Problem-Oriented Policing and Open-Air Drug Markets: Examining the Rockford Pulling Levers Deterrence Strategy
Abstract
Problem-oriented policing strategies have been regarded as promising approaches for disrupting open-air drug markets in vulnerable communities. Pulling levers deterrence interventions, which are consistent with the problem-oriented framework, have shown potential as an effective mechanism for reducing and preventing youth, gun, and gang violence. This study examines the effect of a strategic, pulling levers intervention that was implemented by law enforcement officials in Rockford, Illinois, to address drug markets in a high crime neighborhood. The initiative builds on a similar effort developed in High Point, North Carolina, and represents an extension of pulling levers that was originally developed in Boston. The impact evaluation uses a mixed method of quantitative hierarchical growth curve models and qualitative interviews with residents. Study findings suggest that the Rockford strategy was associated with a statistically significant and substantive reduction in crime, drug, and nuisance offenses in the target neighborhood. Results from this examination have implications for both research and public policy.
Since the mid-1980s, a number of criminal justice interventions have been introduced in response to a surge in drug-related offenses (Mazerolle, Soole, & Rombouts, 2006, 2007). There is considerable variation in law enforcement approaches (Weisburd & Eck, 2004), however, and this extends to strategies that target drug markets and related offending. Problem-oriented policing initiatives are directed at specific issues and rely on a host of proactive tactics in an effort to address the underlying causes of crime in varying community contexts (see Goldstein, 1990). This study evaluates a problem-oriented policing strategy used by the Rockford Police Department (RPD) to combat open-air drug markets and related offending in a high-crime neighborhood.
Drug Law Enforcement Strategies
An abundant body of research exists with regard to policing strategies designed to disrupt the flow of illegal drugs in open-air markets. Mazerolle et al. (2007) found that interventions aimed at reducing narcotic activity offer promise in terms of effect. Often-used aggressive policing tactics that rely extensively on crackdowns (e.g., arrests, sweeps, and saturation) in high crime neighborhoods have produced mixed results, however (Bynum & Worden, 1996; Wood et al., 2004). Prior investigations consistently indicate that, at best, crackdowns have a short-term effect (Best, Strang, Beswick, & Gossip, 2001; Smith, Davis, Hillenbrand, & Goresky, 1992; Smith, 2001). Thus, successful interventions directed at drug offenders in high crime communities require more than identification and arrests.
The literature indicates that the most successful drug market interventions have relied on problem-oriented policing approaches, which involve a variety of tactics designed to tackle problems in specific contexts (e.g., supply-side reductions, improving police-community relations, and nuisance abatement efforts). The use of these strategies has yielded reductions in crime and problem behaviors associated with drug markets in Chicago, Illinois (Coldren & Higgins, 2003), Jersey City, New Jersey (Mazerolle, Ready, Terrill, & Waring, 2000; Weisburd & Green, 1995), Oakland, California (Green, 1995; Mazerolle, Price, & Roehl, 2000; Mazerolle & Ransley, 2006), and San Diego, California (Clarke & Bichler-Robertson, 1998; Eck & Wartell, 1998).
A meta-analysis of drug law enforcement evaluations conducted by Mazerolle et al. (2006) concluded that problem-oriented policing tactics appear to be the most effective approach when dealing with drug crime, incivilities, and overall offenses than were community-wide policing, hot spots policing, and standard (i.e., unfocused or reactive) policing.1 Similarly, recent research relying on simulation techniques comparing the experimental conditions of random patrol, hot spots policing, and problem-oriented policing found that the latter approach was the optimal strategy for disrupting street-level drug markets, reducing crime, and minimizing harm, regardless of the drug being trafficked (Dray, Mazerolle, Perez, & Ritter, 2008).
Although problem-oriented policing tactics seem to hold promise for minimizing criminal offenses associated with drug markets, few studies have specifically examined the utility of the “pulling levers” problem-oriented approach (see Kennedy, 1997) in an open-air drug market setting. To date, a majority of pulling levers strategies has focused on reducing violence and gang-related crime. The pulling levers intervention appears adaptable in terms of affecting youth, gang, and gun crime in a number of large U.S. cities; thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize that pulling levers can also be used as an approach to reduce nongang-related drug crime.
Pulling Levers: Combining Focused Deterrence and Social Support
Problem-oriented policing strategies have also been suggested as effective tools for preventing violence, in particular when targeted at gang-involved offenders (Decker, 2003). In response to the huge increase in firearms violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Blumstein & Rosenfeld, 1998), a large number of criminal justice agencies began experimenting with focused deterrence strategies often referred to as “pulling levers” (Braga, Kennedy, & Tita, 2002; Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001; McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson, & Corsaro, 2006; Weisburd & Braga, 2006). The multistage approach consists of diagnosing a specific crime problem, convening an interagency working group of criminal justice personnel, conducting research to identify patterns of chronic offenders and criminal networks, framing a specific response to law violators that uses a variety of sanctions as a coercive approach to stop continuing illegal behavior, providing social services and community resources to targeted offenders, and directly and repeatedly communicating with offenders so that they understand why they are receiving special attention (Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, Bond, & Cronin, 2008; Kennedy, 1997, 2006).
