only 11% as 'Chinese'.Some 71% declared 'not to feel proud of becoming a national citizen of China' (https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/).On the mainland, this has led to reciprocal reactions, the formula 'One Country -Two Nationalisms' seems more apt today.In March 2021, a new electoral law was passed by the National People's Congress of the PRC that all candidates for the Chief Executive, the Legislative Council and the Election Committee will be pre-selected to ensure that 'only patriots should govern Hong Kong'.This, at the latest, has turned Hong Kong from an 'electoral democracy' into a very special 'electoral autocracy'.

Singapore
In 1819, Sir Stamford Raffles, as representative of the British colonial administration, arrived on Singapore island.The island possessed a natural deep harbour and fresh water supplies, but was scarcely populated.He realized the potential of the port as an important trading post on a major shipping route and concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Johor, the nominal ruler.In 1824 the entire island became a permanent possession of the British East India Company.Merchant houses were set up mainly by European trading firms.The population greatly, increased including many immigrants from mainland China who had fled the hardships of the Opium Wars and served as labourers.During World War II Singapore was occupied by Japanese forces, but with the defeat of Japan in 1945 the status of a British Crown Colony was re-established.
Increasing political turmoil in the course of de-colonization led to an agreement with the elected Chief Minister to grant full internal self-government in 1958.The first elections to the Legislative Assembly in 1959 were won by the People's Action Party (PAP) under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, who became the first Prime Minister.He favoured a merger with Malaya to benefit the economy by creating a common market.Ethnic tensions and race riots between the Malay and Chinese parts of the population, however, led to a separation in 1965 and the independent Republic of Singapore was created.
The new state to some extent followed the Westminster model with a parliamentary system and a Prime Minister as head of the executive.The President has largely ceremonial roles.The unicameral parliament is elected by a 'first past the post' majoritarian system.In addition to directly elected MPs in single-member constituencies, some Group Representation Constituencies of between three and six members were created, of which at least one must represent a minority ethnic group of Malay, Indian or similar descent.Up to nine nominated MPs can also be appointed by the President.Furthermore, up to six Non-Constituency Members can be appointed from opposition parties.
Since independence the PAP has held the vast majority of seats in all elections.In the course of time elections have become somewhat more competitive.In the latest (2020) election, 10 candidates from the biggest opposition party, the 'Workers Party', were elected or nominated.The PAP with a vote share of 61.2% gained 83 of the 93 seats.The second largest opposition party, the 'Singapore Democratic Party', with 10.2% of the votes, was given two Non-Constituency Member seats.There was a record number of women candidates with 28 of them succeeding.
This complicated pattern of representation has been created to reflect the multi-ethnic and multireligious composition of society on the one hand, but also the continuing dominance of the PAP on the other.Similarly, the executive has always been dominated by the PAP. Lee Kuan Yew as the first Prime Minister served from 1965 to 1990 (and continued as 'Senior Minister' and 'Mentor').He was succeeded by his deputy Goh Chok Tong, serving until 2004.Goh was succeeded by Lee Hsien Loong, the eldest son of Lee Kuan Yew, the current Prime Minister.After an amendment to the constitution in 2017, the President was directly elected for the first time under a system ensuring the representation of minority ethnic groups.Under this rule, Halimah Yacob from the Malay community was elected unopposed.
The judiciary is formally independent, but the judges are appointed by the President.The judicial regime in Singapore is quite harsh, including caning for minor offences.The death penalty by hanging is enforced for serious crimes such as murder, but also for drug trafficking.Nevertheless, the judiciary has a reputation of being mostly fair and impartial and is ranked high on rule of law and control of corruption indices.In terms of crime control, Singapore is one of the safest countries in Asia and worldwide.
The country has a population of about 5.7 million, mostly with Chinese (about 75%), Malay (13%) and Indian (9%) backgrounds.Linguistically, however, these communities are internally diverse.English, Mandarin Chinese, Malay and Tamil are the official languages.Religious affiliations reflect these ethnic patterns.A large majority of Chinese profess some attachment to Confucianism, Buddhism or Daoism; the Malay and some Indians are Muslims; there is also a sizeable Christian community and a number of persons without religious affiliation.In addition, there is a large group of foreign workers of about 1.3 million mainly from Malaysia, India, China and the Philippines, most of whom have low-paid jobs in industry, the construction sector or households.
The economic performance of Singapore has been spectacular over the last decades.From a poor 'Third World' place, it has become a First World country.It is now a major trade and financial hub and a popular tourist destination.State-owned enterprises play a substantial role.The port is the second busiest in the world in terms of cargo tonnage.Today Singapore is ranked near the top of Human Development indices (see below).However, it is not only the high rate of GDP growth, but also the provision of welfare measures like public housing schemes for large parts of the population, and excellent health and education systems, which have contributed to Singapore's rather unique ratings.
All of this reflects the thinking and the active political involvement of the founding father of the country, Lee Kuan Yew.As hardly any other person, he has shaped his country.In a way he combined both Chinese (Confucian meritocratic) and British backgrounds and values.From the Chinese side he inherited a strong family orientation and a paternalistic leadership style, aiming at consensual forms of conflict resolution.As a lawyer trained in Britain, he upheld values of public and personal integrity and the rule of law.In practical politics, having experienced communist uprisings in Singapore in the 1950s, he was staunchly anti-communist, but also anti-communalist, fearing ethnic and racial conflicts in the multi-ethnic society.He despised both Western and communist ideologies, preferring a hands-on pragmatism for resolving many concrete problems (Lee, 2013;Plate, 2013).
This success, however, has also its downsides.Some observers doubt whether the 'model' of highly personal authoritarian rule combined with an open capitalist economy is sustainable in the long run.Some 'temptations' among parts of the present leadership seem to have crept in to look after their own well-being.There have also been allegations of money-laundering.Social inequality in terms of the Gini index (45.9) is high.Likewise, the living conditions for the foreign work force are very poor.Increasing levels of general prosperity and higher levels of education have led to demands for less state control and more participation by the younger generation.