The first pulling levers intervention was implemented in Boston and has since been recognized as an effective strategy for reducing violence, firearm offenses, and youth homicide (Braga et al., 2001). For example, pulling levers has been replicated, with promising results, in other U.S. cities including Baltimore, Maryland (Braga et al., 2002), Cincinnati, Ohio (Engel, Baker, Tillyer, Eck, & Dunham, 2008), Chicago, Illinois (Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2007), High Point, North Carolina (Coleman, Holton, Olson, Robinson, & Stewart, 1999), Indianapolis, Indiana (McGarrell et al., 2006), Los Angeles, California (Tita, Riley, Ridgeway, Grammich, Abrahamse, & Greenwood, 2003), Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al., 2008), Minneapolis, Minnesota (Kennedy & Braga, 1998), and Stockton, California (Braga, 2008; Wakeling, 2003). At the national level, Dalton (2002) described how the pulling levers framework has been applied in a large number of U.S. cities and federal districts through the Strategic Alternatives to Community Safety Initiative and Project Safe Neighborhoods.
Summary and Research Implications
Although the promise of problem-oriented policing strategies has been well-documented as a successful law enforcement approach to combat illegal-drug markets (Mazerolle et al., 2006, 2007), and pulling levers deterrence initiatives have been regarded as promising problem-oriented policing strategies to reduce gang violence (Braga et al., 2008; Decker, 2003), very little research exists examining the capacity of pulling levers to combat open-air drug markets that are not directly driven by violent gang members. The first law enforcement agency to use pulling levers in response to persistent street-level drug markets, beyond those driven by gang members, was the High Point Police Department in North Carolina (Frabutt, Gathings, Hunt, & Loggins, 2006). Information about the High Point campaign gained the attention of RPD administrators. Further, officers from Rockford traveled to High Point to get a better understanding of the specific processes that were necessary for replication.
The purpose of this article is to assess the utility of pulling levers as an effective response to open-air drug markets in a distressed Rockford, Illinois, neighborhood. This study contributes to the drug law enforcement literature and pulling levers research by examining the utility of pulling levers as a specific response to drug sellers in drug hot spots. Although pulling levers has largely been implemented and evaluated on its ability to reduce firearms and violence, its usefulness beyond these contexts is unknown. Our results provide insight into whether the pulling levers campaign holds promise as a viable strategy for combating open-air drug markets.
Method and Study Setting
We employed multiple data collection and analysis methods in this study. Specifically, we used narratives and observational data with criminal justice officials to measure program implementation, RPD crime statistics to measure programmatic impact, and in-depth interviews with residents from Delancey Heights (the target neighborhood) to triangulate both process and impact data.2
Activity (i.e., process) data were collected through narratives, interviews, and observations with law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and social service providers in an effort to capture detailed information on program implementation. Specifically, we examined the extent to which the Rockford initiative adhered to the tenets of the pulling levers theoretical framework (see Braga et al., 2001; Kennedy, 1997).
Offense (i.e., impact) data include all crimes reported over a 2-year period, which were aggregated into a monthly format from June 2006 through June 2008. Crime data in Rockford are submitted and conform to the National Incident-Based Reporting System maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and offer distinct advantages for both policy analysis and criminal justice research, at least compared with data submitted to the traditional Uniform Crime Report system (Maxfield, 1999). Crime data were operationalized as composite measures of violent and nonviolent offenses that occurred from the first through the last day of each month. Offense data from RPD are more reliable than conventional calls for service data because immediately following their investigations, officers enter detailed information concerning incidents into a computer system mounted in their patrol cars, allowing for improved cross-validation. In addition to employing pre- and postintervention analyses in Delancey Heights using growth curve models, we also modeled changes in citywide offense trends once the target area was subtracted from the city total for general trend and comparison purposes.
We used qualitative, in-depth interviews with 34 adults in Delancey Heights to complement the narrative, observational, and quantitative data. The interviews lasted approximately 40 minutes to 1 hour. Participation in the study was voluntary and participants were paid $25 and promised strict confidentiality. The in-depth interviews were semistructured and consisted of open-ended questions intended to elicit detailed information about participants’ perceptions of and experiences with crime and disorder in Delancey Heights (prior to and following the initiative).3 The interviews were not audiotaped. Members of the research team, however, meticulously recorded responses by hand. Furthermore, painstaking attention was paid to accurately capture study participants’ statements verbatim. We analyzed the data through numerous readings of participants’ accounts and were careful that the concepts developed and themes that emerged illustrated the most common (and salient) patterns of residents’ descriptions in the target neighborhood. This was accomplished using grounded theory methods involving searches for and highlighting of deviant cases (Strauss, 1987). Finally, we attempted to strengthen the reliability of the data by asking participants about their perceptions and encounters multiple times during the interview.
To place the present pulling levers intervention strategy into context, we provide descriptive information for both Delancey Heights and the city of Rockford. Table 1 displays key demographic characteristics of residents and households in the target community as well as the overall city. Descriptive indicators of neighborhood context include the total population, percent male, percent White, median home income, average educational attainment of inhabitants, and measures of residential stability. These data, taken from the 2000 U.S. Census, were aggregated from block groups in the target neighborhood and the overall city. Delancey Heights accounts for roughly 1.7% of the Rockford population and is generally one of the more distressed neighborhoods within the city.
| Census Measure | Target Neighborhood | Overall City of Rockford |
|---|---|---|
| Percent male | 47.0% | 48.2% |
| Percent White | 46.0% | 72.8% |
| High school graduates (25 years and older) | 33.3% | 77.8% |
| Renter occupied units | 84.4% | 38.9% |
| Median income | $13,284 | $37,667 |
| Population (2000) | 2,681 inhabitants | 150,115 inhabitants |
Variables
Table 2 displays the offense data that were aggregated to create measures of violent and nonviolent outcome variables. In terms of the violent crime variable, nine offenses were selected to create an overall index measure. Violent offenses were aggregated from homicides (< 1%), rapes (1.5%), kidnappings (< 1%), robberies (11%), and simple and aggravated assaults (86.6%), which made up the majority of violent crimes. Similarly, nine crimes comprised the nonviolent offenses measure, which was a composite of drug-related incidents, nuisance crimes (including prostitution and vagrancy), and property offenses. Nonviolent offenses included 63.1% property damage, 15.9% drug and drug equipment violations, and 21% of nuisance crimes (including prostitution, curfew violations, vagrancy, and disorderly conduct). Identical selection criteria were employed for both the target neighborhood and citywide offense variables.
| Violent Offenses (offenses against persons) | Nonviolent Offenses (nuisance, drug, and property offenses) |
|---|---|
| Murder | Stolen property |
| Nonnegligent manslaughter | Destruction of property |
| Rape | Vandalism |
| Kidnapping | Drug/narcotic violations |
| Abduction | Drug equipment violations |
| Unlawful restraint | Prostitution |
| Robbery | Violation of curfew |
| Aggravated assault | Vagrancy and loitering |
| Simple assault | Disorderly conduct |
The intervention variable, seen in Table 3, captures the pulling levers intervention. In Delancey Heights, treatment was measured as a dichotomous variable (0 = pre-May 2007, 1 = May 2007 and beyond). Specifically, May 2007 was treated as the postintervention date because it was during this month that RPD (a) arrested a number of violent offenders who were involved in open-air drug trafficking, (b) conducted the pulling levers notification meeting bringing together community leaders and key criminal justice officials to speak with nonviolent drug sellers, and (c) worked with community development officers to improve neighborhood conditions by issuing citations for a wide range of code violations. In all, these efforts resulted in 11 months of preintervention and 14 months of postintervention data for the target neighborhood. In the next section, we describe process and impact results of the pulling levers intervention employed by Rockford officials in Delancey Heights.
| Variable | N | M | SD | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violent offenses | 50 | 299.5 | 298.5 | 10 | 700 |
| Nonviolent offenses | 50 | 482.4 | 475.2 | 9 | 1225 |
| Intervention measure | 50 | 0.28 | 0.453 | 0 | 1 |
| Target neighborhood | 50 | 0.50 | 0.707 | 0 | 1 |
Results
Implementation and Process Assessment
The Rockford pulling levers intervention strategy generally followed the High Point Drug Market initiative (Frabutt et al., 2006) and involved the following three stages: (a) identification, (b) notification, and (c) resource delivery. The identification stage was a data-driven procedural analysis used by RPD to determine the appropriate neighborhood and individuals for the intervention (see Klofas et al., 2006). The notification stage consisted of a two-part process: (1) a targeted investigation that lasted several months and led to the arrest and focused prosecution of seven chronic, violent offenders in Delancey Heights; and (2) a targeted investigation and publicly delivered message of zero-tolerance to five suspected dealers who were given an opportunity to participate in a “last chance” program that afforded them access to a variety of social support services (i.e., a pulling levers notification) because of their limited and nonviolent criminal histories. The resource delivery stage provided these five offenders with positive support mechanisms that were specific to each person’s situation—a critical component of the mixed deterrence and social support strategy (Cullen, 1994; Tyler, 1990). In addition, RPD and cooperating agencies worked extensively to improve the quality of life for residents in the target area through order maintenance policing efforts. Thus, the stages of the Rockford strategy were consistent with the pulling levers framework (Kennedy, 1997).4 A detailed summary of the action plan and the pulling levers process component is displayed in Appendix A.