Historical cultural background
The four selected cases share some common cultural features.These include traditional beliefs and influences of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism and some syncretistic versions thereof.Each of these traditions has its own history of influential teachers, such as Confucius (551-479 BCE), Lao Tzu, who is the attributed author of Tao Te Ching dated to the late fourth century BCE, and Buddha, born as Siddhartha Gautama in Northern India in the fourth or fifth century BCE.For reasons of space, we cannot go into any details here.
Confucianism, which today is still widely followed in East Asia, emphasizes the importance of the family and social harmony.In its worldly concerns, it focuses on the cultivation of individual virtue in a morally organized world.It contributes to the achievement of motivation in everyday life and served as the basis for the meritocratic examination system in Imperial China.Some authors attribute the more recent success of the 'East Asian tigers' to this cultural influence.At the same time, Confucianism may have contributed to more obedient orientations towards political authorities, which, however, were expected to live up to such moral principles themselves.
In modern times, especially, the compatibility or not of such 'Asian values' with contemporary liberal democracies has been disputed.In particular, it was the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir bin Mohamad, who proclaimed that Asian values are different from 'Western' ones, justifying his authoritarian regime in this way.He was strongly contradicted by others, most prominently Sen (1999), who insisted on the universality of liberal democratic values in today's world.As mentioned above, for the cases considered here, the teachings of Sun Yat-sen have been particularly influential.His guiding principles are, indeed, compatible with modern liberal democracy, building on several strands of Confucianism and similar influences.
Against this background, we now turn to the most recent empirical findings in this respect.

Database
We use the seven waves of the WVS from 1981 to 2020.They are representative of the adult population (18+ years).For our East Asian comparisons, we have included two liberal democracies: Japan as a longer established and South Korea as a recent democracy.To provide a cross-regional perspective, Sweden was added as a long-established European democracy. 1 The WVS cover 113 countries, albeit not for all waves.On the basis of such data, Inglehart and Welzel (2005)