Impact and Outcome Assessment
The ultimate goal of the Rockford pulling levers strategy implemented in Delancey Heights was to reduce criminal offending, interrupt open-air drug markets, and make the once high crime community more inhabitable. The purpose of the following analyses is to assess the impact of the initiative by examining whether changes in crime patterns occurred after implementation.
As an initial step, percentage differences were examined with regard to the changes in violent and nonviolent offenses for the target neighborhood, the remainder of Rockford, and the overall city both before and after the intervention. Because the number of pre- and postintervention periods is not equivalent, the average percentage change in the number of offenses per month across the city is displayed below. Table 4 shows that the target neighborhood experienced an average decline of 24.10% in nonviolent and a 14.29% reduction in violent incidents between the pre- and postintervention periods. Comparatively, from a general trend perspective, the remainder of the city also experienced a decline in both nonviolent (–9%) and violent crime (–2.3%). Ultimately, a decline in both violent and nonviolent offenses occurred in the city of Rockford before and after May 2007. It is also apparent that the decline throughout the remainder of the city was not as extensive (in terms of magnitude for either offense type) and that the decline in both violent and nonviolent crime for the entire city was influenced by specific declines in the target neighborhood.
| Location | Number of Offenses per Month (preintervention) | Number of Offenses per Month (postintervention) | Percentage Δ |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target neighborhood | |||
| Nonviolent | 29 | 22 | −24.10 |
| Violent | 21 | 18 | −14.29 |
| Remainder of city | |||
| Nonviolent | 944 | 859 | −9.00 |
| Violent | 567 | 554 | −2.29 |
| Overall city | |||
| Nonviolent | 1013 | 881 | −13.03 |
| Violent | 588 | 573 | −2.55 |
Growth Curve Estimates
The empirical models presented here examine repeated crime data in a monthly format from June 1, 2006, to June 30, 2008, in the target neighborhood and the remainder of Rockford. The use of a mixed model is appropriate for the current data and is well suited to the specific research questions here because the stochastic process in a hierarchical model can be specified using repeated observations nested within a neighborhood or city (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Specifically, simple linear models as well as maximum likelihood count regressions assume mutual dependence in the error estimates. In time-series data, the observations at adjacent points in time are highly intercorrelated, or autocorrelated, and thus, the Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM) framework is appropriate for this analysis.
HGLM is used to assess within-neighborhood changes in both violent and nonviolent crime from June 2006 to June 2008 by relying on a Poisson sampling model with a correction for overdispersion and the neighborhood population as the exposure variable. In this case, the monthly offense counts were treated as repeated measures nested within the target neighborhood at Level 1. Including the population as the exposure variable means that the dependent variable is interpreted as a crime rate outcome for both violent and nonviolent crime (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In addition, the intervention measure was group-centered to create a unique intercept and slope for the target neighborhood. Group centering a time-varying covariate at Level 1 provides an unbiased estimate of the change effect between the independent variable (X) and violent crime within the neighborhood, which is the focus of this study (see Xie & McDowall, 2008).
The unconditional random effects baseline models for both violent and nonviolent incidents indicated significant variation in crime trends within the target neighborhood as well as the remainder of Rockford (p < .01 for both sets of models). Table 5 displays the conditional models where the intervention variable was included as a Level 1 covariate.5 The intervention measure captures the specific change in the target neighborhood to assess whether there was significant within-neighborhood variation in local offenses after the pulling levers intervention. Because the remainder of the city did not receive the intervention, the measure is always a zero, thus isolating the estimate of the intervention effect to the target neighborhood. Nonviolent crime in Delancey Heights reduced by roughly 22.2% (per 1,000 residents) following the May 2007 pulling levers intervention, and the decline was statistically significant (p < .05).6 Although violent crime also reduced in the target community following the intervention (–8.7%), the decline was not statistically significant (p = .33).
| Nonviolent Offenses | Violent Offenses | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variable | Coefficient | SE | Coefficient | SE |
| Level 1 only models | ||||
| Intercept (β00) | .078** | .000 | .055** | .003 |
| Intervention (β10) | −.250* | .120 | −.090 | .090 |
| Multilevel models | ||||
| Intercept (β00) | .078** | .000 | .055** | .003 |
| Intervention (β10) | −.010* | .000 | −.000 | .000 |
| Target (β11) | −.020† | .011 | −.000 | .000 |
†
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
We next examined whether the changes in both violent and nonviolent offenses experienced in Delancey Heights were significantly different (i.e., above and beyond) from crime changes in the remainder of the city over the same period. The application of multilevel models is useful in this instance because estimates obtained from Level 2 variables indicate differences across (i.e., between) the units at Level 1. In this case, we used the same intervention variable for both the target neighborhood and the remainder of the city (0 = pre-May 2007 intervention, 1 = May 2007 and beyond) to create a viable comparison. Target designation, a Level 2 measure, distinguished the Delancey Heights neighborhood from the remainder of the city (0 = remainder of the city, 1 = target neighborhood). The slope of the intervention measure at Level 1 was thus modeled as a function of the target designation at Level 2 (i.e., a cross-level interaction effect). The results indicated that nonviolent crimes in the target neighborhood reduced at a marginally significantly greater rate (p = .07) than nonviolent offenses in the remainder of the city following the May 2007 pulling levers intervention. Violent crime in the target area also declined at a greater rate when compared with the remainder of the city, but the difference was not statistically significant (p = .41). Both sets of HGLM models yield similar and consistent results: Nonviolent incidents in the target neighborhood experienced a significant decline after the implementation of pulling levers, whereas violent incidents also declined but not to the level of statistical significance.
To visually display the results seen in the HGLM estimates, nonviolent crime trends were standardized (per 1,000 residents) for the target neighborhood and the remaining city (please see Figure 1). The target area experienced a decline from 10.8 nonviolent offenses per 1,000 residents before to 8.3 nonviolent offenses after pulling levers was implemented in May 2007. Comparatively, the remainder of Rockford experienced a reduction from 6.8 nonviolent offenses to 5.9 nonviolent offenses per 1,000 residents over this same period. Figure 1 also indicates that the decreases in the nonviolent offenses within the target area occurred a few months after the intervention and have since remained relatively proximate to nonviolent offense rates seen in the remainder of the city. Thus, an observed lag in the reduction of nonviolent offenses and the observed statistical effect occurred after the early summer months following program implementation. Although this lag was included in the parameter estimates in the growth curve models, it was not specifically isolated using this approach. Although not displayed here, we also used the Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) identification procedure to identify and isolate the lag effect, which was statistically significant (p < .01).7 Data obtained from interviews with residents cross-validated the lag-effect finding, which we note in the next section.
Resident Interviews
The majority of study participants report being very pleased with the RPD intervention and tout it as an innovative crime-reduction strategy. For example, several participants noted that they have seen reductions in crime and incivilities in Delancey Heights following the intervention. For instance, Ted remarked, “Now the people who walk down the street aren’t outsiders trafficking drugs. Now [when you see people outside] it’s residents from this community. Outsiders don’t come in and cause problems anymore, at least not as much as they did before.” Similarly, James stated, “We used to have ‘trash pickup’ days every couple of months to make the neighborhood look good. We’ve had to cancel several of those because we just don’t have the amount of trash in this neighborhood as we used to. And that’s a good thing.” And finally, Mary explained,
I wouldn’t say it’s one hundred percent better, but it’s a heck of a lot better. There are a lot less dealers, hookers, and noise around here than there used to be. It’s been a long time since we have seen something bad happen, like a shooting. The big difference around here is at night; it’s just a lot more peaceful at night now.
These statements highlight that residents in Delancey Heights have noticed a tangible change with regard to drug dealing, crime, nuisance offenses, litter, and incivilities in the neighborhood.
In terms of specifying when the positive changes occurred, a majority of Delancey Heights residents identified the period when RPD publicly announced its intervention efforts. Furthermore, study participants consistently attributed the observed crime reduction in their neighborhood to increased police presence and shorter response times. This perception was consistent among both heavily involved and disengaged neighborhood residents. For example, William, who attended the pulling levers community notification, noted,
It took several months after the call-in before we saw real impact. There were some remaining drug dealers in the neighborhood that refused to leave because this was their turf and they were going to stay. Police were able to eventually drive them out, but it took a few months.
Similarly, Carla, a resident who was uninvolved in the pulling levers call-in, remarked,
Things changed for the better when police got the dealers out of here. Really, when police boarded up [an abandoned building], locked the gates to it, and put up a camera, things got a lot better around then; maybe a little after that. After the dealers couldn’t find anywhere else to go, this place has just been a lot better.
It is also important to note that as time has elapsed since the intervention, a number of participants expressed dissatisfaction with what they considered poor police response times. They were especially troubled because according to them, they enjoyed appreciably quicker response times during the earliest period of the intervention. And in their view, the police department no longer showed the same level of commitment to Delancey Heights. Jason’s comment illustrates this point. He reported, “There’s a perception among residents in this neighborhood that police [no longer] make us a priority when we call. We’d like to know why this is, especially since problems in this neighborhood used to be a priority.” Likewise, Jan said, “Police response takes longer now than it used to. For a long time, police were always here and were so quick to respond to our calls. Now they seem to care less about what goes on here than they used to and that is something they should address.” There were other underlying issues and concerns that the interviews seemed to uncover.