Family values, secular orientation and interpersonal trust
The Asian Values thesis has largely focused on family ties.Importance ascribed to the family, trust in family members and making parents proud are equally high in all of the cases considered here (Table 2).The wish to please one's parents and an unconditional deference to parents' authority are  Berg-Schlosser and Hoffmann-Lange traditional values.In modern societies, they give way to less hierarchical intra-familial relations and accord children more autonomy.These two values are especially widespread in Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea.Interestingly, China has a somewhat lower share of deference.Japan's share is even lower, although it is still much higher than that in Sweden.Thus, family values are indeed more deeply entrenched in East Asia, regardless of socio-economic development.
The results for Secularism, Welzel's second dimension, reveal a more differentiated pattern (Figure 1).
The share of respondents with a secular orientation is very high in China, Hong Kong and Japan.South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have a higher degree of religious diversity.Ancestor worship and Confucianism differ from other religions by not having an over-arching organizational structure.Therefore, the number of people without organizational ties to a religion is rather high.The cultural imprint of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism has weakened in recent decades.Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 256) emphasized that interpersonal trust is an important societal resource because it influences the formation of personal social networks that transcend people's primary social environment (family, friends) and ties them to their wider social and political community.Those who distrust other people tend to limit their contacts to their in-group and are less likely to engage in collective action.Interpersonal trust encourages people to form or join politically active groups or parties, even in authoritarian systems.Putnam (1993) emphasized that such inclusive social networks constitute an important social capital.
Welzel (2013) operationalized generalized trust by asking for three different types of trust.Close trust refers to family members and primary groups.Unspecific trust is the conviction that people are generally trustworthy.Remote trust involves trust in strangers and people with a different cultural or religious background.Welzel combined the questions for the three levels into his Index of generalized trust.
Table 3 shows that close trust is very high in all seven countries, while unspecific trust and especially remote trust have considerably lower scores.In China both close trust and unspecific trust are quite high.At the same time, it has the lowest score for remote trust.This may be due to political restrictions on personal contacts with foreigners.Japan and South Korea traditionally have been more secluded, too, and have lower levels of remote trust.Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore with their more open societies show higher levels.With respect to Putnam's theory of social capital, remote trust is the most important of these indicators.Therefore, China, Japan and South Korea provide the least favourable environment for a strong and open-minded civil society.This has not, however, prevented some strong protest movements in the past.
Emancipative value orientations: Support for a free choice of lifestyle and gender equality Tolerance of different lifestyles (choice) and equality of women are two core indices of emancipative values.Since the theory of value change posits that such values have considerably increased over the past 40 years with socio-economic development and educational expansion, Figure 2 shows the trend curve for the Choice Index.While choice values have continuously increased in Sweden from 0.49 to 0.83 and in Japan from 0.28 to 0.57, this has not happened in the other East Asian countries.In China, tolerance of different lifestyles has even decreased, from 0.29 to 0.20.The scores indicate that a traditional disapproval of homosexuality, abortion and divorce is still widespread.While all three behaviours are no longer criminalized, homosexuality in particular is only tolerated, but politically stigmatized in China and Singapore.Equality of women is legally guaranteed in the seven countries (World Bank, 2019).Public support for gender equality trails these legal advances, however.In the most recent survey wave, it ranged between 0.46 in South Korea and 0.64 in Singapore, while it reached 0.92 in Sweden.
Overall, the data do not justify the optimism of value change theory regarding a steady rise of emancipative values.The theory predicts a strong cohort effect based on the assumption that value change proceeds slowly and increases from older cohorts that grew up under more adverse economic conditions to younger cohorts growing up under better auspices and being more highly educated.The results based on all seven survey waves suggest different cohort effects in the different countries.The effect is fairly strong in Taiwan and Japan, with an increase of more than 0.30.In China, the oldest cohort is the most tolerant, while later cohorts have slightly lower values.
Since figures following cohorts over several survey waves cannot be shown for all seven countries, the following analysis is limited to China and Taiwan.A comparison of Figures 3 and 4 reveals that the cohort effect is considerably stronger in Taiwan where the trend lines for the seven cohorts are clearly distinguishable.This development confirms Inglehart's original theory of value change.China shows an inverse period effect.After a slight increase from survey wave two to wave three, the line goes sharply down and has rebounded only moderately between waves 5 and 7.This development suggests that Chinese respondents do not have stable personal convictions regarding these matters.
The different pattern for Taiwan suggests that strong cohort effects can be expected primarily in times of rapid socio-political change.The swift development of Taiwan's political system from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democracy, which was accompanied by strong economic growth, resembles the development of West European countries after World War II, which Inglehart used as prime examples for demonstrating the validity of his theory.How much support is there for democracy?
Finally, we wanted to know how much support democracy can muster among the publics in the six countries.The general ideal of democracy enjoys high and stable support, even in the PRC where it is qualified by 'Chinese characteristics'.The picture changes, however, once we consider steadfast support for democracy.Our index support for democracy is based on independent ratings of democracy and of two non-democratic regime types: rule by an autocratic leader, who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, or a military regime.The index was constructed by subtracting the higher score for one of the authoritarian regime types from the score assigned to democracy.This index has a range from −1 to +1.Positive scores imply that respondents expressed a preference for democracy.This is a demanding index in the sense that it requires respondents to explicitly reject non-democratic alternatives.Similar measures have been suggested by other authors (Diamond, 2008: 31-34;Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 253).
Figure 5 shows the trend in support for democracy.Sweden's scores range between 0.55 and 0.67.Japan has the highest scores (0.39-0.48) among the East Asian cases.The others show some variation, but no substantial increase.Singapore's scores decreased from 0.39 in survey wave 4 to only 0.22 in wave 6, before they increased again to 0.40.Hong Kong's and China's scores are even lower, they fluctuated over time and reached 0.27, and 0.15 in wave 7. Taiwan's curve points downward, too, with a steady decline from 0.24 to 0.12.South Korea started out with relatively high scores close to 0.40 in the third wave (1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998) and experienced dramatic declines thereafter.This indicates that the more recent democracies of South Korea and Taiwan do not show an increase in public support for democracy.Instead, they have fallen back rather than catching up.In fact, the scores of Singapore, an electoral autocracy, have meanwhile surpassed them.In the case of South Korea this may be due to a series of political scandals involving, among others, President Park Geun-hye, serving from 2012 to 2017 until she was impeached and convicted for charges of corruption.In any case, the WVS do not capture the most recent developments where in Taiwan the increasingly aggressive rhetoric from mainland China under President Xi apparently has led to stronger support for the regime and President Tsai, who was re-elected in 2020.
The differences between the countries become even more instructive if we look at Table 4 based on the results of the most recent survey.The index of support for democracy is here trichotomized to distinguish respondents with a preference for an authoritarian regime or a preference for democracy, and indifferent respondents who provided nearly identical ratings for both.It shows similar patterns for Chinese and Taiwanese respondents.About two-fifths of them indicate a preference for democracy.In case of the former that must be qualified again by an understanding of 'democracy with Chinese characteristics'.Hong Kong and Japan are clearly on the democratic side.South Korea is a negative outlier: more than 25% of the respondents indicated a preference for an authoritarian regime, while two-fifths did not reveal a clear-cut regime preference.
A final analysis tried to determine factors explaining support for democracy.For the multiple regression we included two macro-level variables, the classification as liberal democracy and a high GDP per capita (see the sections 'Historical cultural background' and 'Emancipative value orientations: Support for a free choice of lifestyle and gender equality' above).We also attempted to determine the effect of five micro-level variables (according to Inglehart's and Welzel's (2005) theory of human development): Support for a free choice of lifestyle, the importance of making one's parents proud, a secular orientation, an intrinsic understanding of democracy based on the extent to which respondents associated democracy with free elections, equal rights for women, the protection of civil rights and the importance of living in a democracy (Table 5).
Altogether, the explanatory power of these variables (as expressed by r 2 ) is relatively low.They explain only 16% of the total variance.The choice index shows the second-strongest influence, although its b coefficient is lower than the theory of value change predicts.This confirms the persistence of regional cultural traditions.An intrinsic understanding of democracy and the importance assigned to living in a democracy achieve similarly high coefficients.This indicates that a deeper understanding of the benefits of democratic rights for citizens decreases the belief in the merits of autocratic regimes.
In sum, this is in line with broader findings which show that the more recent democracies worldwide generally enjoy lower public support than the longer-established ones (Hoffmann-Lange and Berg-Schlosser, 2022).This is not really surprising because a 'congruence' between political structures and political culture necessarily takes time (Eckstein, 1988).In many instances democratization has occurred 'from above' (as in West Germany or Japan after World War II) or because of other external circumstances, as in Eastern Europe after 1990.Among the cases considered here, this is confirmed by Japan's scores.In contrast, the long-term democratizing effects 'from below' as propagated by Welzel have been quite weak.