Although participants remarked that the most blatant forms of open-air drug dealing had dissipated, they noted that many remaining dealers had simply adapted to enforcement efforts and now sold drugs more covertly (i.e., inside cars and residences rather than on the street). Sheila commented, “We have less dealers than we used to, but the ones we still have are also different. They don’t sell out on the street anymore but rather in their cars. Now they have to be sneaky about it.” In agreement, Kendall noted,
I think the dealers that have been able to avoid getting caught try hard not to bring too much attention to themselves. People who used to sell drugs here sold to outsiders who were coming in, bringing attention to themselves. We don’t have those types of dealers anymore, out in the street.
And finally, Kim advised, “I know there are still people here who deal. But it’s not ‘in and out’ anymore. People who are selling drugs now are doing it out of their homes or in their cars. It’s not gone, but it’s much more out-of-sight.”
Although study participants were consistent in the belief that drug crime and related offenses in Delancey Heights had indeed subsided, they desired a continued commitment from RPD to the area.
Discussion
Results from the HGLM growth curve models indicate that Delancey Heights experienced a statistically significant, substantive, and noticeable reduction in property, drug, and nuisance offenses after pulling levers was implemented. This is important given the relationship between these specific types of behaviors and open-air drug markets documented in prior research (Pettiway, 1995; Rengert & Wasilchick, 1989). Comparative statistical analyses reveal that the greater city did not experience a similar effect with regard to changes in crime rates over the same period. Interviews with residents demonstrated that they observed an appreciable transformation in the neighborhood shortly after RPD introduced proactive, strategic, and focused approaches to interrupt the open-air markets that had once flourished in the community. Regardless of their level of involvement with and knowledge of the intervention strategy, the majority of study participants agreed that crime and disorder in Delancey Heights had dropped precipitously as a result of the multiagency crime-control effort.
In sum, our findings consistent with previous studies, which indicate that strategies relying on both proactive and reactive policing tactics appear to be extremely promising for reducing drug and related crime (Mazerolle et al., 2006, 2007; Weisburd & Green, 1995). It is important that RPD and other public officials sought to strengthen informal social control in Delancey Heights throughout the initiative by involving residents in various stages of the intervention process (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Interviews with residents, and in particular with those who were engaged in the pulling levers notification meeting, indicated a heightened sense of awareness and responsibility in terms of cooperating with police to regulate neighborhood behaviors.
In terms of sustainability, once drug, nuisance, and property offense rates declined in the target neighborhood, they remained consistent with those experienced by the remainder of the city. It is not surprising that RPD officials have since implemented additional proactive law enforcement and pulling levers strategies in other high crime, Rockford communities in an effort to replicate the effect seen in Delancey Heights. Resident interviews indicated that many citizens in the target area believed that RPD was not prioritizing Delancey Heights as it did when intervention dosage was highest (i.e., during the implementation of strategies), despite the apparent and sustained effect. In fact, residents feared that RPD had shifted its attention and resources to other problem neighborhoods. As Tyler and Folger (1980) observed, citizens’ perceptions of procedural fairness from a criminal justice perspective are directly related to issues such as police response time, regardless of whether quicker responses by law enforcement would actually solve their specific problems. Given that prior research indicates that crime victims want compassion, concern, and sensitivity from law enforcement personnel (see Mawby & Walklate, 1994), it should come as no surprise that residents who greatly appreciate the benefits of enhanced policing strategies (i.e., quicker response times, greater police presence, etc.) struggle with a perceived withdrawal or reduction of those resources once crime rates subside. Further research should be invested in effective “weaning” strategies focused on neighborhood residents’ perceptual vantage points as well as on crime rates.
It is interesting that although violent crime in the target area declined following the intervention, it did not reduce at a statistically significant level. A likely explanation is the lack of statistical power given that violent offenses were relatively infrequent in Delancey Heights. As mentioned previously, more than 86% of the violent offenses were classified as assaults. A more detailed analysis should attempt to delineate those physical attacks that were drug market related, such as retaliatory violence as a means of debt collection (see Anderson, 1999) or assaults that occurred in public, in an effort to better understand this phenomenon. It is unfortunate that our data do not allow for a more in-depth investigation of these events. The fact that only nonviolent offenders were included in the pulling levers program also has implications for the lack of a significant violent crime reduction. It is difficult to assess the generalizability concerning the lack of an observed violent crime reduction that has been seen in other pulling levers strategies because the Delancey Heights neighborhood had such a small number of robberies and homicides, which have been the major focus of pulling levers research to this point (Piquero, 2005).
On a related note, the observed gradual or lagged effect on nonviolent crime rates in the Rockford strategy also differs from those seen in prior research. Specifically, some of the initial pulling levers initiatives had an immediate effect, which was seen in Boston, Massachusetts (Piehl, Cooper, Braga, & Kennedy, 2004), Indianapolis, Indiana (Corsaro & McGarrell, 2009), Minneapolis, Minnesota (Kennedy & Braga, 1998), and other sites. Whereas the immediate or “light-switch” effect (see Kennedy, 2006, p. 158) of pulling levers is consistently observed where reducing youth, gang, and gun crime is the target of the strategy, much less is known about how much time should be expected until an effect is observed in an open-air drug market setting. Rather than having an immediate and abrupt effect when dealing with gang offenders, the pulling levers intervention strategy may serve more as a catalyst for change (requiring more lag time before an effect is observed) when directed at open-air drug market offenders. Further research that examines pulling levers in different contexts is vital to our obtaining a better understanding of its utility.
There are a number of limitations to this study that we mention with the hope of informing further research on this topic. First, the pulling levers intervention assessment here is not isolated from the combination of reactive, directed, and proactive/partnership strategies that have been established as successful interventions, which are outlined in Mazerolle et al.’s (2007) systematic review of drug enforcement strategies. In essence, the Rockford intervention could be referred to as “pulling-levers plus” because there were supplemental strategies associated with the antidrug, law enforcement tactics. The effect of a pulling levers intervention strategy without the nuisance abatement and civil remedy approaches that were also included in the Rockford initiative would be extremely beneficial to this line of inquiry. It is certainly plausible that the correlation between the reduction in nonviolent crime in the target neighborhood and the implementation of the pulling levers strategy could be heavily influenced and confounded by the nuisance abatement programs implemented in Rockford. Future studies that examine pulling levers would benefit from a more singularly focused strategy to address this issue.
Whereas the statistical techniques and in particular the HGLM estimates were appropriate for the data used here, Bushway and McDowall (2006) contend that the use of ARIMA time-series analysis is perhaps the most rigorous criminal justice evaluation approach to assess program impact. The data available equate to 25 observation periods for the target area and the overall city, which is roughly half of the recommended number of observations needed to obtain reliable ARIMA estimates (Box & Jenkins, 1976). Despite the low number of observations, we were able to fit zero-order, permanent transfer function ARIMA models8 for the nonviolent and violent offenses in the target area that met all of the assumptions of time-series analysis.9 The time-series results were very consistent with those presented in the Results section above, which indicated a statistically significant reduction in nonviolent offenses (p < .05) and a reduction in violent offenses that was statistically insignificant. In addition, the quantitative data used here do not allow us to examine long-term impact change as well as local displacement or diffusion of benefits in contiguous areas (see Green, 1995).
The use of more rigorous, time consuming, and expensive drug offender identification methods would also strengthen research in this area. For example, Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst (2006) used needle exchange survey data and extensive ethnographic research methods to uncover discrepancies between official arrest data and the dark figure of crime associated with drug use in open-air drug markets. Future drug market intervention research would benefit greatly from approaches such as those used by Beckett and colleagues, especially if collected throughout the duration of program implementation. In addition, although the use of a baseline comparison of the remainder of Rockford helps reduce the concern that crime in Delancey Heights simply went through a natural reduction (i.e., regression to the mean), a more appropriate methodology would be to use comparisons between multiple neighborhoods that were consistent in terms of size, social structure, and crime rates. Officials in RPD maintained that the target area was unique from all other communities within the city and, thus, a quasi-experimental analysis of within-city neighborhoods would be somewhat unreliable. Future studies should draw from the use of more powerful analytical methodologies including the application of a quasi-experimental or experimental design to assess the effect of the localized intervention (Cook & Campbell, 1979).
Summary
The statistically significant reduction in nonviolent offenses that occurred after pulling levers was implemented in Delancey Heights suggests that the extension of the initiative to drug markets holds promise. On the other hand, the lack of a statistically significant reduction in violent offenses requires further exploration. To this point, most of the research on pulling levers has focused on reducing youth, gun, and gang violence. These prior studies have consistently indicated a reduction in violent offenses driven by changes in gang-related activity. This study builds on prior problem-oriented policing research and suggests that the use of pulling levers, at least in combination with other drug law enforcement strategies, is not limited to affecting youth violence and gang-related offenses but also can be adapted to nuisance, drug, and property crimes. Future studies are needed to assess the capacity of pulling levers both independent of and in addition to other drug law enforcement strategies for eliminating drug markets in crime-ridden communities. The results of the Rockford initiative highlight the utility of such an approach.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Chief Chet Epperson, Chief Michael Booker, Sergeant Marc Welsh, Roger Ratze, Kimberly Binder, Becky Bartkowicz, and the citizens of Rockford for their contributions to the initiative in addition to their assistance with the authors’ evaluation efforts.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article: This project was supported by Grant No. 2008-DD-BX-0338 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the authors and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Footnotes
1. Community-wide policing focused on drug law enforcement efforts at a broader level than drug hot spots, whereas hot spots policing relied on more traditional methods (i.e., saturation, crackdowns, street sweeps) employed at drug hot spots (see Mazerolle, Soole, & Rombouts, 2006).
2. Pseudonyms are used throughout the article, both for the study neighborhood and for participants.
3. Our interview strategy involved a two-stage approach. First, we interviewed a subsample of participants following a local community policing meeting to capture “engaged citizens’” views. Second, we also interviewed “less than involved” neighborhood residents. Equal numbers of participants were drawn from each setting.