Macro-level analyses
In this section the major regime characteristics of the four cases are discussed in greater detail.These are their democratic components and 'qualities' (or not) since the latest 'wave' of democratization in 1990.This is followed by assessments of their 'governance' performance and overall socio-economic development.

Components of liberal democracy
We first present the major elements of liberal democracy in the East Asian regional context.This is done with the help of the most recent V-Dem data and graphic illustrations (https://www.v-dem.net/en).V-Dem is based on a broad range of expert judgements both from inside and outside the respective countries.The indices can also be disaggregated to their specific components and different levels of analysis (national, sub-national, local).The development of 'electoral democracies' over the last three decades is shown in Figure 6: As can be seen, Sweden and Japan (which have been added here for comparative purposes) constantly are at the top and China at the bottom of this index.The regional average increased somewhat.Taiwan considerably improved, Singapore remained stable at a higher level than the PRC and Hong Kong declined recently.
The electoral democracy index consists of five components: freedom of association, freedom of expression and alternative sources of information, clean election index, percentage of population with suffrage and elected officials.For the more demanding 'liberal democracy' index three more components are added: rule of law, judicial constraints on the executive and legislative constraints on the executive (Coppedge et al. (2022), V-Dem Codebook, p.45).The development of liberal democracy is presented in Figure 7.
Here, the contrasts are even sharper showing, in particular, more differentiation recently at the upper end.These developments can be specified more closely according to the eight components of this index and the total index numbers for the four system types.These are listed in Table 6.It becomes apparent that things have not changed very much on most of these dimensions in the PRC.In particular, alternative sources of information and judicial restraints on the executive have decreased further.Hong Kong shows considerable declines for all components.Freedom of information and association has suffered considerably, the rule of law is in danger and elections are no longer free and fair.In Singapore the media, freedom of association, and most importantly, elections remain restricted; the rule of law has been maintained.Taiwan is the shining example of a successful transition to democracy and can be considered to be largely consolidated with a strong rule of law component.

Elements of democratic quality
In addition to these elements of a 'liberal democracy', concerns about the overall 'quality' of democracy and the good functioning and performance of democratic systems have become more pronounced (Diamond and Morlino, 2005).Such criteria include basic democratic values such as liberty and equality, broad-based participation and party competition, horizontal (inter-institutional) and vertical (elected incumbentssociety) accountability, and the rule of law (Morlino et al., 2017, chapter 6).The precise values are reported in Table 7.
Here, too, the values for China have remained mostly stable at low levels.In particular, both horizontal and vertical accountability have negative values.Similarly civil liberties and the rule of law are very low.Hong Kong shows a recent decline of civil liberties and horizontal and vertical accountability, but remains at higher levels than the PRC.The values for Singapore remained stable at a considerably higher level than in the PRC, with some improvements of horizontal and vertical accountability and, in particular, party competition.Taiwan, once more, is the showcase with significant improvements on all dimensions over the last three decades.

Governance indicators
As elsewhere, the state of democracy is related to actual governmental processes and performance.The World Bank 'good governance' data cover this aspect.These data comprise indices of 'government effectiveness' (the quality of the bureaucracy and public services), 'regulatory burden' (market-unfriendly policies like price and trade controls), 'graft' (the exercise of public power for private gain) including various forms of corruption, nepotism or clientelism, and 'political stability' or its opposite, the extent of social unrest and violence.(Table 8) For China, the values are negative for the entire period on almost all dimensions.The indicator for voice and accountability is especially low; government effectiveness has improved over the last decade.Hong Kong shows high values for control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and the rule of law.Only voice and accountability and, in particular, political stability (reflecting the massive street demonstrations) have declined.Singapore has even higher figures, except for the negative score on voice and accountability.The values for Taiwan indicate considerable improvements over time.The figure for voice and accountability is the only high one among our cases.
Taken altogether, these measures justify the classification of the PRC as a harsh 'closed autocracy', the continuing status of Singapore as an 'electoral autocracy' with a strong rule of law, the decline of Hong Kong from a 'guarded' electoral democracy to a special electoral autocracy, and finally, the consolidation of liberal democracy in Taiwan.As competitors, these regime types also have to be evaluated concerning such important material dimensions as socio-economic development, ecological sustainability and policies coping with climate change, and most recently, the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Socio-economic performance
In empirical democratic theory a strong relationship between the level of socio-economic development and the emergence and sustainability of democracy in modern times has been emphasized: the famous 'Lipset hypothesis' (Lipset, 1959;Przeworski et al., 2000).As mentioned, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan belong to the group of East Asian 'tigers' which had rapid rates of economic  1996 2000 2010 2020 1996 2000 2010 2020 1996 2000 2010 2020 1996 2000  growth in the 1970s and 1980 s. Of these only Taiwan, however, followed the expected pattern: strong economic development followed by successful democratization (as also in South Korea).Hong Kong remained a case of limited democracy, first under British and now under PRC tutelage.Singapore developed its own model of successful socio-economic development under continuing authoritarian auspices.Mainland China is a latecomer in many ways.In spite of significant recent economic advances, it does not show any sign of authoritarian 'softening'.
Here, we assess the performance of these regimes with the 'Human Development Index' (HDI) compiled by the United Nations Development Programme.This index combines gross national income per capita measured in 'purchasing power parity', levels of education and average life expectancy at birth.This is a more meaningful index than GDP per capita alone.The respective values are presented in Table 9.
The HDI initially was highest in Taiwan, closely followed by Hong Kong and Singapore, with the PRC lagging far behind.By now, the three 'tigers' have continued their advance on all dimensions with Hong Kong ranking fourth worldwide in 2019.The PRC has caught up considerably with the highest growth rate over the last three decades.Nevertheless, the PRC is only ranked 85th worldwide.
Successful performance in these domains can considerably contribute to the long-time support of any regime ('specific support' in Easton's (1965) terms).However, material conditions alone do not determine political developments.Acemoglu and Robinson (2019), for example, emphasize that successful polities need to uphold a balance between a strong state and a strong civil society.This implies that an all-powerful state will not be able to generate long-term legitimacy among citizens.
A dramatic test of regime performance: Covid-19 2 In December 2019 an unknown infectious lung disease was detected in the City of Wuhan in Hubei Province in China.It quickly spread and was transmitted by travellers to neighbouring countries and Europe in the first months of 2020.The World Health Organization coined the term Covid-19 for this infection.In March 2020 it was officially declared a pandemic by World Health Organization.
In the meantime, it has become a worldwide phenomenon on an unprecedented scale.It has infected more than 500 million persons and caused more than 6 million deaths in all parts of the world (figures for May 2022).For our four cases, this natural experiment was a litmus test for specific features of these system types and presents important evidence for the global democracy vs. autocracy system competition.
In our four cases the situation developed as shown in Figure 8.As can be seen, the pandemic was contained relatively successfully (compared e.g. with Europe or the US) in the four cases until late 2021 in Singapore and early 2022 in the other cases.Hong Kong, and especially Taiwan, have shown the most dramatic increases recently.
A similar picture is shown by the cumulative number of deaths (Figure 9).The situation became most dramatic in Hong Kong in early 2022, followed by Singapore and Taiwan.Mainland China has fared better.Detailed figures of total confirmed cases and deaths are provided in Table 10.
All such figures, however, have to be taken with a grain of salt since the testing and reporting of cases and the precise diagnoses of deaths vary greatly from country to country and are by themselves an indicator of regime openness and transparency.In the following, we look at this situation in greater detail, taking into account the reactions and measures taken in each case.
In the PRC an immediate top-down 'Zero-Covid' strategy was followed.The City of Wuhan and other major cities in Hubei Province were subjected to a complete lockdown which lasted almost Education index is an average of mean years of schooling (of adults) and expected years of schooling (of children).
Berg-Schlosser and Hoffmann-Lange three months.All schools, non-essential companies, public transport, airports and major highways were closed.Only one person from each household was permitted to go outside for provisions once every two days.Other provinces and major cities soon followed.A strict health monitoring system   The PRC thus clearly had the strictest measures in the observed period, followed by Singapore.Hong Kong and Taiwan remained more lenient.Other measures such as mask policies and social distancing were more generally accepted, reflecting some cultural traditions in these regards.
In early 2022 Hong Kong, which was not as secluded from the outside world as mainland China, was severely hit by the wave of the recent Omicron variant.The number of confirmed cases and related deaths increased dramatically.Hospital capacities and other health resources quickly  Berg-Schlosser and Hoffmann-Lange reached their limits and strict measures were imposed (https://www.coronavirus.gov.hk/eng/index.html).Given the many links between Hong Kong and the mainland, the spread of this wave could not be prevented.At the end of March 2022, the City of Shanghai including the major harbour were subjected to a complete lockdown for almost two months.In May 2022 the capital of Beijing was affected as well.The number of cases and deaths spread almost countrywide.The Chinese lockdowns have severely hampered domestic and international supply chains and industrial production.
Unemployment has risen and many temporary workers have been left without any compensating welfare measures.For the first time in many years, open street protests could be observed.The situation is further aggravated by the fact that, in spite of high vaccination rates, the locally produced vaccines such as Sinovac are much less effective than their Western counterparts (Biontech, Moderna etc.).It seems that the Covid genie has escaped from the bottle and can no longer be contained by the Zero-Covid policy.
Comparatively speaking, Singapore has taken a middle road in coping with the pandemic.The numbers of confirmed cases and Covid-related deaths per million people were higher than in China and, until recently, in Taiwan, but less than in Hong Kong.The imposed restrictions were also less severe (Figures 10 and 11).The situation was helped by the fact that Singapore has a well-developed health system and, as a tropical country, a longer experience with serious virus infections such as the SARS-CoV-1 pandemic in 2002/2003.Concerning the Omicron variant, the government has issued a new list of measures which, however, are less restrictive than those in China (https://www.moh.gov.sg/news-highlights/details/resetting-our-measuresto-live-with-the-omicron-v).
Taiwan for most of the period also followed a Zero-Covid policy.In contrast to the PRC, however, this was not done in a simply repressive top-down manner, but involved local governments, private enterprises and citizens, which were jointly engaged in the National Epidemic Prevention Team (Hsie et al., 2021).In addition, various innovative digital tools were introduced to distribute real-time health information, track individuals subjected to home quarantine and facilitate international border controls for inbound passengers before arrival.Social acceptance thus remained high and trust and cooperation with the government continued (Lee, 2021).Being situated on an island, as was Singapore, was also a facilitating factor.In March 2022, in spite of the Omicron variant, the government announced a new strategy as a possible 'exit' from the pandemic.This explains the sudden rise of confirmed cases in Figure 9. Travel restrictions and contact tracing were relaxed, mild cases isolated at home and close contacts needed only to be quarantined for three days instead of 10.In this way, a return to a more normal life could be achieved.The number of Covid-related deaths has increased as well (Figure 10).The situation remains under observation and Premier Su Tseng-chang said that the virus 'would not be allowed to spread unchecked' (https://time.com/6174132/taiwan-Covid-strategy/).It is too early to judge the final result of this strategy, but it shows the prudent approach that the government has taken all along, in stark contrast to the dramatic repression in the PRC.