4. It is important to note that David Kennedy, considered the architect of the original pulling levers strategy in Boston, worked with RPD officials prior to program implementation to provide guidance concerning the specific tenets of the pulling levers framework.
5. None of the random effects variance components were statistically significant in the conditional models, and thus, all of the estimates were obtained from fixed-effects models (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
6. The decline of 22.2% was calculated by using exponentiation on the logged coefficient, (–.250) = –.778, and subtracting 1.0 to obtain the estimated change between pre- and postintervention.
7. We estimated the following Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average model in the identification stage, which was an appropriate statistical fit to the observed target neighborhood nonviolent crime data: 1(6), 0, 0. Akaike information criterion = 26.0. This indicated a statistically significant trend in the observed nonviolent offense data without the inclusion of the intervention estimate. Results are available upon request.
8. Both violent and nonviolent offenses fit the ARIMA (1, 0, 0) models.
9. Specifically, both of the estimated ARIMA models had mean and variance stationarity and no residuals were statistically significant at key-lags, indicating appropriate model fit.
Appendices
| Strategy | Description |
|---|---|
| Identification (February 2007) | Research analysts at RPD mapped index offenses, drug arrests, and drug complaints for the entire city. |
| Mobilization (March 2007) | Law enforcement officials determined that the Delancey Heights target neighborhood, consisting of two sub-beats, would be the ideal locale for the pulling levers intervention. |
| Intelligence Gathering (March 2007) | A narcotics unit officer at RPD supervised intelligence gathering on individuals who engaged in chronic drug dealing in the target neighborhood. |
| Incident Review (March 2007) | Narcotics detectives conducted a complete incident review of all known offending in the target area. All reports and contacts with police, including intelligence gathered from cooperating witnesses, were examined. Twelve persistent offenders were identified. |
| Undercover Investigation (March-April 2007) | Narcotics detectives made controlled buys from the twelve identified drug dealers over the course of eight weeks. Surveillance equipment was used to record the purchases. And, cooperating witnesses were recruited. |
| DMI Eligibility Meeting (April 2007) | A multi-agency committee reviewed the cases made against the twelve individuals and relied upon the suspects’ criminal histories (e.g., the number of violent offenses and the total number of offenses) to identify five dealers who would be eligible for the pulling levers meeting. |
| Notice to Residents (May 2007) | RPD notified residents at a local community meeting that an undercover investigation had been conducted over the past couple of months and that an immediate response was about to take place. |
| Sweep of Violent Offenders (May 2007) | Within 48 hours of the initial notification meeting, the seven violent offenders who were ineligible for the pulling levers strategy were subsequently arrested and received $500,000 bonds. |
| Contact With Eligible Offenders’ Families (May 2007) | RPD made phone calls, and relied upon a pastor at a local church, to notify offenders of the call-in by contacting their families. The police Chief also wrote a letter to each offender guaranteeing they would not be arrested at the meeting. RPD provided assistance for those out of town to ensure their attendance. |
| The Call-In (May 2007) | The offenders, their families, key criminal justice personnel, and community members attended the pulling levers meeting. First, residents spoke of the harm that drug dealing caused in their community. Next, offenders and their families received the deterrent message from multi-agency members that continued offending would not be tolerated. Finally, an immediate needs assessment was made by social support services, followed by a more detailed assessment in the following weeks. |
| Community Follow-Up (May 2007) | RPD and housing inspectors seized five housing complexes where prior drug offending had been prominent. Social service officials assisted in moving residents who did not previously engage in illegal drug distribution into new homes. Maintenance code citations (e.g., lawn, trash, and poor fencing) were written for violations throughout the neighborhood. A street-sweeper cleaned the streets to symbolize the change that was occurring. |
| Long-Term Follow-Up | RPD continues routine and saturated patrols in the neighborhood. Community source officers and community leaders maintain communication for up-to-date information on neighborhood issues. |
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Biographies
Nicholas Corsaro is an assistant professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University–Carbondale. Prior to joining SIUC, he completed his PhD at Michigan State University in 2007. Corsaro’s research interests include strategic approaches to reducing crime, environmental criminology, program evaluation, and quantitative statistical techniques. His recent articles appear in the Journal of Experimental Criminology, Victims and Offenders, and Justice Quarterly.
Rod K. Brunson is an associate professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University–Carbondale. His work appears in the British Journal of Criminology, Criminology, Criminology & Public Policy, Gender & Society, Justice Quarterly, Sociological Quarterly, Urban Affairs Review, and the Journal of Crime and Justice.
Edmund F. McGarrell is a professor and director of the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. His research interests are in communities and crime with particular emphasis on studying problem-solving responses to gun, gang, and drug market crime and violence. His recent articles appear in the Journal of Experimental Criminology, Justice Quarterly, Policing, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, and the Journal of Criminal Justice.
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