Conclusions
The four 'most similar' regime types present a most interesting and highly topical comparison for the 'system competition' in today's world.On the micro-level, a broader influence of East Asian historical traditions and values could be observed.These show a strong emphasis on family ties and family values, social trust confined mostly to people personally known, and relatively high secularism with regard to religious beliefs and practices.More recent emancipative value orientations, support for free choice of lifestyle and gender equality exhibit a mixed picture.Choice of lifestyle has increased somewhat in Singapore and Hong Kong, but decreased in China.In contrast, gender equality has become more widely accepted, in particular in Taiwan, but remains generally below that in Western countries.Similarly, popular support for democracy is generally weaker, even in Taiwan, and strongest in Hong Kong.Preferences for authoritarian regimes remain relatively high.Recent events in Hong Kong and Taiwan are not, however, reflected in our WVS data.
Altogether, such 'Asian Values' do not stand in the way of a more successful democratization, as demonstrated in Taiwan.Rather, some (slow) assimilation seems to take place as in other parts of the world.The teachings of Sun Yat-sen already pointed in this direction.Nevertheless, the road to a more profound liberal democratic culture, even in cases like South Korea and Taiwan, still seems to be a long one.
By and large, the strong performance on many dimensions at the macro-level (quality of democracy, good governance, socio-economic development and, dramatically, coping with the Covid pandemic) demonstrated the strength of Taiwan's democracy (for a similar recent assessment see Templeman, 2022).In contrast, Hong Kong under the PRC's dominance can no longer be considered to be an 'electoral democracy' and has ceased to be an independent regime type.Singapore has maintained its hybrid status of electoral autocracy with satisfactory governance and economic performance.Some 'softening' of the authoritarian aspects could be observed.The PRC, in spite of strong economic but weaker governance scores, has become even more repressive recently.The 'Zero-Covid' policy had further aggravated the situation.Under Xi's highly personalized and centralized leadership without time limits this regime has become less attractive elsewhere and possibly, in the longer run, even in China itself.It clearly shows totalitarian features (Brown, 2022;Cai, 2022).
All this is happening in an increasingly tense international context.The annexation of the Crimea peninsula in 2014 and, since 24 February 2022, the military attack on Ukraine by Putin's Russia have led to a new worldwide confrontation.Some observers regard this as a new 'Cold (and potentially hot) War' between liberal democracies with the US and the EU as major players on the one hand and authoritarian regimes led by Putin's Russia and Xi's China on the other.Allison (2015), for example, compares the situation with the conflict in ancient Greece have developed a theory of human development associated with emancipative values.They claim that value change is a crucial factor driving democratization.The rise of emancipative value orientations proceeds by a displacement of older generations with traditional values by younger ones in which emancipative values are prevalent.Welzel (2013) constructed two indices, the Index of Emancipative Values and the index of Secular-Rational Values vs. Traditional Values.Both groups of values are supposedly conducive to democracy.The following aspects are most pertinent for our cases.

a
Question: 'For each of the following, indicate how important it is for your life'.Four-point scale, rescaled to 0-4.Included in waves 2-7.b Question: 'I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups'.Four-point scale, rescaled to 0-1.Included in waves 5-7.c Question: 'One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud'.Four-point scale, rescaled to 0-1.Included in waves 3-7.d Question: 'With which of these two statements do you tend to agree?A.Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them.B. One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes'.Included in waves 1-4 only.

Figure 1 .
Figure 1.Secular orientation.The index of secular orientation is the mean of several items: importance of religion in life (four-point scale), whether respondents consider themselves religious (three-point scale), frequency of church attendance (eight-point scale), rescaled into range 0-1, with higher values indicating a secular orientation.Included in waves 1-7.

Figure 5 .
Figure 5. Support for democracy by country and wave.

Table 2 .
Importance of family ties and family values (percentages).
b Mean score for 'Most people can be trusted' vs. 'Need to be very careful' (0 and 1) and 'Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?',10-point scale, rescaled to 0-1.Second question not included in wave 7. c Mean score for trust in 'People you meet for the first time', 'People of another religion' and 'People of another nationality'; four-point scale, rescaled to 0-1, Included in waves 5-7.Calculated if all three had valid scores.d Mean of all three indices: the first item was weighted with 1, the second with 2 and the third with 3 (Welzel 2013, online appendix, pp.62-63).

Table 5 .
Multiple least squares regression: determinants of support for democracy.

Table 7 .
Quality of democracy.

Table 9 .
Human Development Index (HDI).Since Taiwan is not a member of the UN, it is not included in official UN statistics.The data here are provided by National Statistics Office, Republic of China.These data are less complete, and some years differ.
a b